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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 26, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States
agreed to hear two cases — Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,1 and
Conestoga Wood Specialties v. Sebelius2 — challenging the validity of the
Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) mandate that employer-sponsored health plans
cover all FDA-approved contraceptives (the Contraceptive Mandate). In
each case, closely held plaintiff corporations contend that the Contraceptive
Mandate illegally infringes upon the corporation’s freedom to exercise
religion.
The cases attract attention because the Supreme Court agreed to hear
yet another challenge to the validity of the ACA’s provisions, but it has been
less noticed that both cases, and others like them, implicate a fundamental
question that the Supreme Court has never decided: on what basis, if any, is
a corporation a “person” entitled to assert the constitutional and statutory
rights of natural persons? Without denying the significance of the challenge
to the ACA’s Contraceptive Mandate, the Supreme Court’s failure to define
a principled corporate person theory has had — and continues to have —
far more important and pervasive implications for the American legal
system.
Typically, legal concepts creating and regulating societal rights and
obligations, like the corporate personhood concept, come into being
incrementally in an extended evolutionary process. That evolutionary process
is characterized by a dialectic give and take in which the principles justifying
— or precluding — application of a legal concept in a variety of different
factual scenarios are gradually clarified, defined, and developed through a
series of judicial decisions. Familiarity with such precedents and with the
reasoning underlying the courts’ application of the concept allows courts,
lawyers, and policy-makers to assess whether proposed legislation or
regulatory changes are sufficiently analogous to prior precedents that the
legal viability of the proposal can be determined by reference to the
principles that courts previously have relied upon to determine the
applicability of the concept in other situations.
The problem confronting the Supreme Court as it takes up the Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga Wood cases is that the concept of corporate
personhood did not develop gradually or in an evolutionary process in
which the meaning of the concept was developed and refined. Instead, the
concept of the corporate person was imposed on the law ipse dixit, that is,
1. 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev’d and remanded for further
proceedings, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3139 (U.S. Nov. 26,
2013) (No. 13–354).
2. 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, aff’d, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W.
3139 (U.S. Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13–356).
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by judicial fiat and without definition, in a series of late nineteenth century
Supreme Court cases decisions. Those opinions all were written by Supreme
Court Justice Stephen J. Field, who, if not beholden to railroad interests, was
certainly a devoted friend of the railroads. Moreover, Field had no occasion
to explain the reasons that corporations possessed the rights of natural
persons because, in every one of those cases, the Supreme Court held that,
person or not, the corporations had no viable claim for relief.
As a result, the concept of the corporate person lacks a principled
definition and, therefore, seems to expand, or contract, depending on the
circumstances and on the personal predilections of the speaker. The
resultant confusion about the meaning of corporate personhood makes
application of the concept troublesome in any case, but it is particularly
problematic in the context of statutes, like the ACA, which attempt to
fundamentally change basic aspects of societal structure and, therefore,
implicate divisive questions — here, contraception and abortion —
grounded in deeply-held and profoundly personal beliefs. As Conestoga
Wood and Hobby Lobby illustrate, the undefined and ubiquitous corporate
person provides little guidance to those who must assess the legal viability of
statutes like the ACA and, equally problematic, results in polarization and
politicization of already difficult matters, thereby preventing or impeding
implementation of ground-breaking reforms, like the ACA.
Individuals concerned with health policy would be well-advised to follow
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood closely because the question whether
an entity — corporate or natural — is a “person” able to claim protected
legal rights cannot be easily cabined to corporations or to the ACA. It
happens that the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood are
corporations, but the next case to implicate the meaning of legal
“personhood” could just as easily involve a different type of entity. In
addition, legal principles are rarely confined to discrete pigeon holes.
Rather, the law seeks to identify unifying principles that can be applied in a
variety of analogous contexts. Thus, resolution of the legal issue in Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga Wood will not necessarily be limited to the meaning
of corporate personhood. The more fundamental question the cases raise is
what attributes entitle any entity — whether artificial or natural — to claim
the status of a legal person protected by the Constitution and statutes of the
United States.
The answer to that broader question, should the Supreme Court choose
to address it, has health policy and other implications well beyond the
Affordable Care Act. For example, the outcome of Roe v. Wade3 — which
held that women had a constitutionally protected right to abortion —turned

3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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to a significant extent on whether — or when — an embryo or fetus is a
legal person with a right to life which the state had a legitimate interest in
protecting. Thus, a ruling in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood
establishing a principled definition of legal personhood could either
reinforce, or undermine, the holding of cases such as Roe that turn, at least
in part, on whether an entity is a legal person.
The corporate person issue is central in both Conestoga Wood and
Hobby Lobby for two reasons: First, in each case, the plaintiffs’ alleged that
the Contraceptive Mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).4 RFRA provides that the “Government shall not substantially burden
a person’s exercise of religion.”5 Thus, unless a corporation is a person, the
statute provides no protection. Second, in each case, the plaintiffs also
alleged that the Contraceptive Mandate violated the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment to the Constitution. The First Amendment’s Free
Exercise Clause provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion].” The Free Exercise Clause clearly secures the
rights of natural persons, but the government argued that the Clause affords
no protection to for-profit corporate entities.
The Conestoga Wood and Hobby Lobby ACA challenges are paradigms
of the problems caused by the Supreme Court’s ad hoc approach to
corporate personhood. On virtually identical facts, the Third Circuit in
Conestoga Wood held that a for-profit corporation had no protected Free
Exercise rights, but the Tenth Circuit in Hobby Lobby held that such a
corporation was, indeed, a “person” with protected rights.6 Moreover, the
two courts were deeply divided on the most basic questions of the meaning
of corporate personhood; eleven sitting circuit judges produced a total of
eight separate opinions between them.
To be sure, the Supreme Court has on many occasions held that both
for-profit and non-profit corporations may, or may not, assert constitutional
and other rights, including rights protected by the First Amendment.7
Recently, for example, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission the
Supreme Court held that a for-profit corporation’s right to engage in
political speech is protected by the First Amendment.8 Yet, although
corporations have been treated as legal persons capable of exercising at

4. See Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 380; Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1125.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(a) (2012) [hereinafter RFRA] (emphasis added).
6. Compare Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 388, with Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1136.
7. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978)
(collecting cases).
8. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010).
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least some of the rights of natural persons since Colonial times,9 and
despite urban legends to the contrary,10 the Supreme Court has never
provided a generally applicable rationale that explains why, or when, a
corporation is allowed to assert the rights of a natural person. The absence
of a principled explanation for allowing corporations, at least in some
instances, to exercise the rights of natural persons has led to a web of
conflicting and confusing precedent in a plethora of constitutional and
statutory contexts and made application of corporate personhood appear
irrational, inconsistent, result-oriented and, to say the least, unpredictable.
The question whether a corporation is a “person” able to assert the
constitutional and statutory rights of natural persons11 — and, if so, the
basis on which it may do so — has been debated for over 150 years.12 That
debate has, at times, had aspects of a Civil War era melodrama. It has
featured contrived test cases, blatantly false evidence, a facetious Supreme
Court argument, the reappearance — and then re-disappearance — of the
supposedly secret Journal of the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
Supreme Court Reporter who knowingly, and falsely, stated in a headnote
that the existence of the constitutional corporate person had been decided,
and a Supreme Court Justice who used the false headnote and the
nineteenth century Court’s decision-making process to embed the corporate

9. See The Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. The Town of NewHaven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 481-82 (1823) (interpreting ‘person’ in the treaty ending the
Revolutionary War to include corporations); United States v. Amedy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 392,
412 (1826) (Story, J.) (interpreting ‘person’ in criminal statute to include corporations).
10. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780 n.15; id. at 822 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Donald J.
Smythe, The Rise of the Corporation, the Birth of Public Relations, and the Foundation of the
Modern Political Economy, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 635, 662 (2011).
11. See, e.g., Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
American Law, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (1987).
12. A list of the articles and books that have addressed the question would be
voluminous. No one, however, has explored the legal history in more depth and meticulous
detail, or with more insight, than Howard Jay Graham. See, e.g., Howard Jay Graham, The
Conspiracy Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment, Part One, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938)
[hereinafter Graham, Conspiracy Theory, Part One]; Howard Jay Graham, The Conspiracy
Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment, Part Two, 48 YALE L.J. 171 (1938) [hereinafter Graham,
Conspiracy Theory, Part Two]; Howard J. Graham, Justice Field and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 52 YALE L.J. 851 (1943) [hereinafter Graham, Justice Field]; Howard J. Graham,
An Innocent Abroad: The Constitutional Corporate Person, 2 UCLA L. REV. 155 (1955)
[hereinafter Graham, Innocent Abroad]; Howard J. Graham, Builded Better than They Knew,
17 U. PITT. L. REV. 537 (1956) [hereinafter Graham, Builded Better]; Howard Jay Graham, The
Waite Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 VAND. L. REV. 525 (1964) [hereafter Graham,
Waite Court]. Mr. Graham’s scholarship on the issue (including the articles cited above as well
as others) is collected in HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS
ON
THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE “CONSPIRACY THEORY” AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1968) [hereinafter GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION].
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person in constitutional law at virtually the same time that his brethren were
asserting that the issue remained undecided. All of this led to allegations by
respected New Deal and Progressive Age historians that Gilded Age robber
barons and their legislative henchmen had successfully conspired to secretly
insert protection for corporations into the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The confusion and uncertainty caused by the Supreme Court’s failure
was anticipated in the late nineteenth century when the Court first refused to
define the corporate person. Railroad corporations had structured a series
of test cases believing that the Supreme Court would be compelled to
determine the existence and meaning of corporate personhood. The
Supreme Court, however, declined to address the “grave questions of
constitutional law” whose “importance cannot well be over-estimated.”13
The Court refused to address the question despite one Justice’s warning
that: “The question is of transcendent importance, and it will come here [to
the Supreme Court], and continue to come, until it is authoritatively decided
. . . .”14
In fact, the question has continued to come to the Supreme Court.
Indeed, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood are merely the latest iterations
of the corporate person question. For example, on September 9, 2009,
during oral argument in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a
case testing the constitutionality of statutory limits imposed on corporate
political speech, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor
reignited the debate.15

13. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1886).
14. Cnty. of San Bernardino v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 417, 423 (1886) (Field, J.,
concurring).
15. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 33–34, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205) [hereinafter Citizens United Transcript].
Citizens United, of course, involved the ability of the Federal Government to restrict speech
and, therefore, arose under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The scope of First
Amendment protection, of course, is not explicitly limited to “persons.” In recent decisions,
including Citizens United, the Court’s majority has rejected the notion that First Amendment
protection of speech turns on whether “its source is a corporation” or a natural person. See
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784). The majority opinions in
such cases either explicitly or implicitly appear to rest on the proposition that:
The proper question therefore is not whether corporations “have” First Amendment
rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead,
the question must be whether [the federal statute] abridges expression that the First
Amendment was meant to protect.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776. In contrast to the majorities’ focus on the conduct protected, the
dissenters in First Amendment cases do emphasize, among other things, their belief that the
Amendment protects only natural persons, not corporations. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Framers did not intend First Amendment to
protect corporate speech and that ability of corporations to amass wealth as well as potential
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Justice Sotomayor opined that “[t]here could be an argument made that
. . . the Court . . . error[ed] when it created corporations as persons, gave
birth to corporations as persons.”16 Earlier, Justice Ginsburg had asked
counsel:
[a]re you taking the position that there are no differences in the First
Amendment rights of an individual [and a corporation]? A corporation, after
all, is not endowed by its creator with inalienable rights. So is there any
distinction that Congress could draw between corporations and natural
human beings for purposes of campaign finance?17

to exercise disproportionate and corrupting power in public forum provides rationale for
excluding corporations from First Amendment protection). But see id. at 392-93 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that: (1) an “individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak
in association with other individual persons”; (2) “the text [of the Amendment] offers no
foothold for excluding any category of speaker” from individuals to partnerships to
unincorporated associations to corporations).
As discussed, infra at Section III.D, the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood opinions reflect
deep disagreement about whether First Amendment Free Exercise Clause rights are attributes
of natural persons which can be exercised only by such natural persons. For example, all of
the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood opinions recognize that Citizens United held that
corporate political speech was protected without regard to the corporate identity of the
speaker. The opinions, however, diverge on whether religious exercise is a purely personal
attribute of natural persons versus whether corporations’ Free Exercise rights are protected in
order to protect the rights of the individuals who exercise such rights collectively through the
corporate form. In those cases, then, whether a judge would permit the corporate Hobby
Lobby or Conestoga Wood plaintiffs to assert Free Exercise rights ultimately depends on the
judge’s view of the characteristics of the corporate person.
In contrast, whether corporate speech is protected against abridgement by state law depends
on whether the corporate speaker is a “person.” The First Amendment applies to state
regulation of speech through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
text of the Fourteenth Amendment — unlike the First Amendment — expressly protects only
“persons.” Thus, the threshold question in any case asserting a First Amendment challenge to
state regulation of corporate speech is whether the corporate speaker is a “person” protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court routinely holds that corporate speakers are
“persons” protected by the Fourteenth and, therefore, the First Amendments. See, e.g., Bellotti,
413 U.S. at 780 (holding that First Amendment freedoms have “always been viewed as
fundamental components of the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause and the Court
has not identified a separate source for the right when it has been asserted by corporations”
which “for almost a century” have been held to be persons protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment) (citing Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 394 and Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co.,
164 U.S. 578, 578 (1896) (citations omitted from text)); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 244 (1936) (stating that a corporate speaker is a Fourteenth Amendment “person”)
(citing Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co., 164 U.S. at 592). In addition, the protective cloak
of certain Federal statutes is available only to “persons.” See, e.g., RFRA, supra note 5.
16. Citizens United Transcript, supra note 15, at 33-34.
17. Id. at 4.
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Unlike most questions asked at oral argument, the Justices’ questions
sparked public debate about the nature of the corporate person.
On September 17, 2009, The Wall Street Journal proclaimed
“Sotomayor Issues Challenge to a Century of Corporate Law.”18 Asserting
that “[p]rogressives have to feel reassured that this was one of [Justice
Sotomayor’s] first questions,” the Journal also briefly sketched the utilitarian
arguments for according corporations constitutional protections.19 Although
pointing out that Justices as philosophically diverse as William O. Douglas
and William Rehnquist have “vacillated” and “been skeptical” of the extent
of corporate rights, the Journal confidently declaimed that “[o]n today’s
Court, the direction Justice Sotomayor suggested is unlikely to prevail” even
though the Justice “may have found a like mind in Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.”20
On September 22, 2009, The New York Times21 rejoined, asserting that
“[t]o us, as well as many legal scholars, former justices and, indeed, the
drafters of the Constitution, the answer is that the rights [of corporations]
should be quite limited.”22 Acknowledging that “[t]he courts have long
treated corporations as persons in limited ways for some legal purposes,”
the Times stated that “corporations could not and should not” be allowed to
do what, as artificial persons, no one ever has claimed they might do —
“vote, run for office or bear arms.”23 The Times criticized “the Court’s
conservative bloc” for betraying “their often-proclaimed devotion to the text
of the constitution.”24

18. Jess Bravin, Sotomayor Issues Challenge to a Century of Corporate Law, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 22, 2009, at A19.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Editorial, The Rights of Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009, at A26. See also
Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Over the Cliff, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2011, http://opinionator.
blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/over-the-cliff/ (discussing Bellotti and development of
corporate speech jurisprudence); Martha C. White, Idea of Company-As-Person Originated in
Late 19th Century, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2010, at G4.
22. See Rights of Corporations, supra note 21. There is no reason to believe that the
“founders of this nation” even thought about the question. Corporations were addressed only
once during the Constitutional Convention. James Madison and Charles Pinckney sought to
add a provision authorizing Congress to create corporations. The effort failed and
corporations are not mentioned in the Constitution. See James Madison, Journal of Sept. 14,
1787, in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 615 (Max Farrand ed., 1911),
available at http://files.libertyfund.org/files/1786/0544-02_Bk.pdf.
23. Rights of Corporations, supra note 21.
24. Id.
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The Justices’ questions, the Journal article, and the Times editorial, all
are founded on the supposed history of the constitutional corporate person.
All appeal to a history that they imagine is consistent with their world-view.25
This article argues that, while it is clear that there was no robber barondriven corporate conspiracy to highjack the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as was once popularly believed, constitutional protection for
the corporate person became settled law because Justice Stephen J. Field,
in a series of ipse dixit assertions, made it so. The historical significance of
Field’s achievement cannot be gainsaid: If “person,” as used in the
Constitution, does not include a corporation, a corporation is not entitled to
equal protection of the laws and it is irrelevant whether the due process
clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments impose substantive limits on
regulation of corporations. By establishing the constitutional corporate
person as settled law, Field erected the foundation for the development of
substantive due process and for the Court’s laissez-faire era.
This article begins by reviewing the legal context in which the debate
regarding the constitutional person arose. Two Federal Circuit Court cases
in which Field first addressed the issue are examined. The article then
examines the handling and resolution of Field’s decisions by the Supreme
Court of the United States, one of which, County of Santa Clara v. Southern
Pacific Railroad Co. — thanks to Justice Field — has erroneously been
viewed by “[m]any scholars, judges, and even U.S. Supreme Court Justices
. . . as affirming the concept of corporate personhood because of an
inaccurate headnote in the official published version of the opinion written
by the Supreme Court Reporter, J.C. Bancroft Davis.”26
Thereafter, each Supreme Court decision expressly addressing the
corporate person question between 1886, when Santa Clara was decided,
and Justice Field’s 1897 retirement is examined. This analysis demonstrates
that Field unilaterally created a web of cross-corroborating decisions
claiming that corporate personhood had been definitively established by
Supreme Court precedent. Field did so largely based on the Reporter’s
headnote and accompanying commentary the Reporter attributed to the
25. Referring to Progressive Era theories about the manner in which corporations became
constitutional persons, Howard Jay Graham offers an apt assessment that is capable of more
general application:
[T]he Beard’s Conspiracy Theory, or, speaking more accurately, the progressive-New
Deal generations’ Conspiracy Theory, really was anachronized — “Pogo”-ized history.
To quote the learned Walt Kelly, “Incongruity is the nature of the natural . . . . You
develops a good memory, then you reverses the whole process” . . . . Forty years of
constitutional development were misread, and read back into, that one word,
“person.”
Graham, Waite Court, supra note 12, at 545.
26. Smythe, supra note 10, at 662.
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Chief Justice, which Field clearly knew falsely claimed that the corporate
person issue had been decided in Santa Clara. Indeed, Field had
contemporaneously castigated the Court for refusing to decide the question.
Field was able to establish the existence of the constitutional corporate
person by taking advantage of opportunities and personal prerogatives
afforded by the Court’s then far less collaborative decision-making process
and, ultimately, through the silent acquiescence of his brethren on the
Court.
This article then considers the practical implications of Field’s actions,
focusing first on whether Field’s corporate person decisions, even if sui
generis, nonetheless reflected the position of the Court or were simply one
man’s opinion. After concluding that Field was not authorized to speak for
the Court on the issues, this article concludes, arguing that the discussion
regarding corporate personhood needs to focus on what it means to be a
corporate person and on identifying the source of corporate constitutional
rights, if any, not on whether or not the Court erred when it “created
corporations as persons, [and] gave birth to corporations as persons.”27
This is so for two reasons. First, the historical record demonstrates that
the term “person” has universally been understood since at least the
Colonial Era to include corporations. Second, Field’s Supreme Court
decisions established the constitutional corporate person by preemptory
declaration. As a result, notwithstanding general agreement that corporate
persons and natural persons share some constitutionally protected rights,
the corporate person has never had the benefit of the incremental,
evolutionary development that tests, validates and clarifies most common
law concepts. Instead, the Court has never articulated a consistent,
principled rationale for the corporate person, making it largely impossible
— other than on a case-by-case basis — to identify the scope, nature, or
limits of such rights.
Finally, the circuit decisions in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood are
examined. The virtually unexplained and unexplainable discordant outcomes
in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood are merely among the latest
illustrations of the confusion and contradictory precedent resulting from the
Supreme Court’s failure to establish a definitive rationale explaining when a
corporation may, and may not, assert the rights of a natural person. Failure
to define the meaning of corporate personhood exalts ad hoc judicial
decision-making over the structure, predictability and even-handedness that
the law ought to provide. This article then argues that the resultant
uncertainty impedes meaningful assessment of the legal viability of complex
statutes that attempt to restructure important societal programs and

27. Citizens United Transcript, supra note 15, at 33-34.
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promotes divisiveness by creating the impression that the validity of such
legislation is dependent on personal predilection rather than on consistently
applied standards, both of which forestall effective implementation of such
legislation. The Supreme Court can, and should, use Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga Wood to eliminate the uncertainties and define the meaning of
the corporate person.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Corporate Person in Historical Context

The status of corporations has been an issue since the early years of the
Republic. For example, in 1823 the Supreme Court, interpreting the
provisions of the treaty that ended the Revolutionary War, held that “there is
no difference between a corporation and a natural person, in respect to
their capacity to hold real property,” and that the “civil rights of both are the
same.”28 Other state and federal courts reached the same conclusion in the
early and mid-nineteenth century.29
However, prior to adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, corporations
had limited protection from state regulation. Early on, in 1833, the Supreme
Court held in Barron v. Baltimore that the Constitution’s Bill of Rights
inhibited action by the federal government only, and did not proscribe state
action.30 The only viable cause of action to challenge state regulation
available to private corporations under the federal constitution was the
claim that the regulation violated the constitutional proscription that states
may not impair the obligations of contracts.
Initially, when the Court decided Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, it appeared that the argument that state regulations at odds
with corporate charters constituted an unconstitutional impairment of
contract might provide something of a bulwark against state regulation.31
Such hopes were dashed, however, by the Court’s decision in Charles River
Bridge, Co. v. Warren Bridge32 and its progeny which held, in effect, that,
notwithstanding the terms of a corporate charter, states always retained the
right to regulate in the public interest.

28. Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. The Town of New Haven,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 482 (1823) (applying anti-divestiture provisions of treaties of 1793
and 1794 between United States and Great Britain).
29. See infra Section II.B.1.
30. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
31. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 712 (1819).
32. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 436-38 (1837). See
also Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 377 (1884) (upholding state’s
amendment of incorporation statute to permit price regulation).
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Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment gave new hope to corporate
interests that a Constitutional tool to defeat state regulation now was
available. First, the Amendment expressly proscribed state actions. Second,
the Amendment mandated that state actions must be consistent with due
process and guaranteed equal protection of the laws. Third, the Amendment
expressly protected the rights of “persons.” Notwithstanding the debate that
would later erupt, at the time the Amendment was adopted, a long litany of
English common law decisions, Supreme Court decisions and state court
decisions provided a basis to believe that the term “person” included a
corporation.33
The Supreme Court, however, soon appeared to disagree. In 1873, the
Supreme Court, in the Slaughter-House Cases34 — a case in which plaintiffcorporations claimed constitutional protection — interpreted the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly, making the
Amendment, according to Mr. Justice Field, “a vain and idle enactment.”35
Even more damning to corporate hopes, however, Mr. Justice Miller, writing
for the five-justice majority, was virtually certain that only the recently freed
slaves could claim the protection of the Amendment:
The existence of laws in the states where the newly emancipated negroes
resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them
as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this [equal protection] clause . . . .
We doubt very much whether any action of a state not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race,
will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly
a provision for that race . . . that a strong case would be necessary for its
application to any other.36

Known as the “African race theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
supposed limitation appeared to exclude corporations from any protections
afforded by the Amendment.
A few years later, in Munn v. Illinois37 and in The Granger Cases,38 the
Court upheld state price controls and other regulations against challenges

33. See infra Part II.A.
34. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S (16 Wall.) 36, 76 (1873).
35. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 81. For a thoughtful, and thought-provoking, re-examination of the SlaughterHouse Cases, see Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A ReInterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 643-744 (2000). See also
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PART II (1998).
37. 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1877).
38. See, e.g., Chi., Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877); Peik v.
Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Ackley, 94
U.S. 179 (1877); Winona & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180 (1877); and Stone v.
Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181 (1877).
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that the state’s exercise of such authority was precluded by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause. Taken together, the Court’s SlaughterHouse ruling appeared to exclude corporations from the coverage of the
Fourteenth Amendment and, even if they had been covered, according to
the Munn line of cases, the Amendment’s due process clause afforded little
substantive protection.
The rulings in the Slaughter-House Cases, Munn, and The Granger
Cases were a major problem for corporations, generally because they were
rendered when the country was transforming from a locally based economy
to a national economy. That transformation was driven in large measure by
building of railroads. As a result, the Court’s holdings were especially
problematic for railroads which, unlike most other contemporary businesses,
operated across state lines. Those cases seemed to say that each state was
free to subject railroad corporations to whatever regulations and taxes each
state’s legislature deemed consistent with the public interest. The railroads,
therefore, began a campaign in the courts aimed at undermining the
holdings of The Slaughter-House Cases, Munn, and The Granger Cases.
The railroad’s impact on the national economy in the late nineteenth century
parallels the significance of healthcare in the economy currently.
Railroads — the first businesses to conduct large-scale, interstate
commerce — rendered state boundaries less significant in one sense, but
more problematic in another. Perceived problems attributed to inconsistent
and allegedly discriminatory state regulations led the railroads to seek to
limit state regulation. In addition, as contrasted with the local artisan and
agrarian-based economy that it was supplanting, the developing industrial
economy was dependent upon capital investment of a magnitude beyond
the means of a single individual. Because it allowed groups of investors to
jointly fund an enterprise, existed in perpetuity and limited the potential
liabilities and risks to which investors were exposed, the corporation became
essential to economic growth.39
Notwithstanding the early lack of success in the courts, the railroads
firmly believed that popularly-elected legislatures could not be counted on
to protect their interests, the railroads, therefore, continued to seek judicial
relief. The railroads’ efforts focused on establishing two cornerstone
propositions: (1) that the term “person” as used in Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment (which guaranteed due process and equal
protection of the law) included corporations; and (2) that corporate
personhood meant that corporations, as aggregations of natural persons,

39. Cf. Joseph E. Casson & Julia McMillen, Protecting Nursing Home Companies:
Limiting Liability through Corporate Restructuring, 36 J. HEALTH L. 577, 586 (2003).
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derived rights from their incorporators and were entitled to assert the same
rights and protections afforded natural persons.
Ultimately, the railroads achieved their first goal — albeit not exactly as
they had planned — and the corporate person was established as a
cornerstone of American law. They failed, however, to establish the
“corporation aggregate” theory. Indeed, the railroads failed to obtain any
settled, principled articulation of what it means to be a corporate person.
B.

The Supreme Court’s Seminal Decisions: The Corporate Person and the
Fourteenth Amendment: County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific
Railroad Co. and County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad
Co.

The Fourteenth Amendment, the second in the trilogy of Civil War
Amendments, was drafted by the Joint Congressional Committee on the
War and Reconstruction and proposed by Congress on June 13, 1866. The
Amendment became effective on July 9, 1868. The Amendment has two
components of importance here, both of which are found in Section One:
(1) the Privileges and Immunities clause; and (2) the Equal Protection and
Due Process clauses.40
1. Round One: San Mateo in the Circuit
The railroads sought to induce the judiciary to definitively hold that
corporations were “persons” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in a
series of cases brought before Justice Field sitting as Circuit Justice, of which
County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific Railroad41 was the first. San Mateo
challenged the constitutionality of taxes authorized by the California state
constitution. The San Mateo case, from its inception, was a test case
designed to compel the Supreme Court to decide definitively whether

40. In its entirety, Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment reads as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), writ of error dismissed as moot, 116 U.S. 138, 142
(1886). The case was originally filed in state court, but was removed to federal court. See
Cnty. of San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 13 F. 145, 145 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) [hereinafter San
Mateo I].
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corporations were persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.42
It was no accident that the cases were brought in the court in which
Field sat as Circuit Justice. Field had made clear, especially in cases such as
The Slaughter-House Cases,43 The Sinking Fund Cases,44 Munn,45 The Legal
Tender Cases,46 and Bartemeyer v. Iowa47 that he read the Fourteenth
Amendment far more expansively than most of his Supreme Court brethren
both with respect to the scope of coverage and with respect to the substance
of the protections afforded. When Field sat as Circuit Justice, his broader
view of the Amendment, which became known as “Ninth Circuit Law,”
prevailed, not that of the Supreme Court.48
Field also was a close friend of Leland Stanford, Charles Crocker, Mark
Hopkins, and Collis P. Huntington, the founders of the Central Pacific
Railroad who also controlled the Southern Pacific Railroad. In fact, when
Congress created a new Circuit for California, it was Stanford — then
Republican governor of California — who urged President Lincoln to
appoint California Supreme Court Chief Justice and War Democrat Stephen
Field to the Supreme Court.49
Such was the Stanford-Field relationship that Justice Field was one of the
original trustees-for-life appointed to the Board of the newly-founded
Stanford University.50 Further, notwithstanding his position on the bench,
Field provided legal advice and counsel to Stanford and, after Stanford’s
death, to Stanford’s widow.51 In fact, Field, as a practical matter, selected
counsel — another Field friend, Hastings Law professor, John N. Pomeroy
— to represent the Southern Pacific before Field in the Circuit Court.52 At

42. 116 U.S. 138 (1886); CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW
258 (Brookings Inst. 1930) (both sides agreeing that San Mateo would test validity of
California taxes).
43. 83 U.S. at 83-89 (Field, J., dissenting).
44. 99 U.S. 700, 750-69 (1878) (Field, J., dissenting).
45. 94 U.S. at 136-54 (Field, J., dissenting).
46. 110 U.S. 421, 451-70 (Field, J., dissenting).
47. 85 U.S. 129, 137-41 (Field, J., concurring).
48. Graham, Justice Field, supra note 12, at 881-89 (discussing Field’s propensity to
follow his Supreme Court dissents in the Circuit and reaction thereto).
49. SWISHER, supra note 42, at 243-46; PAUL KENS, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MORRISON
R. WAITE, 1874-1888, 23-24, 102 (2010).
50. STANFORD UNIV., THE FOUNDING GRANT WITH AMENDMENTS, LEGISLATION, AND COURT
DECREES 3 (1987). Note that federal circuit Judges Lorenzo Sawyer and Matthew P. Deady also
were among the original trustees. Id.
51. Swisher, supra note 42, at 245; PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY
FROM THE GOLD RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 190 (1997).
52. C. PETER MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER 220-21 (1963);
Howard Jay Graham, Four Letters of Mr. Justice Field, 47 YALE L.J. 1100, 1106 (1938).
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the time it was rumored — and ultimately shown to be true — that Field
provided confidential information — including internal court memoranda —
and advice to railroad interests, both with respect to the presentation of
cases before courts on which he sat and with respect to the deliberations of
such courts.53 To state the obvious, the railroad’s case in Field’s court, at
the very least, was assured a professionally and personally sympathetic
audience.
San Mateo originated when the County sued the railroad for delinquent
taxes.54 The gravamen of the railroad’s defense was that the tax illegally
denied the railroad equal protection of the law because all taxpayers, other
than railroads, were assessed based on the net value of their property, after
any mortgage was deducted. Railroads, however, were taxed on the full
assessed value of their property, without any allowance for mortgages.55
This had substantial financial implications for the railroads because,
generally speaking, the mortgages on railroad property far exceeded the
value of the property. Thus, if the railroad’s suit was successful, they would
pay no property tax while earning substantial profits in California.56
According to the railroad, the differential treatment “subjected them to an
unjust proportion of the public burdens and denied the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal
Constitution.”57

53. See Graham, supra note 52. See also KENS, supra note 51, at 239-40. Field seemed
unfazed by such rumors. For example, the evening that the Supreme Court arguments in San
Mateo concluded, Field attended a dinner given for the railroad’s counsel by Stanford at a
Washington restaurant.
54. San Mateo II, 13 F. at 724.
55. Id. at 726.
56. See infra pp. 257-58 and note 182.
57. Cnty. of San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 13 F. 722, 729 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882)
[hereinafter San Mateo II]. The Complaint filed by the county is a short (five paragraphs),
straight-forward statement that the tax assessed pursuant to state law had not been paid and
demanding payment. See Complaint at 1-2, San Mateo II, 13 F. 722 (No. 1063) [hereinafter
San Mateo II Complaint]. In contrast, the railroad’s Answer is lengthy, meandering and
repetitive. See Answer at 3-15, San Mateo II, 13 F. 722 (No. 1063) [hereinafter San Mateo II
Answer]. Although the Answer addresses state law, those allegations arguably (but not, clearly)
are not independent claims for relief. Instead, they seem to have been included primarily to
provide background for the federal claims. The federal claims include: (1) that the railroads
were denied a hearing to challenge the tax; (2) that the assessment was ad hoc; (3) that the
railroad was the victim of discrimination because it was not permitted to offset the mortgage
on its property; (4) that the railroads were denied rights given all other persons; (5) that the
assessments were excessive, applying to a higher proportion of the value of the railroad’s
property than any other property; (6) that the railroads, as federal corporations, could not be
taxed by the state; and (7) that the tax was applied to property not owned by the railroads. See
id.
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Although the railroad’s Answer included allegations that the California
tax had been imposed in violation of state law,58 in addition to the
constitutional challenges, the state law allegations were cursory and were
buried in claims of illegal discrimination. The state law claims were virtually
ignored in both the briefing and arguments.59
Predictably, the plaintiff County argued that the Supreme Court’s
decision in the Slaughter-House Cases60 barred the railroad’s claims: “[t]he
fourteenth amendment of the constitution . . . was adopted to protect the
newly-made citizens of the African race . . . and should not be extended
beyond that purpose.”61 Accordingly, the County argued, “corporations are
not persons within the meaning of that amendment.”62
In 1882, Justice Field held that the taxes unconstitutionally discriminated
against the railroad.63 Justice Field first characterized “[t]he questions thus
presented” as of “the greatest magnitude and importance” and “of the
highest interest” to “all corporations . . . within the United States.”64 After
stating that “it is not possible to conceive of equal protection . . . where
arbitrary and unequal taxation is permissible,” Field turned to the pivotal
question: “[i]s the defendant, being a corporation, a person within the

58. San Mateo II Answer, supra note 57, at 10-11.
59. The Circuit argument made on behalf of the railroad by Professor John Norton
Pomeroy rested on four propositions, all based on the Constitution. First, “[p]rivate
corporations are “persons” within the meaning of section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . .” Second, “[t]he mode of assessing the defendant prescribed by the
Constitution of California, and the assessment made thereunder, violate the [due process]
clause of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” Third, the tax “violate[s] the [equal
protection] clause of . . . the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” Fourth, “[t]he power reserved to
the State . . . to alter . . . charters of private corporations does not take the defendant out from
those guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” See Brief for Defendant by John Norton
Pomeroy at 1-2, San Mateo II, 13 F. 722 (No. 1063), contained in SUPREME COURT TRANSCRIPT
OF RECORD [hereinafter Pomeroy Brief].
60. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
61. 13 F. at 729-30.
62. Id. at 730.
63. Id. at 722. Circuit Judge Lorenzo Sawyer concurred and wrote a separate opinion.
Oral arguments in the case lasted from August 21 to 29, 1882 in the Circuit. SWISHER, supra
note 42, at 254. See Argument of Creed Haymond at 8, San Mateo II, 13 F. 722 (No. 1063),
contained in SUPREME COURT TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD (noting that, in addition to Mr. Haymond,
the case in the Circuit was argued by “Ex-[California Supreme Court] Chief Justice Rhodes,
Attorney-General Hart, District Attorney Tolles of Marin County, and District Attorney Ware of
Sonoma County for the plaintiffs, and by Professor Pomeroy, Mr. T. I. Bergin, and Mr. T. B.
Bishop for the defendants, and by Governor Johnson . . . .”) (copy in possession of author,
thanks to the generous assistance of the Supreme Court Librarian).
64. San Mateo II, 13 F. at 730.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2014]

THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP

219

meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, so as to be entitled, with respect to
its property, to the equal protection of the laws?”65
Holding that a corporation was a protected “person,” Field began his
analysis by rejecting the plaintiff’s Slaughter-House-based argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected “only the newly-made citizens of the
African race.”66 Quoting at length from Chief Justice Marshall’s Dartmouth
College opinion, Field held that the words used in the Fourteenth
Amendment were so clear and well understood that the intent of the authors
was largely irrelevant:
It is more than possible that the preservation of rights of this description [i.e.,
corporate] was not particularly in view of the framers of the constitution
when the clause under consideration was introduced into that instrument
. . . but although a particular and a rare case may not in itself be of
sufficient magnitude to induce a rule, yet it must be governed by the rule
when established, unless some plain and strong reason for excluding it can
be given . . . the case being within the words of the rule, must be within its
operation likewise, unless there be something in the literal construction so
obviously absurd or mischievous, or repugnant to the general spirit of the
instrument, as to justify those who expound the constitution in making it an
exception.67

“[T]hat authority,” Field concluded, precluded a “narrow view” of the
Amendment because “[i]t has a much broader operation,” prohibiting a
state from “depriv[ing] anyone of rights which others similarly situated are
allowed to enjoy.”68

65. Id. at 733, 738.
66. Id. at 738-41. Field, in an earlier opinion denying a motion to remand the case to
state court, had acknowledged that the “amendment was undoubtedly proposed for the
purpose of fully protecting the newly-made citizen of the African race in the enjoyment of their
freedom . . . .” San Mateo I, 13 F. at 149.
67. San Mateo II, 13 F. at 741 (citing Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 644 (1819) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
68. Id. Field’s approach exploited the weakness in the textual argument relied upon later
by, among others, Justices Black and Douglas. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S.
562, 576 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303
U.S. 77, 85 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting). That argument would define “persons” and
“citizens,” used earlier in the Amendment as referring to the same individuals — the Freedmen
— because they were the intended beneficiaries of the Amendment. It is, however, difficult to
imagine that the Reconstruction Congress or the ratifying states would have agreed that the
Amendment protected only one race to the exclusion of all others. Certainly, given the time,
an argument that the Amendment intended to confer on the Freedmen greater protection than
the constitution provided to white citizens, would be farfetched. See Richard L. Aynes,
Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment and What They Tell Us about Its
Interpretation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 289, 304 (2006).
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This was not a new approach for Field. On Circuit, Field had previously
and routinely ignored the “African race” limitation of the Slaughter-House
Cases. Indeed, Field’s Slaughter-House dissent was a more accurate
statement of the governing law in the Circuit than Justice Miller’s opinion for
the Slaughter-House Court. Field, for example, in some circumstances
utilized the Fourteenth Amendment to overturn state legislation that
discriminated against the Chinese.69
Arguably, the most important aspect of Field’s San Mateo opinion is the
analysis — generally overlooked — of the reason that corporate property
rights are protected by the Amendment. Rather than following John
Marshall’s dictum in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward that
“[b]eing the mere creature of law [a corporation] possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly,
or as incidental to its very existence,”70 Field followed the common law
“corporation aggregate” approach, and found that corporations acquire
protected rights derivatively because the Amendment protects “the property
of the corporators.”71
Field’s analysis begins by acknowledging that “[p]rivate corporations
are, it is true, artificial persons,”72 and immediately looks through the
corporate form to the “aggregations of individuals united for some
legitimate business.”73 Asserting that corporations were profligate, meeting
69. See San Mateo II, 13 F. at 761 (Sawyer, J., concurring) (rejecting “African-race”
theory, noting that the Amendment was applied in the Ninth Circuit to protect Chinese
immigrants). Field wrote the concepts of constitutional personhood and liberty that he had
articulated in his Slaughter-House, Sinking Fund, and Granger dissents into Ninth Circuit law
in largely unappealable habeas corpus and other cases. See, e.g., Graham, Waite Court,
supra note 12, at 534. Although Field early in his career rejected attempts to deny the
Chinese the right to engage in lawful occupation, some have argued that his solicitude was
really for the corporations that would have employed the Chinese had they been legally able
to work. Be that as it may, Field extended the scope of the Amendment beyond citizens to
include resident aliens, among others. See, e.g., Graham, Innocent Abroad, supra note 12, at
175; Graham, Waite Court, supra note 12, at 534. By 1884, Field’s “Ninth Circuit Law”
became so great an intrusion upon the Western states’ ability to legislate that it became the
object of a campaign to roll it back. See KENS, supra note 51, at 190.
70. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636.
71. San Mateo II, 13 F. at 746-48. Some writers characterize this approach as being
grounded in partnership theory. See Mark, supra note 11, at 1463. Field had utilized this
approach in refusing to remand the case to state court: “If [the Amendment] also include[s]
artificial persons, [such] as corporations . . . it must be because the artificial entity is
composed of natural persons whose rights are protected in those of the corporation.” San
Mateo I, 13 F. at 149.
72. San Mateo II, 13 F. at 743.
73. Id. Compare Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 64-5
(1809), overruled on other grounds by Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Leston,
43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844) (on which Field relied, in which Chief Justice Marshall applies
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almost every need of the people and “enrich[ing] and ennobl[ing]
humanity,” Field stated his overarching principle:
It would be a most singular result if a constitutional provision intended for
the protection of every person against partial and discriminating legislation
by the states, should cease to exert such protection the moment the person
becomes a member of a corporation. We cannot accept such a
conclusion.74

According to Field, “the property of a corporation is in fact the property of
the corporators,” so that “[t]o deprive the corporation of its property, or to
burden it, is, in fact, to deprive the corporators of their property or to lessen
its value.”75 If a “corporation is deprived of its property . . . in every just
sense of the constitutional guarantee, [the corporators] are also deprived of
their property.”76 Field argued that his conclusion was nothing new:
[I]t is well established by numerous adjudications of the supreme court of the
United States and of the several states, that whenever a provision of the
constitution, or of a law, guaranties [sic] the enjoyment of property . . . the
benefits of the provision extend to corporations, and that the courts will
always look beyond the name of the artificial being to the individuals whom
it represents.77

In other words, corporations are treated as legal persons in order to
protect the corporators who, as natural persons, clearly are “persons”
protected by the Amendment. Field points out that in The Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Town of New-Haven, the
Supreme Court had held that the term “person,” as used in the 1783 Treaty
of Peace with Great Britain, included corporations.78 Next, Field asserts that

English common law and looks through corporation to identities of individual corporators).
See also Bacon v. Robins, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 480, 485 (1855) (discussing common law
principles adopted in United States’ cases characterizing corporations as “private
partnerships” and holding that individuals associated in corporations are not thereby
“deprived of their civil rights”).
74. San Mateo II, 13 F. at 744.
75. Id. at 747.
76. Id. In the published opinion, the sentence states that “in every just sense of the
constitutional guaranty corporations are also deprived of their property.” Read in context, use
of “corporations” is a scrivener’s error, the correct word is “corporators.” Id.
77. Id. at 744.
78. San Mateo II, 13 F. at 744-45 (discussing The Soc’y for the Propagation of the
Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823)). Field noted
that the Town of New Haven court had rested its conclusion that “when necessary” a court
“will look beyond the name of the corporation to reach and protect those whom it represents.”
Id. at 745, on Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809). Field
did not indicate, however, that Deveaux had been overruled, at least in part, by Letson, 43
U.S. at 523-24. Arguably, the decision was overruled on unrelated grounds because the Court
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“[t]he same point was presented in . . . Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad Company,”79 which held:
A citizen who has made a contract, and has a controversy with a
corporation, may also say, with equal truth, that he did not deal with a mere
metaphysical abstraction, but with natural persons . . . and that his contract
was made with them as the legal representatives of numerous unknown
associates, who were secret and dormant partners.80

Although the Supreme Court’s decisions were far from consistent — and
Field ignored those, like Dartmouth College, seemingly at odds with his view
— Field did have a point. In 1882, when Field was writing, a substantial
number of federal court decisions could have been cited for the proposition
that corporations possessed rights derived from the natural persons who had
incorporated them.81
Field continued, arguing that provisions protecting “persons” against the
deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process of law were
found in nearly all state constitutions82 and that:

continued, for some purposes, to look through the corporate form to the character of the
incorporators. See Mark, supra note 11, at 1463.
79. San Mateo II, 13 F. at 746 (quoting Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16
How.) 326 (1853)).
80. Id. at 746.
81. The Supreme Court of the United States had held that the term “person” included a
corporation, whether the term was used in a treaty pre-dating the Constitution, Soc’y for the
Propagation of the Gospel, 21 U.S. at 464; in criminal statutes, United States v. Amedy, 24
U.S. (11 Wheat.) 392, 412-13 (1826) (Story, J.); in civil statutes, Beaston v. Farmers’ Bank of
Del., 37 U.S. 102, 134-35 (1838); or in the United States Constitution itself, Deveaux, 9 U.S.
at 86-92 (appearing to adopt corporation aggregate theory and looking through corporate
form to person who incorporated the entity). Bacon v. Robertson, 59 U.S. 480, 485-89 (1855)
(stockholders not “deprived of their civil rights inter se,” because they associate in
corporation). At about the same time, several federal circuit courts also had occasion to
address or comment on the corporate person issue. See, e.g., Spring Valley Water-Works v.
Bartlett, 16 F. 615, 621-22 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883) (municipal corporation subject to judicial
process “as any other body or person, natural or artificial”) (Sawyer, J.); Indiana ex rel. Wolf v.
Pullman Palace Car Co., 16 F. 193, 200 (C.C.D. Ind. 1883) (equating corporations and
persons with respect to state taxation and right to engage in interstate commerce); Nw.
Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 F. 393, 393-94 (C.D. Ill. 1873) (holding that corporations
were “persons” protected by the “act of the 20th April, 1891 (17 Stat. 13),” i.e., the Civil
Rights Act of 1871); Live-Stock Dealers & Butchers’ Ass’n. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing
& Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. 649, 651 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (holding that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause protects corporations) (Bradley, Cir. J.); United States v. McGinnis, 26 F.
1090, 1091 (D.N.J. 1866) (noting that criminal provisions of internal revenue act apply to
“persons” which is defined to include corporations). But see Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F.
Cas. 67, 67-68 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (Woods, J.) (corporations not protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
82. San Mateo II, 13 F. at 746.
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At all times, and in all courts, it has been held, either by tacit assent or
express adjudication, to extend, so far as their property is concerned to
corporations. And this has been because the property of a corporation is in
fact the property of the corporators.83

Field asserted that his view was supported by “[d]ecisions of state courts . . .
in [such] numbers” that it was “unnecessary to cite them.”84 Further,
83. Id. at 746-47.
84. San Mateo II, 13 F. at 747. State courts, primarily interpreting state statutes, in fact,
almost universally had concluded that the term “person” included corporations.
California: Douglass v. Pac. Mail S.S. Co., 4 Cal. 304, 305 (1854) (“[T]he word ‘person,’ in
its legal significance, is a generic term, and was intended to include artificial as well as natural
persons.”). See also Frank v. Bd. of Supervisors of S.F., 21 Cal. 668, 696 (1863) (Field, C.J.)
(“[T]he vital question is not one of names, but of persons — is the same individual, whether
natural or artificial, in existence?”); Pimental v. San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351, 361-62 (1863)
(obligation “to do justice . . . rests upon all persons whether natural or artificial”); Argenti v.
San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255, 265 (1860) (corporations on same footing as natural persons);
San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453, 467-68 (1858) (statute makes no
distinction between rules “applicable to natural persons and those applicable to artificial
persons;” same pleading rules apply to “corporations as with individuals”) (Field, J.); Hunt v.
San Francisco, 11 Cal. 250, 258 (1858) (Field, J., concurring); Touchard v. Touchard, 5 Cal.
306, 307 (1855) ([A] corporation, both by the civil and common law, is a person, an artificial
person . . . treated as a private person, and its contracts construed in the same manner and
with like effect as those of natural persons.”).
Connecticut: Knox v. Protection Ins. Co., 9 Conn. 430, 434 (1833) (“the word person is,
indeed, used in the statute . . . but a corporation is a person”) (citing Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns
Rep. at 382, and Rex v. Gardner, 1 Cowp. 79 (1755)).
Georgia: S.C. R.R. Co. v. McDonald, 5 Ga. 531, 535 (1848) (“where the law-making power
uses the word person . . . it is to be presumed that the legal meaning is intended, and not the
social or ordinary meaning”). See also id. at 538, 541 (“corporations for commercial . . .
purposes were [in 1799] known to the law, and to all intelligent legislators . . . who could not
have been ignorant or unobservant of these facts;” “one rule of statutory construction
recognized in England, and by the Supreme Court of the United States which is conclusive . . .
is this[:] Corporations are to be deemed and considered as persons, when the circumstances
in which they are placed are identical with those of natural persons, expressly included in a
Statute”); Sw. R.R. Co. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 356, 362-63 (1858) (“the word person, both in civil
and penal statutes, applies to artificial as well as natural persons”).
Maryland, New Hampshire, Illinois, Alabama & Kentucky: See Maryland v. Bank of Md., 6 G.
& J. 205, 219 (Md. 1843); Libbey v. Hodgon & Portland Stage Co., 9 N.H. 394 (1838).
Richland v. Lawrence, 12 Ill. 1, 8 (1850); Louisville v. Univ. of Louisville, 54 Ky. 642 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1855). Planters’ & Merchants Bank of Mobile v. Andrews, 8 Port. 404, 426 (Al. 1839)
(“[I]t is well settled, that the term ‘person’ in a statute, embraces not only natural, but artificial
persons . . . .”).
Massachusetts: See The Pres., Dirs. & Co. of Maine Bank v. Butts, 9 Mass. 49, 53 (1812)
(holding that, although corporations were not named, statute applicable to persons, applied
to corporations); Portsmouth Livery Co. v. Watson, 10 Mass. 91, 92 (1813) (“corporations are
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artificial persons . . . .”). See also Greene Foundation v. Boston, 66 Mass, 54, 59-61 (1853)
(by statute, the word “person” includes corporations); Otis Co. v. Ware, 74 Mass. 509 (1857)
(statutes uniformly construed so that “all the varied forms of expression, ‘inhabitants,’
‘persons’ or ‘individuals’ apply equally to corporations and individuals”).
Mississippi: Commercial Bank of Manchester v. Nolan, 8 Miss. 508, 524 (1843) (“[T]he
cases . . . all hold that corporations are included in the word persons in a general statute.”);
Grand Gulf Bank v. Archer, 16 Miss. 151, 174 (1847) (“[I]t is not now to be doubted, that
corporations are subject to the general laws of the land, so far as applicable to them.”).
New Jersey: United States v. McGinnis, 26 F. 1090, 1091 (D.N.J. 1866) (criminal provision of
internal revenue statute (13 Stat. 229 § 15) defines person to include partnerships, firms,
associations, and corporations). Because such statutes are strictly construed, including
corporations within “persons” reflects that such meaning was both customary and near
universal. But see Ohio v. Cincinnati Fertilizer Co., 24 Ohio St. 611, 614 (1874) (“person” in
criminal statutes means natural persons only).
New York: People ex rel. Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358, 381 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1818) (court was “unable to discover any possible grounds on which [corporations] can
claim an exemption from the prohibitions contained in [an] act,” declaring that no person
“could engage in certain banking-related activities”); British Comm. Life Ins. Co. v. New York,
31 N.Y. 32 (1864) (holding that “[g]enerally, under ‘persons’ as used in the laws providing for
taxation, corporations have been included . . . .” (citations omitted)). See also Ontario Bank v.
Brunnell, 10 Wend. 186, 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833) (noting that “upon the authority of the
cases which included corporations within the term inhabitants” the court previously held
“persons” to include corporations); People ex rel. Bank of Watertown v. Assessors, 1 Hill 616,
620-21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841) (corporation aggregate is artificial person capable of transacting
business like a natural person); Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill 531, 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842)
(municipal corporation “stands on same footing as would any individual or body of persons”);
Indiana v. Woram, 6 Hill 33, 38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (statute regarding enforcement of
promissory notes that “[i]t did not require the aid of the legislature to prove that the word
person . . . shall be construed to extend to every corporation . . . .”); Brower v. Mayor, 3 Barb.
254, 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848) (municipal corporation owning lands bound by same
obligation as a private person); Milhau v. Sharp, 15 Barb. 193, 213 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853)
(“whether they be a corporation or individuals” the law treats them “merely as persons dealing
with property without legal authority” (internal quotations omitted)).
Pennsylvania: Bushel v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 15 Serg. & Rawle 173, 177 (Pa. 1827)
(“[w]hen the word persons is used in a statute, corporations as well as individuals are
included”).
Virginia: Stribbling v. Bank of the Valley, 26 Va. 132, 141-43 (1827) (Carr, J.) (“some pretty
strong cases to . . . the effect [that corporations are persons] were cited at the bar;” it is “clear,
therefore, that corporations, generally, are within the usury law”); id. at 150 (Green, J.)
(“corporations are, in their nature, bound as individuals are by the general laws regulating
contracts”); id. at 190 (Cabell, J.) (“the term ‘person,’ used in the law, is unquestionably
sufficiently comprehensive to embrace corporations”). But see id. at 173 (Coalter, J.) (“it
seems to me, however, that a corporation is not a person who can be punished under the . . .
Act”); Crafford v. Bd. of Supervisors, 12 S.E. 147, 149 (Va. 1890) (“In the Code of 1849
(chapter 16, §17, p. 101) it is provided that the word ‘persons’ in a statute ‘may extend to
and be applied to bodies politic and corporate . . . the omission of the word ‘corporation’
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according to Field, “all text writers, in all [civil] codes, and in revised
statutes” have concluded that “the term ‘person’ includes, or may include,
corporations . . . whenever it is necessary for the protection of contract or
property.”85
does not exclude them, for this act uses a word ‘persons,’ which may include them, and which
must include them, unless it was the manifest intention of the legislature to exclude them from
the operation of the act”). See also Bank of Marietta v. Pindall, 23 Va. 465, 472 (1843)
(equating natural and artificial persons); Bank of the U.S. v. Merchants Bank, 40 Va. 573, 581
(1824) (“the circumstances in which [corporations] are placed [by our act] are identical with
those of the natural person”); Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Gallahue’s Adm’rs., 53 Va. 655, 663
(1855) (under the common law and by statute “[w]hen the word person is used in a statute,
corporations as well as natural persons are included for civil purposes”).
State cases decided after the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted but around, and just after,
the time that the San Mateo and Santa Clara cases were making their way to the Supreme
Court continued to hold that “persons” included corporations. See, e.g., Detroit v. Detroit &
Howell Plank-Road Co., 43 Mich. 140, 147-48 (1880) (Cooley, J.). See also Chicago & Alton
R.R. Co. v. Koerner, 67 Ill. 11, 24 (1873) (holding that constitutional provisions forbidding
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law and which guarantee the
right of trial by jury are designed to apply only to natural persons, but may also be invoked by
artificial persons to protect their property). Dickie v. Boston & Albany R.R. Co., 131 Mass.
516, 517 (1881) (person “includes corporations and applies to the defendant” citing “Gen.
Sts. c. 3, § 7, cl. 13.”). See also Brookhouse v. Union Ry. Co., 132 Mass. 178 (1882),
Shockley v. Fisher, 75 Mo. 498, 501 (1882) (“[W]hether we go by the common law rule or by
the statutory provision . . . there is no doubt that section 354 [relating to assignments by
debtors], will apply as well to a corporation as to a person.”), and Loring v. Maysville
Creamery Assoc., 70 Mo. App. 54, 57 (1897) (applying statutory definitions of persons to
“bodies corporate as well as individuals”). Albion Nat’l Bank v. Montgomery, 74 N.W. 1102,
1103 (Neb. 1898) (rejecting the argument that because “the statute under consideration is
penal in nature” the term “persons” should be strictly construed to apply only to natural
persons).
85. San Mateo II, 13 F. at 747-48. In statutes adopted in the late nineteenth century, at
about the same time as the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress often expressly defined the term
“person” to include corporations. See id. 723. These statutes were adopted by many of those
who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment and their contemporaries. See id. at 774. They
would, therefore, seem to offer first hand insight into the meaning the Fourteenth
Amendment’s drafters — if asked — would have given the term “persons.” See id. at 723,
774.
In 1867, for example, the Thirty-Ninth Congress adopted “[a]n Act to establish a uniform
System of Bankruptcy throughout the United States.” Bankruptcy Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176,
§ 48, 14 Stat. 517 (1867). See also Bankruptcy Act of March 2, 1867, Ch. 1-2, § 5013, 1
Rev. Stat. 967 (1878). Section 48, “Meaning of Terms” provided that, as used in the Act, “the
word ‘person’ shall also include ‘corporation.’” Bankruptcy Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, §
48, 14 Stat. 540 (1867). One year later, in 1868, the Fortieth Congress adopted a series of
statutes that provided “[t]hat where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly
incompatible with the intent thereof, the word ‘person’, as used in this act, shall be construed
to mean and include a firm, partnership, association, company, or corporation, as well as a
natural person . . . .” Bankruptcy Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, § 104, 15 Stat 166 (1868).
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The universal use of “person” to include a corporation made it obvious
to Field that “[a]ll the guaranties [sic] and safeguards of the constitution for
the protection of property possessed by individuals may, therefore, be
invoked for the protection of the property of corporations.”86 Summing up,

Unlike earlier legislation which tended to provide ad hoc definitions, in 1871, the Forty-First
Congress adopted generally applicable rules in the Dictionary Act, “prescribing the Form of
the enacting and resolving Clauses of Acts and Resolutions of Congress, and Rules for the
Construction thereof.” Dictionary Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat 431 (1871). The
Act provided: “That in all acts hereafter passed . . . the word ‘person’ may extend and be
applied to bodies politic and corporate.” Id.
In 1872, a proposal was made to revise and simplify the United States Statutes. See 1
REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES STATUTES AS DRAFTED BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED FOR THAT
PURPOSE: IN TWO VOLUMES AS BOUND FOR EXAMINATION BY THE COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FORTY-SECOND CONGRESS, ON THE REVISION OF THE LAWS (1872)
[hereinafter REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES STATUTES]. That proposal suggested that the
Dictionary Act be revised to delete “body politic” from the definition of “person,” so that the
Act would read “the word ‘person’ may extend and be applied to partnerships and
corporations.” Id. at ch. 3 § 22. The proposal also recommended removal of the definition of
person “in section 48 of the [A]ct of 1867” regarding bankruptcy because the “substance of
[the definition] is sufficiently embraced in the TITLE GENERAL PROVISIONS.” Id. at p. 13 vol. 2.
The proposal was adopted in 1873. Act of Dec. 1, 1873, § 1, 1 Rev. Stat. 1 (1873). Compare
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 48, 14 Stat. 540 (1867). Similarly, the proposed revision
recommended that the general internal revenue laws be amended to provide that “[t]he word
‘person,’ as used in this Title, shall be construed to mean and include a firm, partnership,
association, company, or corporation, as well as a natural person except where it is . . .
manifestly incompatible with the intent of the provisions in which that word is used.” 2
REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES STATUTES, Title 38, “Internal Revenue,” ch. 1, § 1. See also §
5013, 1 Rev. Stat 974 (1875) (as adopted).
On April 27, 1876, Congress passed an act incorporating the Mutual Protection Fire
Insurance Company of the District of Columbia. Act of April 27, 1876, ch. 85, § 1, 19 Stat.
38 (1876). Section 5 of the act provides “the word ‘person’ as used in this act shall be held to
include corporations also.” Id. at § 5. The Forty-Fourth Congress, in 1877, revised the Statutes
at Large to provide that, “where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible
with the intent thereof the word ‘person,’ as used in this title, shall be construed to mean and
include a partnership, association, company, or corporation, as well as a natural person.” Act
of Feb. 27, 1877, ch. 69, § 3140, 19 Stat. 248 (1877). Finally, in 1890, the Fifty-First
Congress adopted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. See Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209
(1890). Section 8 of the Act provided “[t]hat the word ‘person,’ or ‘persons,’ wherever used in
this act shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized
by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State,
or the laws of any foreign country.” Id. at § 8.
“Persons” is even defined in the statutes of the Confederate States to include corporations. See
1864 The Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of
America 1861-1862, Stat. 3, Ch. 61 § 18 (“[T]he word ‘person’ in this law [relating to seizing
of property] includes all private corporations.”).
86. San Mateo II, 13 F. at 748.
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Field reiterated that, in order to affect that protection, “courts will look
through the ideal entity and name of the corporation to the persons who
composed it, and protect them . . . .”87
2. Round Two: Santa Clara in the Circuit
As had been intended, San Mateo made its way to the Supreme Court
and was argued before the Court in August of 1882.88 However, while San
Mateo remained undecided, Justice Field, again sitting as Circuit Justice, on
September 17, 1883, decided a second railroad tax case, County of Santa
Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company.89 As expected, Field again held
that the California taxes, as imposed on railroads, violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because Justice Field had
addressed the issue in a lengthy opinion only one year earlier, the Court

87. Id. Although Field had followed, in substance, but without attribution, the outlines of
the argument for the defendant Railroad made by his friend and confidant, Hastings Law
professor J.N. Pomeroy, his Circuit colleague Judge Sawyer quoted at length from, and
expressly adopted, whole portions of Pomeroy’s argument in his separate opinion. See id. at
758 (Sawyer, J., concurring) (quoting Pomeroy’s argument wholesale).
Paul Kens has suggested that there is reason to believe that Field and Professor Pomeroy
collaborated to shape the railroad’s arguments in San Mateo. See KENS, supra note 51, at
239-40. Professor Kens further asserts that “[w]hether the two simply shared information or
actively planned a strategy, they undoubtedly cooperated in the cases.” Id. Professor Pomeroy
was representing the railroads as a result of suggestions made to corporate officials by Justice
Field. See Graham, supra note 52, at 1106. Following the suggestion, Pomeroy was retained
for four months at $10,000 per year by the railroad. See Graham, Innocent Abroad, supra
note 12, at 183. By way of comparison, Associate Justices of the Supreme Court were paid
$10,000 per year at the time and the Chief Justice earned $10,500. See MAGRATH, supra
note 52, at 253. Notably, when Justice Field told Professor Pomeroy about the
recommendation, he also reported that he had advised the railroad officials of the Professor’s
“special study of questions in which the Railway was interested.” Graham, supra note 52, at
1102-03. Field’s specific reference is not known, but seems obvious. Pomeroy’s son described
the relationship between Field and Pomeroy as “‘a warm and devoted friendship’ between the
two men, [and] an intellectual sympathy at almost every point.” See MILTON S. GOULD, A CAST
OF HAWKS: A ROWDY TALE OF SCANDAL AND POWER POLITICS IN EARLY SAN FRANCISCO 160
(1985).
There is no question that Pomeroy provided the jurisprudential underpinning for Field’s
opinion. See Graham, Innocent Abroad, supra note 12, at 182 (Pomeroy’s argument was
most forceful and certainly the key argument). Compare 13 F. at 758, with Pomeroy Brief,
supra note 59, at 2-24. See also Graham, Innocent Abroad, supra note 12, at 185. It was, for
example, Pomeroy’s corporate theory — that the rights of the corporators would be lost if
those of the corporation were not protected — that provided the foundation for Field’s Circuit
opinion. See Mark, supra note 11, at 1461.
88. See supra text accompanying note 63.
89. 18 F. 385, 387 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883). As in San Mateo, Judge Sawyer concurred and
wrote separately. Id. at 415.
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might have ruled based on the authority of San Mateo, but that was not to
be.90 Instead, Justice Field issued a second, even more detailed opinion.
Justice Field — in a departure from San Mateo — opens with an
attention-grabbing statement highlighting a critical difference between the
San Mateo and Santa Clara cases: in Santa Clara the defendant railroad
argued that the taxes had been imposed in violation of state law. Although
that distinction would play a pivotal role later in the Supreme Court, Field
“[did] not . . . deem it important to pass upon these or other objections to
the assessment, arising from an alleged disregard of the laws of the state.”91

90. Compare the Supreme Court’s disposition of the companion cases to Santa Clara.
The Court disposed of the cases by referring back to the Santa Clara opinion without further
discussion of the merits. See, e.g., Cnty. of San Bernardino v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 417,
424-25 (1886).
The reasons that Justice Field fully explained his rationale a second time are matters of
speculation. One of Field’s few surviving letters suggests, however, that Field was reacting to
significant discomfort among his Supreme Court brethren (likely exacerbated by Field’s
relationships with railroad magnates) with inconsistencies and inaccuracies in both his San
Mateo opinion and in the record. See Graham, supra note 52, at 1106. See also infra note
130 (detailing factual inconsistencies). See infra note 175 (discussing concerns about Field’s
behavior). The history of San Mateo at the Supreme Court — being advanced on the docket
ahead of cases pending for years, thereafter languishing undecided and ultimately being
dismissed in somewhat strange circumstances — circumstantially corroborates the inference
that, at least some, members of the Supreme Court were uncomfortable with the state of the
San Mateo record. See Graham, Innocent Abroad, supra note 12, at 191 (Field “requested to
hear additional cases and evidence . . . because inaccuracies came to the attention of other
members of the Court.”); id. at 192-93 (discussing external publicity given San Mateo Circuit
decision; including commentary that facts regarding railroad mortgages were wrong).
91. 18 F. at 390 (Field, J.); id. at 444 (Sawyer, J., concurring) (“As there must be judgment
for the defendant upon the points arising under the national constitution, it is unnecessary . . .
to extend these opinions by examining the questions arising alone under the state laws and
constitution . . . .”).
The Santa Clara Complaint, in three paragraphs, alleges that the railroad owed $8,065.11 in
unpaid county taxes and $5,301.42 in delinquent state taxes for tax year 1882 on the
county’s pro rata share of the railroad’s “real and personal property[,] to wit, the franchise
railway, road-bed, rails, and rolling stock . . . .” See Complaint at 1-3, Santa Clara, 18 F. 385
(1883) (No. 480) [hereinafter Santa Clara Complaint]. The Complaint also alleges that the
aggregate state-wide assessment imposed on the railroad was $2,412,600 based on a total
of 160.84 miles of track, including 59.3 miles in Santa Clara County. Id. at 1. The assessed
per mile value is said to be $15,000, or a total of $889,500 in the county. Id. at 4.
The Answer is, in many respects, similar to the San Mateo Answer, but there are significant
substantive and stylistic differences. See San Mateo Answer, supra note 57, at 19. For one
thing, no claim that the railroad was denied the right to be heard is made. Instead, the Answer
focuses on the state’s allegedly “unequal” and discriminatory treatment of the railroad.
Whereas the San Mateo Answer had embedded allegations that the taxes had been imposed
illegally on fences abutting the right of way, which were not the property of the railroad, in a
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Thus, notwithstanding the settled rule, that a “court should not decide
[constitutional questions], unless their determination is essential to the
disposal of the case in which they arise,”92 Field had no intention of
avoiding the constitutional question.
Field’s Santa Clara Circuit holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
applied to corporations as well as natural persons has three principal

lengthy paragraph making other, related claims, see id. at 18, the fence allegation now is
contained in its own, not to be missed, prominent paragraph. See Santa Clara Complaint,
supra note 91, at 16. Moreover, that paragraph clearly alleged that the County imposed the
tax in violation of state law. Id.
In addition, the San Mateo allegation, albeit inaccurate, that the railroad mortgages were
approximately $3,000 per mile has disappeared. See infra note 130. Instead, unlike San
Mateo, the Answer contains a detailed, and presumably more accurate, description of the
mortgages, and goes on to describe the mortgaged property and the aggregate amount of
California taxes paid by the defendant railroad. The Answer states that, as of April 1, 1875,
the railroad was indebted to “divers persons sic[sic]” for “large sums of money advanced to
construct and equip the railroad hereinbefore described.” See Santa Clara Complaint, supra
note 91, at 8. According to the Answer, the mortgage was secured by the railroad’s
“franchises and all rolling stock and appurtenances, and upon a large number of tracts of
land, aggregating over eleven million acres . . . in the State of California.” Id; California v.
Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1888). In what seems like a remarkable admission,
the Answer — unlike the San Mateo Answer — further alleges that such “indebtedness
amounts to the sum of forty-six million dollars, and no part thereof has ever been paid except
the accruing interest . . . .” Santa Clara Answer, supra note 91, at 8. Further, the Answer states
that such lands “are not, and never have been, in any way, connected with the railroad
business of the defendant,” and that the railroad paid state, county, and municipal taxes
thereon of $92,442.49. Id. at 9.
In contrast to the Complaint’s allegation that Defendant operated 160.84 miles of track in the
aggregate, the Answer claims that the railroad operated 711.51 miles as of March 1880. Id.
at 1-5. Using 711 miles, the mortgage per mile was approximately $64,700 compared to the
assessed value of $15,000. Id. at 4. (If the county’s 160 aggregate miles figure is used, the
mortgage per mile is $287,500.)
The detail with respect to the amount of the mortgages, the assessed value of the railroad’s
property and the total amount of state, county, and municipal taxes paid correlates directly
with, and appears to be a response, to Justice Field’s March 28, 1883 letter to Professor
Pomeroy. See Graham, supra note 52, at 1104-07. That letter advised Pomeroy — who
represented the railroads in the Circuit — that the Supreme Court had held San Mateo over
and expressed Justice Field’s “hope” that future tax cases would present “all the facts relating
to the mortgage upon the property of the Railroad . . . and also the extent to which its property
has been subjected to taxation throughout the State.” Id. at 1106. Inasmuch as the Santa
Clara Answer, which was filed less than two months after Field’s letter to Pomeroy, seems to
fulfill Field’s “hope” for more defined factual development of the record, there can be little
doubt that Field and Pomeroy were, at least in this respect, working together to frame the next
test case. See id.
92. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 410 (1886). See, e.g.,
California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 28 (1888).
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components. Field begins by arguing that it is essentially immoral to treat
corporations differently than natural persons. Next, Field argues that the
authors of the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily intended the Amendment
to apply to corporations and that such intent is confirmed by textual
analysis.93 Finally, Field elaborates on the principal point made in his San
Mateo opinion — that natural persons who associate in corporate form
continue to possess property rights which courts must protect.
Field starts by asserting the fundamental unfairness of the state’s
treatment of the corporate defendant: “[t]he discrimination is made against
the company, for no other reason than its ownership.”94 Field then made the
discrimination both personal and generic: “[t]he principle which justifies
such discrimination . . . where one of the owners is a railroad corporation
and the other a natural person, would also sustain it where both owners are
natural persons.”95 Seemingly exasperated, Field explains:
Strangely, indeed, would the law sound in case it read that in the
assessment and taxation of property a deduction should be made for
mortgages thereon if the property be owned by white men or by old men,
and not deducted if owned by black men or by young men; deducted if
owned by landsmen, not deducted if owned by sailors; deducted if owned
by married men, not deducted if owned by bachelors; deducted if owned by
men doing business alone, not deducted if owned by men doing business in
partnerships or other associations; deducted if owned by trading
corporations, not deducted if owned by churches or universities; and so on,
making a discrimination whenever there was any difference in the character
or pursuit or condition of the owner.96

Emphasizing the moral imperative, Field concludes that the discriminatory
state taxes are “the very essence of tyranny, [that] has never been done

93. This new approach may have reflected the fact that the San Mateo Supreme Court
briefs and arguments focused heavily on the framers’ intent, utilizing, among other things,
textual analysis — especially the juxtaposition of the terms “citizen” and “person” — to
demonstrate such intent. See DONALD BARR CHIDSEY, THE GENTLEMAN FROM NEW YORK: A LIFE
OF ROSCOE CONKLING 368-69 (1935). Moreover, at least one of the railroad’s lawyers,
former Senator George F. Edmunds, was a highly respected constitutional lawyer who had
helped shepherd the Amendment through the Senate. Senator Edmunds’ oral argument in the
Supreme Court focused heavily on the framers’ intent. See Argument of George F. Edmunds of
Counsel for Defendant In Error at 4-8, Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385 (1882)
(No. 1063) [hereinafter Edmunds’ Argument].
94. Santa Clara Cnty., 18 F. at 394-95.
95. Id. at 396.
96. Id. See also Edmunds’ Argument, supra note 93, at 7 (Congress adopted Amendment
not because Freedmen “had black skins” but “because they were men . . . [Congress] said
every man should have equal rights and due process of law . . . .”). The irony was probably
lost on Field, and at least one half of his readers, that “persons” seemed to include every adult
human being other than women.
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except by bad governments in evil times, exercising arbitrary and despotic
power.”97
As he had done in San Mateo, Field quoted Chief Justice John
Marshall’s dicta in Dartmouth College, and held that the framers’ actual
understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment did not limit the scope of its
application:
It is not enough to say that this particular case was not in the mind of the
[drafters] when the article was framed, nor of the American people when it
was adopted . . . .98

Field goes on to say that the application of a constitutional provision is not
restricted to the “existing wrong” that led to the provision’s adoption if “[t]he
case [is] within the words of the rule” unless such application is “obviously
absurd or . . . mischievous, or repugnant to the general spirit of the
instrument.”99 Field, as had Marshall in Dartmouth College, and as
Professor Pomeroy did before the Circuit, argues that constitutional
provisions necessarily have broad application to “new needs . . . [that] have
arisen or shall arise which the framers in their forebodings never saw, and
— wrongs which shall be righted by the words they established . . . .”100
Field nevertheless asserts that, of course, the authors of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended the Amendment to have broad application to persons

97. Santa Clara, 18 F. at 396. See also Edmunds’ Argument, supra note 93, at 11-13.
Field’s almost religious rhetoric was typical of his apocalyptic vision in many of the cases that
came before the Court. To a degree even greater than most nineteenth century conservatives,
Field was “ideologically programmed” to see in many disputes a class-based dialectic
materialism that, if unchecked, would destroy the social and political fabric. See Manuel
Cachan, Justice Stephen Field and “Free Soil, Free Labor Constitutionalism:” Reconsidering
Revisionism, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 541, 546 (2002). Indeed:
[a] mystic faith in right and rights, somehow established otherwise than by human
power, with sanctions somehow higher than those of human use and benefit, was all
but universal in a generation endoctrinated [sic] not only with the Declaration of
Independence but also with the Word of God. To set up an interest, even of mankind,
against a right of man, had a connotation as of timeserving. To contradict the majestic
nonsense of Field’s abstract conceptions would have been a heresy which no
pragmatic faith was yet confident enough to hazard.
Walter Nelles, Book Review, 40 YALE L.J. 998, 1007 (1931) (reviewing CARL BRENT SWISHER,
STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW (Brookings Inst. 1930)).
98. 18 F. at 397, quoting Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 644 (1819).
99. Id.
100. Santa Clara, 18 F. at 400. Compare Pomeroy Brief, supra note 59, at 24-25, and
Edmunds’ Argument, supra note 93, at 5-6. See also Edmunds’ Argument, supra note 93, at
6-7 (history shows that “the simplest grievance . . . to one man . . . by legislative or executive
power . . . is the moving and sole cause that leads the [legislature] . . . to make a general
law” to address any other possible related injury).
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and entities other than the newly emancipated former slaves. Field arrives at
this conclusion by turning the “African race” theory of the Slaughter-House
Cases inside out.
According to Field, the threat of special legislation directed at the new
citizens was an ominous warning that the rights of all were threatened. Thus,
“the framers of the amendment [were moved] to place in the fundamental
law of the nation provisions not merely for the security of those citizens, but
to insure to all men, at all times, and at all places, due process of law, and
the equal protection of the laws . . . .”101 In other words, Field concludes
that a specific problem experienced by one discreet group because of
unique characteristics and circumstances caused Congress to adopt a broad
rule of general application.
Field found evidence of the framers’ intent in the San Mateo Supreme
Court argument of Senator Edmunds. Field stated:
In the argument of the San Mateo Case in the supreme court, Mr. Edmunds,
who was a member of the senate when the amendment was discussed and
adopted by that body, speaking of its broad and catholic spirit, said: ‘There
is no word in it that did not undergo the complete scrutiny. There is no word
in it that was not scanned, and intended to mean the full and beneficial
thing it seems to mean. There was no discussion omitted; there was no
conceivable posture of affairs to the people who had it in hand which was
not considered.’ And the purpose of this long and anxious consideration
was that protection against injustice and oppression should be made forever
secure — to use his language — ‘secure, not according to the passion of
Vermont, or of Rhode Island, or of California, depending upon their local
tribunals for its efficient exercise, but secure as the right of a Roman was
secure, in every province and in every place, and secure by the judicial
power, the legislative power, and the executive power of the whole body of
the states and the whole body of the people.’102

101. Santa Clara, 18 F. at 398. Field kept an annotated copy of Senator Edmunds’
argument in the Circuit file. See Graham, Innocent Abroad, supra note 12, at 196.
102. Santa Clara, 18 F. at 398.
Judge Sawyer also quotes at length “the forcible and accurate language of Mr. Edmunds,
[before the Supreme Court in San Mateo] which I cannot improve . . . .” 18 F. at 429. Senator
Edmunds was the Senate manager of the bill that became the Civil Rights Act of 1871 which
includes what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983. During debate on the meaning of the term “persons,”
as used in the Act, Edmunds asserted that “it is merely carrying out the principles of the civil
rights bill [of 1866], which have since become part of the Constitution” and that “[Section 1 is]
so very simple and really [reenacts] the Constitution.” Monell v. Dep’t. Soc. Srv., 436 U.S.
658, 684-85 (1977). Cf. Nw. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 F. Cas. 393, 393-94 (C.C.N.D.
Ill. 1873) (holding that corporations are persons protected by Civil Rights Act of 1871).
Edmunds went on to state that the term “persons” was intended to be given a broad reading
and that it “[secured] the rights of white men as much as of colored men.” Monell, 436 U.S. at
685. Opponents agreed. See id. at 686, quoting remarks of Senator Thurman that “[there] is
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Again relying on the corporation aggregate approach, on which he had
based his San Mateo opinion, Field states “[t]his protection attends everyone
everywhere, whatever his position in society or his association with others,
either for profit, improvement, or pleasure.”103
Field dismisses opposing arguments as nonsensical, “involving doctrines
which sound strangely to those who have always supposed that
constitutional guaranties [sic] extend to all persons, whatever their relations
. . . .”104 Field then reasserts the first of two predicates on which his
corporation aggregate-based reasoning rests:
[P]rivate corporations consist of an association of individuals united for
some lawful purpose, and permitted to use a common name in their
business and have succession of membership without dissolution . . . . But
the members do not, because of such association lose their rights to
protection, and equality of protection. They continue, not withstanding, to
possess the same right to life and liberty as before, and also to their
property, except as they may have stipulated otherwise.105

Moving to his second premise, Field holds that corporate property is, in
reality, the property of the persons who form the corporation. According to
Field, “[w]hatever affects the property of the corporation — that is, of all the
members united by the common name — necessarily affects their
interests.”106 According to Field, “[w]hatever confiscates or imposes burdens
on [the corporation’s] property, confiscates or imposes burdens on their
property, otherwise nobody would be injured . . . .”107 Although largely

no limitation whatsoever upon the terms that are employed [in the bill], and they are as
comprehensive as can be used.” Thus, in Monell, the Court held that, a Congress that
included many of the same legislators who had drafted and approved the Fourteenth
Amendment, intended the term “person” when used in legislation implementing the
Amendment to include corporations, albeit municipal corporations. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
103. Santa Clara, 18 F. at 398. Field also contended that congressional re-adoption of the
Civil Rights Act supported his argument regarding the author’s intent. However, Field uses the
re-adoption of the Act after adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to support his view that
the Amendment applied to discriminatory taxation, not its application to corporate persons. Id.
at 399-400. Field appears to be mixing the two points in a purposeful effort to conflate two
different aspects of legislative intent into support for his principal concern — application of the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect corporate persons.
104. Id. at 402. See Edmunds’ Argument, supra note 93, at 5 (addressing the same
question and asking “What sort of logic is that?”).
105. Santa Clara, 18 F. at 402. Accord Pomeroy Brief, supra note 59, at 10-16.
106. Santa Clara, 18 F. at 403. Accord Pomeroy Brief, supra note 59, at 12 (arguing that
statutes violating the Fourteenth Amendment “in dealing with corporations must necessarily
infringe upon the rights of . . . the natural persons who compose them.”).
107. Santa Clara, 18 F. at 403. Accord Pomeroy Brief, supra note 59, at 15-16 (arguing
that “[u]nless the corporator, the natural person has been deprived of his private property,
within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition, then nobody has lost any property . . .

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

234

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 7:201

ignored, because, as will be seen, the Supreme Court declined to address
the question, the Circuit opinions in San Mateo and Santa Clara are the
only appellate decisions explaining the reasons why a corporate person can
assert the rights of a natural person.108
3. Round Three: San Mateo in the Supreme Court
The most noteworthy aspect of most Supreme Court cases is the
decision. In contrast, San Mateo is noteworthy because: (1) the railroad’s
arguments led to widespread belief that robber baron conspirators had
secretly inserted protection for corporations into the Fourteenth Amendment;
and (2) despite the parties’ investments and the Court’s recognition and
treatment of San Mateo as a test case of singular importance, it was
dismissed from the docket after argument without decision.
a. The Conspiracy Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment
San Mateo was argued for three days in the Supreme Court by a highly
paid team of handpicked attorneys. The team included two former senators,
nobody suffers a loss.”). But see JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 193 (1868) (“the property of a corporation is
entirely distinct from the property of its stockholders. No member of a corporation, by virtue of
his ownership of a number of shares, owns any portion of the lands, moneys, securities or
other property belonging to the institution; he is simply possessed of a right to participate in
the profits while the business is carried on . . . .”).
108. Howard Jay Graham goes further and asserts that: “The Field-Sawyer opinions thus
today stand as the highest — indeed in most respects the only — authoritative judicial
statement and justification of the corporate constitutional ‘person.’” See Graham, Innocent
Abroad, supra note 12, at 160. See also Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Taylor,
86 F. 168, 179-80 (C.C.M.D. Tn. 1898) (stating that the Santa Clara circuit opinion “must be
regarded as of the highest authority which any case decided at the circuit can possess”);
Russell v. Croy, 164 Mo. 69, 108 (1901) (expressing doubt regarding whether Supreme Court
resolved question of constitutional corporate person and concluding that the Circuit “opinion
of Mr. Justice Field . . . seems to furnish a conclusive answer . . . and we are satisfied with . . .
the correctness of its conclusion”); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 33 F. 121, 125-26 (C.C.N.D.
Ga. 1887) (noting that Supreme Court did not decide a constitutional question, leaving
authority of San Mateo and Santa Clara Circuit decisions in doubt).
Note that the corporate person issue was addressed in related contexts in other circuit
decisions, albeit far less comprehensively. See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Wolf v. Pullman Palace Car
Co., 16 F. 193, 200 (C.C.D. Ind. 1883) (treating corporations and persons as equivalent for
Commerce Clause purposes); Spring Valley Water-Works v. Bartlett, 16 F. 615, 621-22
(C.C.D. Cal. 1883) (no distinction natural versus artificial persons per California constitution);
Nw. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 F. Cas. 393, 393-94 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1873) (analyzing use
of term “persons” in Civil Rights Act of 1871; holding that term includes natural persons and
corporations); Live-Stock Dealers’ & Brokers’ Ass’n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 653 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (applying Civil Rights Act of
1866, treating corporations as citizens possessing protected privileges and immunities).
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both of whom had been in office when the Fourteenth Amendment was
drafted, one of whom — former Senator Roscoe Conkling — had been
among the draftsmen, two former judges, including the former Chief Justice
of the California Supreme Court, as well as an eminent law professor whom
Justice Field had advised the railroads to retain.109
In the early twentieth century, the theory was popularized by respected
New Deal and Progressive Age historians — and widely accepted — that
the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment had hoodwinked their
congressional colleagues, as well as the states who had ratified the
Amendment, by secretly slipping protection for corporations into the
Constitution.110 According to the conspiracy theory, the framers of the
Amendment had included several notable railroad corporate lawyers,
including Senator Conkling. These corporate lawyers, while ostensibly acting
to secure the rights of the Freedmen, supposedly secretly wrote protection
for corporations into the Constitution.111 Almost twenty years after the
Amendment was drafted, Roscoe Conkling’s argument on behalf of the
Railroad in the San Mateo case before a Supreme Court allegedly

109. In the Supreme Court, the case was argued from Tuesday, December 19, 1882
through Thursday, December 21, 1882. See infra note 112. The railroads were represented
by former Senators Roscoe Conkling and George F. Edmunds, as well as former California
Supreme Court Chief Justice S.W. Sanderson, all friends of Justice Field. See Supreme Court
Docket at Oct. Term, 1882, San Mateo, 116 U.S. 138 (1885) (No. 1063). Conkling had
been a member of the Congressional committee that had drafted the Amendment. See
DONALD BARR CHIDSEY, THE GENTLEMAN FROM NEY YORK: A LIFE OF ROSCOE CONKLING 369
(1935) (noting Conkling’s membership and that “he himself had consistently voted against the
section in question, the first”). Senator Edmunds, a key member of the Judiciary Committee,
had been the Senate manager of the Civil Rights Act adopted to implement the Amendment
and was one of the most well respected Constitutional lawyers of the day. See text and
accompanying source, infra note 112; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
177 (1993).
110. SWISHER, supra note 42, at 416 (characterizing Charles and Mary Beard as “thorough
students of the history” who were “convinced that [Conkling’s] interpretation was correct” and
quoting another contemporary historian asserting that the Amendment was intended to
increase Federal power, “but to do it in such a way that the people would not understand the
great changes . . . in the fundamental law of the land”). See also Aynes, supra note 68, at
307; Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 641-43 (1990); Comment, Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person,
91 YALE L.J. 1641, 1644 (1981); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 66-69 (1970).
111. See, e.g., Alvin L. Goldman, Book Review, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 864 (1969) (reviewing
HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION (1968)) (describing the conspiracy theory of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
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sympathetic to railroad interests supposedly was the final, penultimate act of
the “conspiracy” among the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.112
Howard Jay Graham, in his definitive, two-part article “‘The Conspiracy
Theory’ of the Fourteenth Amendment,” echoes many others when he calls
Conkling’s argument “one of the landmarks in American constitutional
history, an important turning point in our social and economic
development.”113 Graham sees the argument as marking the end of the

112. It must be remembered that, despite the importance conspiracy theorists attach to
Conkling’s argument, Conkling was only one of several attorneys arguing on behalf of the
Railroad. Prior to the argument, on the motion of the County, the Court had “ordered that in
the argument of this cause each side be allowed three hours additional time and that three
counsel on each side be allowed to argue the same orally.” Counsel for the County opened
the argument on Tuesday. The Court reconvened at noon Wednesday; after the County
concluded, and Roscoe Conkling opened for the Railroads. Counsel for the County
commenced replying on Wednesday, carrying over to Thursday when the Court again
reconvened at noon. Senator Edmunds and S.W. Sanderson followed, arguing for the
Railroad. Prior to argument, the Court granted counsel for the Railroad leave “to file a
certified copy of the journal entry of the Legislature of the State of California.” Justice Field,
despite having decided the case in the Ninth Circuit, was on the bench throughout the
argument. See Court Minutes at Dec. 19, 1882 – Dec. 21, 1882, San Mateo I, 13 F. 145
(No. 1063). At the time, “Supreme Court justices, after having given decisions in cases in the
circuit courts, often sat in the Supreme Court to hear appeals from decisions which they had
given in the lower courts.” SWISHER, supra note 42, at 247 n.14.
113. Graham, Conspiracy Theory, Part One, supra note 12, at 372. Conkling’s San Mateo
argument also has been described as “powerful,” of “telling effect,” “ingenious” and one of
the “first rank” historical events that “distinctly [mark] the point at which the Supreme Court
ceased to interpret section I of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment as having reference almost
wholly to negroes, and began to regard it as having a much broader application.” BENJAMIN
B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION: 39TH
CONGRESS, 1865-1867, at 22, 24, 28, 36 (1914). One of Conkling’s biographers states that:
The significance of his [argument] cannot possibly be overestimated . . . . The case
itself was dismissed as having become moot, but Conkling had shown the way . . . .
[G]reat corporation lawyers . . . all owe Roscoe Conkling a debt of incalculable value.
They followed him, hammering at his point until it was definitely established . . . .
[Roscoe Conkling] was easily the most important of the early champions of the trusts.
He did more than any other man to establish this doctrine [that corporations were
persons entitled to constitutional protection].
CHIDSEY, supra note 109, at 369-70. See also Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., History and Legal
Interpretation: The Early Distortion of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Gilded Age Court, 25
CATH. U. L. REV. 207, 225 n.103 (1976) (describing Conkling as “[o]ne of the individuals
principally responsible for the Court adopting this position” and discussing the argument);
HURST, supra note 110, at 67 (noting that the conspiracy theory of the Fourteenth Amendment
was born of innuendo in Conkling’s argument); GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION, supra
note 12, at 18-19 (quoting the “Brahman historian and the scholar in politics,” Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, who “authoritatively assembled and certified the Conkling canon” to which “[i]t
was owing . . . undoubtedly, that the Court extended [the Fourteenth Amendment] to
corporations”); Graham, Innocent Abroad, supra note 12, at 194 (noting that Conkling added
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“African race” theory of the Fourteenth Amendment espoused in the
Slaughter-House Cases as well as the beginning of the modern development
of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses and the corresponding
expansion of the power of the courts over social and economic
legislation.114
It is easy to understand why some would perceive that Conkling’s
credentials, and his involvement at the Amendment’s conception, may have
gilded his argument with authority.115 Conkling was a former congressman
and senator from New York and had been a member of the Joint
Congressional Committee which drafted the Fourteenth Amendment.116 He
had twice declined a seat on the Supreme Court, once in 1873 as Chief
Justice, and later in 1882 as Associate Justice.117
Conkling’s argument also relied upon, what he asserted was, the
previously secret Journal of the Joint Committee that had drafted the
Amendment.118 Conkling’s brief in San Mateo and his oral argument before

little substance to the debate is “not the measure of the arguments’ importance” because
three years later the Court agreed); ERNEST SUTHERLAND BATES, THE STORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT 208 (1936) (stating that the Court adopted argument and “transmogrified” the
Amendment).
114. Graham, Conspiracy Theory, Part Two, supra note 12, at 193-94.
115. See Graham, Conspiracy Theory, Part One, supra note 12.
116. CHIDSEY, supra note 109, at 368-69.
117. MAGRATH, supra note 52, at 6, 16, 270. Notably, the sitting Chief Justice, Morrison R.
Waite, had been appointed after Conkling declined the seat. Id.
118. Brief for Defendant by Roscoe Conkling at 9-17, Cnty. of San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R.
Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1885) (No. 1063) [hereinafter Conkling Brief] (asserting that “a
journal . . . was made from day to day by an experienced recorder . . . [which] was kept in
confidence . . . [and] never been printed, or publicly referred to” and discussing its contents);
Oral Argument on behalf of Defendant by Roscoe Conkling at 14-25, Cnty. of San Mateo,
116 U.S. 138 (1885) (No. 1063) [hereafter Conkling Argument].
Conkling’s implication that the Journal was the product of a standardized process designed to
record or digest the Joint Committee’s deliberations is false. Benjamin B. Kendrick, who
discovered the Journal in 1908, states that the handwritten Journal “is one made up from the
notes kept by the clerk of the committee at its various sessions” and includes “several loose
sheets,” also handwritten, containing various propositions. KENDRICK, supra note 113, at 20.
Dr. Kendrick, the historian who also edited and published the Journal, also argues that
Conkling’s argument marked a turning point in American law, resulting in the Court moving
away from the “African race” theory of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dr. Kendrick states that the
“dramatic episode which occurred in the argument of the San Mateo case, when Roscoe
Conkling, a member of the committee which drafted the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, produced
in the court room a copy of the journal of his committee and revealed for the first time what
purported to be the real intention of those who framed the fourteenth amendment” was of
“first rank” importance in the “legal revolution” that ensued. According to Dr. Kendrick,
Conkling’s argument was of supreme importance because “the Court seems to have been
unusually prone to take into consideration the intention of the [F]ramers of [the Fourteenth]
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the Supreme Court marked the first — and, as far as been discovered, the
only — use of this Journal as evidence of the intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s framers with respect to corporations. In fact, although the
Senate ordered 6,000 copies of the Journal printed little more than a year
after Conkling’s argument, the copies were never distributed and the single
remaining copy of the Journal did not resurface in public until 1914, more
than thirty years later.119
Conkling argued that the drafters had two distinct purposes in mind:
first, to protect the Freedmen and loyal citizens in the South in the exercise
of their civil rights; second, to secure constitutional protection for the rights
of all “persons,” corporate as well as natural.120 This, according to
Conkling, was evident because the Committee had treated the Equal
Protection Clause (i.e., that relating to persons) as distinct from the
Privileges and Immunities clause, dealing with political rights (i.e., those
relating to citizens).
Conkling, however, blatantly falsified the record of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s drafting. Conkling claimed that the word “persons” had been
inserted in lieu of “citizens” at the last moment to provide that corporations,
no less than natural persons, were entitled to due process and equal
protection of the laws.121 The inference was that the drafters had done so
purposefully to include corporations.122 In fact, “persons” had been used in

[A]mendment. Since Conkling had been a member of the committee which drafted the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment, he may have been presumed to have been in an excellent position
to interpret the intentions of himself and his colleagues . . . . He occupied a still stronger
strategic position in that he was armed with the very journal of the committee, and with it
proceeded to show that the committee did not expect that the operation of the amendment
would be confined merely to the protection of the freedmen.” Id. at 29-30.
In contrast, Conkling argument has been cited in only one decision, but for a proposition
completely unrelated to the existence of the constitutional corporate person. In Hopwood v.
Texas, the argument was cited, ironically, in support of the conclusion that a law school’s
admission process engaged in unconstitutional race-based discrimination. 861 F.Supp. 551,
584 n.91 (W.D. Tex. 1994). The District Court decision later was reversed in part (without
mentioning the argument). See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
119. CHIDSEY, supra note 109, at 427. See KENDRICK, supra note 113, at 19.
120. See Graham, Conspiracy Theory, Part One, supra note 12, at 375-85 for a thorough
discussion of the flaws in the argument.
121. See, e.g., Graham, Conspiracy Theory, Part One, supra note 12, at 377-78, 381-84;
CHIDSEY, supra note 109, at 368-70.
122. See Conkling Argument, supra note 118, at 15, 16, 18, 20 (addressing clause
regarding political rights) (asserting that equal protection guaranteed to “persons” was “a
thing substantive, separate, independent”). HURST, supra note 110, at 66-68. The strength of
Conkling’s contention that “persons” included corporations is further weakened by the fact
that Conkling used “persons” to mean natural persons in a resolution relating to another
article. As Mr. Graham has pointed out, it is hard to believe, in view of the fact that the
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the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses from the beginning and no
substitution ever took place.
Conkling’s argument further fails to address a critical point: one of the
principal purposes of the Amendment was to overturn the Dred Scott
decision. Justice Taney’s opinion for the Dred Scott Court had emphatically
stated that Africans could never be “citizens,” but also acknowledged that
they were “persons.”123 Thus, “persons” was the only term which the drafters
could have used to assure that the Freedmen were included within the
protections afforded by the Amendment.124
The definitive, virtually dispositive, impact some accord Conkling’s
argument is the last surviving vestige of the “long since discredited”
conspiracy theory of the Fourteenth Amendment.125 Remarkably, despite the
influence ascribed to the argument by Progressive Age and New Deal
scholars and others, Conkling’s Journal-based argument was little noticed at
the time. Indeed, if Conkling’s lengthy written and oratorical references to
the Journal (in total, the references covered twenty printed pages, seventeen
of which include almost nothing but quotations from the Journal)126 were so
important, it is difficult to understand the failure of the County’s attorneys to
respond to Conkling. Further, suggesting that Conkling’s argument had any
impact whatsoever is pure speculation because San Mateo was never
decided by the Supreme Court. Moreover, Conkling was not involved and
neither the argument nor the Journal were even mentioned by counsel when
the corporate person issue was raised before the Supreme Court a second
time in 1886.127
The treatment of Conkling’s argument by his contemporaries —
colleagues and adversaries — suggests that it became far more significant
in hindsight when seen through the “retrospectoscope.” Quite accurately
then, and in contrast to the vast majority of authors, Professor Peter C.
assertion was twice repeated and underscored, that the misquotation was not intentional.
Conkling’s argument is analyzed in depth and with great care and insight by Howard Jay
Graham. See, e.g., Graham, Conspiracy Theory, Part One, supra note 12; Graham,
Conspiracy Theory, Part Two, supra note 12 (on which this discussion relies).
123. 60 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1856).
124. In addition to Taney’s use of “persons” in Dred Scott, the Constitution used the term
“person” to refer to slaves. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. The
Amendment refuted Dred Scott in two ways: First, the Amendment declared that all persons
born or naturalized in the United States were citizens. Second, the Amendment provided
broadly that all persons were entitled to Equal Protection and Due Process. See Graham,
Conspiracy Theory, Part One, supra note 12, at 376.
125. See Aynes, supra note 68, at 307 (noting that the 1920’s view that corporation
lawyers had secretly slipped protection into the Amendment has been discredited).
126. See Conkling Argument, supra note 118, at 14-25. See also Conkling Brief, supra
note 118, at 9-17.
127. See infra pp. 245-46.
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Magrath, states “[n]othing, however, came of Conkling’s argument, except,
of course, for the now exploded conspiracy theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”128
Indeed, there is no evidence that Conkling’s argument influenced the
Supreme Court or any other court. In contrast, the arguments of Senator
Edmunds and Professor Pomeroy were extensively relied upon in the Santa
Clara Circuit decision, but Conkling’s argument largely was ignored by
contemporaries.129 Moreover, that the 6,000 copies of the Journal printed
at the order of the Senate were never distributed and seemingly
disappeared, that Conkling’s opponents neither replied to the argument nor
utilized the actual text of the Journal to support their own position and that
Conkling played no part when Santa Clara, the second corporate person
case, was heard by the Supreme Court certainly are substantial bases to
question whether Conkling’s argument was quickly recognized for the fraud
it was. Further, rather than the penultimate act of a successful conspiracy, it
is reasonable to wonder — especially in light of later developments —
whether Senator Conkling’s fraudulent argument was recognized by and a
source of deep concern to at least some members of the Court that
ultimately contributed to the Supreme Court’s refusal to decide the
corporate person question.
b. The Supreme Court Punts
The effect of Conkling’s oratory (of which the examples above are
merely illustrative and not nearly exhaustive) is not apparent because the
San Mateo case was never decided by the Court. The Court’s failure to
decide San Mateo is noteworthy and strongly suggests that the Court was
either deeply divided or deeply troubled by the case.130

128. MAGRATH, supra note 52, at 221.
129. It appears that Conkling’s argument has been mentioned only once by any court, in a
footnote in one court decision. That case involved a challenge to a state university’s
affirmative action program, not the existence of the corporate person. See Hopwood v. Texas,
861 F. Supp. 551, 584 n.91 (W.D. Tex. 1994), reversed 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
130. The suggestion is reinforced by the Court’s handling of an unrelated case that also
raised the corporate person issue, and in which counsel vigorously attacked Field’s Circuit
decisions as erroneous and unprincipled. The case was argued five months after Santa Clara
and, initially, was affirmed by an equally divided Court without opinion. See Home Ins. Co. v.
New York, 119 U.S. 129 (1886) (argued within months of San Mateo, also raising the
corporate person question). However, Home Ins. remained on the Court’s docket and was reargued and decided against the corporation on other grounds four years later, after Waite’s
death, in 1890. See id., on re-argument, 134 U.S. 594 (1890).
There is also reason to believe that the Court may have been uncomfortable with the San
Mateo case because of significant shortcomings in the record. Field’s decision below, for
example, stated that the railroad’s mortgages were in the neighborhood of $3,000 per mile
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when, in fact, as the Santa Clara record and circuit opinion made clear, they exceeded
$43,000 per mile. See San Mateo II, 13 F. at 724; Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F.
385, 440 (C.C.D. Cal 1883). This inaccuracy had extreme practical implications. Contrary to
the impression given by the San Mateo Circuit opinion, a decision in favor of the railroad
would have absolved it of any tax liability. See San Mateo II, 13 F. at 724; Santa Clara, 133 F.
at 387. See also MAGRATH, supra note 52, at 221 (noting that “[t]he Court apparently
suspected the accuracy of certain statistics submitted by the railroads and postponed
decision”); Graham, Innocent Abroad, supra note 12, at 191.
The delay also may have reflected Chief Justice Waite’s sensitivity to, and desire to avoid
criticism of the Court, see Donald G. Stephenson, Jr., The Waite Court at the Bar of History,
81 DENV. U. L. REV. 449, 479 (2003) [hereinafter Stephenson, Waite Court], and the fact that
Field’s well known associations with, and perceived zeal to protect, the railroad barons, made
him a “magnet for criticism.” See PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE
GOLD RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 274 (1997); Graham, Waite Court, supra note 12, at 533.
Field’s relationships and pro-railroad bias had been well known for a long time before San
Mateo was advanced for argument in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., D. Grier Stephenson, Jr.,
The Chief Justice as Leader: The Case of Morrison Remick Waite, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 899,
908 (1973) (noting that Field had been viewed as pro-railroads since his days on the
California Supreme Court). Likewise, that the Circuit decision grossly misstated the facts
regarding the value of the railroad’s property and the amount of the mortgages also was wellknown. See Graham, Innocent Abroad, supra note 12, at 191-94 (discussing widespread
press coverage). It seems equally likely that the Court’s reticence to discuss the issue was
triggered by something new which, perhaps in conjunction with past occurrences, gave the
Court pause. There would appear to be several possibilities.
First, it could not have escaped notice that the railroad was represented in the Supreme Court
by a coterie of Field’s friends. In this highly politicized case and with a notoriously flawed
record, the Court may have understandably been concerned about public reaction to an
expedited affirmance of Field’s Circuit decision which would have effectively absolved Field’s
railroad friends from the obligation to pay taxes based on arguments made by Field’s lawyer
friends. Second, several members — including the Chief Justice — of the Court may have
been concerned that the principal argument for the existence of the constitutional person was
made by Roscoe Conkling and, at least to some extent, was dependent on Conkling’s
credibility. Conkling had earned a reputation for self-aggrandizement and self-interested
political duplicity. See Graham, Waite Court, supra note 12, at 527 (“Waite saw through
Roscoe Conkling . . . mistrusting and dismissing him as an unsavory boss and ‘henchman’”);
MAGRATH, supra note 52, at 270 (discussing Waite’s dislike of Conkling and discomfiture that
Conkling had been nominated for the Supreme Court and view that Conkling, “the New York
spoilsman,” was an unsavory henchman); id at 262 (noting that Harlan asked Waite not to
assign him any cases argued by Conkling because of the personal enmity between the two).
See also TINSLEY E. YARBOUGH, JUDICIAL ENGIMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN 109 (1995)
(discussing Conkling’s opposition to Harlan’s Supreme Court nomination, noting that
“Conkling could be counted on to seek to embarrass” Harlan); id. at 113-14 (discussing
Conkling’s effort to have Senate reconsider the vote confirming Harlan); GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S
CONSTITUTION, supra note 12, at 574 (noting that “Harlan, Waite, Matthews, and perhaps
others, had little or no respect for Conkling”).
Third, at the conclusion of the San Mateo arguments, Field attended a dinner given by Leland
Stanford, one of the owners of the defendant railroad, for the lawyers who had represented
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Because of the explosive growth in the Supreme Court’s docket in the
period,131 delays of two to three years before a case was heard were
common. San Mateo, however, had been accelerated by the Court and was
argued two months after docketing.132 After argument, however, the case
languished, inactive and undecided for thirty-six months.133 Despite the

the Southern Pacific before the Supreme Court. See MAGRATH, supra note 52, at 221-22.
Field’s conduct clearly concerned the Chief Justice who saved a newspaper cartoon in his
personal papers that castigated Field for having done so. Id.
Standing alone, any of these facts would have justified concern, taken together in light of what
already was on the record, the Court would have been well-advised to proceed with caution.
Indeed, the Court was in no hurry to decide the constitutional corporate person question when
the issue was raised a second time. Unlike San Mateo which had initially been expedited by
the Court, Santa Clara was argued and decided in the normal course more than two years
after it was decided in the circuit. Supreme Court Docket, supra note 109 (noting that a
motion to advance was granted in San Mateo on Nov. 6, 1882) (copy in possession of author
thanks to the generous assistance of the Supreme Court Librarian); Santa Clara, 18 F. at 385
(noting that the circuit court decided Santa Clara on September 17, 1883); Supreme Court
Docket at Jan. 26-May 10, 1886, Santa Clara, 118 U.S. 394 (No. 464) [hereinafter Santa
Clara Docket] (noting that the Supreme Court heard arguments in Santa Clara and decided
the case in 1886) (copy in possession of author thanks to the generous assistance of the
Supreme Court Librarian).
131. Ten years prior to 1882, when San Mateo found its way to the Supreme Court, the
Court decided a total of 157 cases; in 1882, the Court decided 267, and in 1885, when San
Mateo was dismissed, the Court decided 280 cases. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME
COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS 238 (4th ed. 2007). Moreover, the
number of cases backlogged, and pending review was increasing almost geometrically. In
1876, there were 600 cases awaiting decision. D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., The Chief Justice as
Leader: The Case of Morrison Remick Waite, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 899, 913 (1973). In
1880, 1,212 cases were pending. Jeffrey B. Morris, Morrison Waite’s Court, 1980 SUP. CT.
HIST. SOC’Y Y.B. 65, 69 (1980). In 1884, the number had grown to 1,315 cases and to
almost 1,400 in 1886. Id.
132. At the time it was common for cases to take three years from docketing until
argument. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26 allowing for acceleration of “special and
peculiar” cases, San Mateo was argued approximately three months after decision in the
Circuit and only two months after docketing. See SUP. CT. R. 26; Supreme Court Docket, supra
note 109, at October 13, 1882 and December 19-21, 1882.
133. San Mateo was decided in the circuit on September 25, 1882. See San Mateo II, 13
F. 722. The case was docketed in the Supreme Court on October 13, 1882, argued on
December 19-21, 1882, and ultimately dismissed three years later, on December 21, 1885.
See Supreme Court Docket, supra note 109, at October 13, 1882 and December 19-21,
1882; Supreme Court Minutes at December 19-21, 1882, San Mateo, 116 U.S. 138 (No.
1063) (copy in possession of author thanks to the generous assistance of the Supreme Court
Librarian). Three years without a decision is remarkable because, at the time, opinions were
generally issued approximately two to three weeks after argument. G. Edward White, The
Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth-Century Legacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1463,
1485 (2006). The Court’s standard practice was to vote on cases at the Saturday conference
following the argument and assign the opinion with the expectation that the draft opinion (or a

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2014]

THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP

243

investment of time, talent, and money, not to mention the high stakes, the
case was stayed by stipulation on October 15, 1883, just short of one year
after it had been argued, about one month after Justice Field decided the
second railroad tax case, County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad,
Co.,134 in the Circuit.135
Two years later on November 18, 1885 and about two months before
Santa Clara was to be argued before the Supreme Court, the railroad and
the County notified the Court that the tax had been paid. The County moved
that the Writ of Error be dismissed without a decision.136 Thereafter, the
County Attorney — not the County’s counsel of record in the Supreme Court
— filed a letter with the Court, asserting that the case was moot and should
be dismissed from the docket. This suggestion of mootness was filed over
the vehement objection of the County’s Supreme Court counsel.137 The

summary) would be read to the Court by the author within two to three weeks during a
Saturday conference and then delivered orally from the bench the following Monday. See id.
See also 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, PART ONE 69-70
[hereinafter FAIRMAN, PART ONE] (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971); SWISHER, supra note 42, at 257
(writing that San Mateo was “hurried on to the Supreme Court”); 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN,
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, PART TWO 725 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971)
[hereinafter FAIRMAN, PART TWO] (discussing San Mateo’s advancement for argument).
134. 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883).
135. See Supreme Court Docket, supra note 109. After the successful effort to expedite the
case, that the case was stayed by stipulation exacerbates suspicion that the parties or the
Court, or both, had concerns about the case.
136. See Supreme Court Docket, supra note 109. At the conclusion of the Supreme
Court’s October, 1882 Term, San Mateo had been continued and held over. See Supreme
Court Docket, supra note 109. Several months later, shortly after the new term opened, and
about one month after the Circuit decision in Santa Clara, the notation “Stipulation to
postpone further consideration of case until hearing of other cases involving same question
filed & so ordered” was entered on the Supreme Court docket. See id. No reason was given
for the stipulation, but from other papers filed later, it appears that the parties might have
contemplated further development of the factual record in Santa Clara. See Answer to Motion
to Dismiss of Plaintiff in Error at 5, San Mateo, 116 U.S. 138 (No. 1063) (stating that, when
the Circuit Court lifted the stay and heard Santa Clara, that “it may have been thought . . .
that further light might be thrown on the Federal questions involved . . . .”). This suggestion is
consistent with statements made by Justice Field in correspondence to the railroad’s counsel,
John Norton Pomeroy. In that correspondence, Field noted that San Mateo would not be
decided until next term and that he previously had sent Professor Pomeroy “certain
memoranda which had been handed me by two of the Judges” which, “of course, intended
only for [Professor Pomeroy’s] eye.” Graham, supra note 52, at 1106.Thereafter, Field states
his “hope in whatever case is tried all the facts relating to the mortgage upon the property of
the Railroad . . . will be shown and also the extent to which its property has been subjected to
taxation throughout the State.” Id.
137. See Answer to Motion to Dismiss, Further Answer to Motion to Dismiss and
Supplemental Answer to Motion to Dismiss at 4-8, San Mateo, 116 U.S. 138 (No. 1063).
Although the Court treated the request as a motion to dismiss, the county actually filed a
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County’s attorneys, with the support of the State’s Attorney General, argued
that San Mateo was a test case, raising only the constitutional question, and
must be decided.138 The railroad, however, had nothing to say.
The Court dismissed the case. Yet, it did so in a way that raised
questions, especially in light of later events. In an opinion accompanying the
order dismissing San Mateo, Chief Justice Waite acknowledged that the
case was a test case.139 The Chief Justice, however, then appears to assure
the parties that the dismissal would not prejudice them or preclude them
from obtaining a ruling on the constitutional issue because the Santa Clara
case, which, by then had percolated up from the Circuit and was soon to be
argued, raised the same constitutional issue.140

“stipulation for dismissal of writ between County Board & L.D. McKisick.” Supreme Court
Docket, supra note 109, at Nov. 18, 1885. Mr. McKisick, who, according to the Supreme
Court docket, had not entered an appearance in the Supreme Court on behalf of the
defendant railroad, Supreme Court Docket, supra note 109, at Oct. 13, 1882, was the
attorney who signed the railroad’s Answer in the Circuit Court. See San Mateo Answer, supra
note 56, at 15. Mr. McKisick, however, is not listed among counsel for the defendants in the
report of the Circuit decision. See San Mateo II, 13 F. at 727.
The “stipulation for dismissal” was followed by a blizzard of other filings. A letter to counsel of
record, Messrs. A.L. Rhodes and Alfred Barstow, from the County, requested that the writ be
dismissed. Rhodes and Barstow replied, refusing to comply with their client’s wishes.
Thereafter, the County filed a “resolution of Supervisors of San Mateo County, revoking
appointment of Rhodes and Barstow as counsel and substituting John W. Ross . . . .” The
motion was briefed by Mr. Ross for the County and by Rhodes and Barstow in opposition. See
Supreme Court Docket, supra note 109, at Nov. 18–Dec. 18, 1885. The County’s brief made
the simple point that the tax had been paid, so the fight was over. See County’s Brief in Behalf
of Motion to Dismiss, San Mateo, 116 U.S. 138 (No. 1063) (filed Dec. 14, 1885). Rhodes
and Barstow argued that: (1) as counsel of record, they alone were authorized to speak for the
County; (2) that the parties had cooperated to set up “the pleadings in this cause in such a
form that they would present the Federal questions only,” even to the point of making
“arrangements” so that the County had “the use of money equal to the amount of the . . .
taxes” during pendency of the suit; and (3) dismissal would deny them payment of their
attorneys’ fees. See Answer to Motion to Dismiss at 2, 4-8, San Mateo, 116 U.S. 138 (No.
1063). Reflecting the fact that, because the state’s constitutionally authorized tax methodology
was at issue and, therefore, the state was the real party in interest, not the county, Rhodes and
Barstow were supported by written submissions from the Attorney General, the Governor and
the state Controller, all confirming their appointment as Counsel for plaintiff. See id. at 10-11;
Further Answer to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 137, at 5.
138. Id. at 2-4.
139. Cnty. of San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138, 141-42 (1885). The Court’s
minutes merely recite that the case was dismissed “per Mr. Chief Justice Waite,” making no
reference to the pending Santa Clara case, to the issues raised by that case or describing San
Mateo as a test case. See San Mateo Minutes, supra note 112, at Dec. 21, 1885.
140. San Mateo, 116 U.S. at 141-42. (“As to the objection that this was by agreement of
parties made a test case, and many others are depending on its adjudication, it is sufficient to
say that both sides agree that the suit of the county Santa Clara against the same company
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4. Round Four: Santa Clara in the Supreme Court
Three years after the San Mateo argument, the railroad was again
before the Supreme Court Arguments in Santa Clara began on January 26,
1886, a little more than one month after the San Mateo case was dismissed.
Notwithstanding the Chief Justice’s suggestion that San Mateo and
Santa Clara were essentially mirror images, there were notable differences.
For one thing, although all other railroad counsel who had previously
appeared in San Mateo were present, Roscoe Conkling — who had
delivered the lead argument for the Railroad in San Mateo and also had
filed a separate brief — was missing from the team of railroad lawyers.141
Also missing from the briefs was any reference to the Journal of the Joint
Committee.
In light of the Court’s seeming assurance that it would decide the
constitutional question, it is not surprising that the Railroad’s Santa Clara
briefs focused exclusively on the meaning of “person,” as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment.142 However, in what proved a prophetic insight, the
County’s Santa Clara brief stated:
In deciding these cases the Circuit Court gave no attention to the questions
which are denominated State questions, as contra-distinguished from the
important questions in this litigation, the Federal questions. And when the
first one of this class of cases was being prepared for trial in the Circuit
Court, counsel for the respective parties framed the pleadings in one case
— the San Mateo case — as a test case, so that all the Federal questions
and only those questions might be determined by that Court and afterwards
by this Court. The argument of that case, both in the Circuit Court and this
Court, was confined to those questions, and that, too, with manifest
propriety.

presents all the questions that are in this case, and that the parties have stipulated this need
not be taken up for decision until that is heard. The interests of the state, therefore, will be as
well protected by determination of that case as of this.”) The likelihood that the constitutional
corporate person question would be addressed must have seemed beyond peradventure.
141. See Santa Clara Docket, supra note 130, at Oct. 1883 (copy in possession of author
thanks to the generous assistance of the Supreme Court Librarian). The Supreme Court’s
Minutes from January 26-29, 1886 indicate that the case was argued over four days by D. M.
Delmas, S. W. Sanderson, former Senator George F. Edmunds, A. L. Rhodes, California
Senator William M. Evarts and E. G. Marshall. The Minutes also state that leave was granted
to Senator Edmunds to file an additional brief and to the plaintiffs in error to file a reply. See
Supreme Court Minutes at January 26-29, 1886, Santa Clara, 118 U.S. 394 (No. 464)
[hereinafter “Santa Clara Minutes”] (copy is in the possession of the author thanks to the
generous assistance of the Supreme Court Librarian).
142. 118 U.S. at 396.
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But when the Santa Clara group of cases was presented to the Circuit Court,
the defendants presented several State questions, and it may be assumed
that they will be reviewed here . . . .143

Nevertheless, until the case was called for argument, the constitutional
corporate person’s existence seemed, if not the only issue, the dispositive
issue in Santa Clara. The case was, however, to take a puzzling turn.
Just prior to argument, Mr. Chief Justice Waite apparently took the
constitutional issue off the table, stating, at least according to the Court
Reporter, that:
The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a
State to deny to any persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, applies to these Corporations. We are all of the opinion that it
does.144

Thus, the question — one of “epic importance” in constitutional law and
one of “incalculable value to the business community” — seemingly was
settled “off handedly” from the bench without written opinion.145 This despite
that San Mateo — which raised only the constitutional corporate person
question — had, contrary to the Court’s usual practice, languished
undecided for years.
But was it settled? The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Harlan,
alluded to “the grave questions of constitutional law upon which the case
was determined below,” but does so only in the context of explaining that
the Court was not deciding the constitutional issue.146 The Court was able to

143. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 56-57, Santa Clara, 118 U.S. 394 (No. 464); id. at
56-59 (“State Questions”). See also Argument of D.M. Delmas, Esq., Santa Clara, 118 U.S.
394 (No. 464); Brief for Defendant at 26, Cnty. San Bernardino v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S.
417 (1886) (No. 2757) (filed Jan. 16, 1886), Santa Clara Complaint, supra note 91, at 26
(discussing defendant’s argument that the fences are not taxable under state law).
144. 118 U.S. at 396. If the statement was literally true, it was a remarkable reversal for
among others, Justice Samuel Miller. Only fourteen years previously, Justice Miller in the
Slaughter-House Cases, stated on behalf of five other justices, that the Court strongly doubted
that the Fourteenth Amendment protected anyone other than the Freedmen. 16 U.S. 36, 72
(1873). One wonders what occurred to overcome those strong doubts. It is true, of course,
that Justice Miller was addressing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Amendment and
not the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses, but the sweeping limitations that his opinion
imposed appeared to apply to the Amendment as a whole and not just to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. But see KENDRICK, supra note 113, at 35 (quoting Miller during the San
Mateo argument to the effect that no judge ever held that Amendment was “supposed to be
limited to the negro race”).
145. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 88 (3d ed. 2000).
146. 118 U.S. at 410-11, 416-17. See also Smythe, supra note 10, at 662 (noting that
the Court’s opinion does not refer to corporate personhood and that the Court “decided that
it did not want to address the matter”). But see Fire Ass’n of Phila. v. People, 119 U.S. 110,
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avoid the constitutional question because, according to Justice Harlan’s
opinion for the Court, the tax was illegal under state law.147 In short,
California’s taxing authorities had levied the tax on fences erected along the
railroad right-of-way in addition to other railroad property. According to the
Court, California law did not authorize a tax on the fences. Because the
Court claimed that the portion of the tax illegally imposed on the fences
could not be segregated from the portion legally imposed, the entire tax was
illegal.148
5. The Supreme Court Reporter’s Mulligan: The Erroneous Headnote
that Became Law
The case would take yet another unexpected turn. On May 26, 1886,
sixteen days after the Santa Clara decision was announced, and four months
after argument was completed, Supreme Court Reporter, J.C. Bancroft
Davis wrote to Chief Justice Waite saying:

120 (1886) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting comments attributed to the Chief Justice in Santa
Clara “last term” that a corporation is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment). However, the Fire Association majority never reached the Fourteenth Amendment
question. Instead, the Court applied the long-standing rule of Paul v. Virginia and held that a
foreign corporation’s right to operate in a state is dependent entirely on comity and that a
state is permitted to discriminate between domestic and foreign corporations. Id. at 118.
147. 118 U.S. at 411.
148. Justice Harlan held that the entire tax was illegal because the illegal portion of the
assessment could not be separated from the legal assessment. Yet, Justice Harlan’s assertion
that the tax on the fences could not be separately determined and subtracted from the
aggregate tax due is contradicted by the record. The County’s Supreme Court brief states that:
The amount at which the fences were valued is $300 per mile. If the inclusion of the
value of the fences was improper, it can readily be deducted from the total valuation
apportioned to the county.
See Brief for Plaintiff in Error, supra note 143, at 60. Thus, the record not only shows that the
tax attributable to the fences was separately identifiable, the precise amount to be deducted
from the total assessment, if necessary, is provided.
Had Justice Harlan, rather than declaring the entire tax illegal, acknowledged that the amount
of the tax easily could be adjusted to account for the value assigned the fences, the Court
would have been forced to address the constitutional question. It is hard to see the Court’s
claim that the tax on fences precluded addressing the constitutional issue as anything other
than an excuse to avoid the issue. Whether the fences were or were not taxed, every taxpayer
— other than the railroads — was entitled to offset the amount of any mortgage against the
value of the taxable property before calculation of the tax due. Thus, the railroads were
subject to differential treatment with or without the tax on fences. The tax on fences simply had
no bearing on the existence of the constitutional question and clearly was not a barrier to
addressing it.
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I have a memorandum in the California cases
Santa Clara County
v.
Southern Pacific &c &c
as follows:
In opening the Court stated that it did not wish to hear argument on the
question whether the Fourteenth Amendment applies to such corporations
as are parties in these suits. All the judges were of the opinion that it does.
Please let me know whether I correctly caught your words and oblige.149

The Chief Justice replied five days later, on May 31, 1886:
I think your mem[orandum] in the California Rail Road Tax Cases expresses
with sufficient accuracy what was said before the argument began. I leave it
with you to determine whether anything need be said about it in the report
inasmuch as we avoided meeting the constitutional question in the
decisions.150

Even leaving aside that it is universally known and accepted that statements
made by judges during oral argument do not constitute law,151 the Chief
Justice’s response, although veiled in the non-confrontational kindness for
which Waite was known,152 would have been crystal clear to a lawyer, such
as the Reporter: the constitutional corporate person question was not
decided in Santa Clara. Nonetheless, the Reporter included the comments
as a kind of preface in the official report of the decision immediately before
the Court’s opinion.153 However, Mr. Davis did more.
149. The Waite-Davis correspondence was unknown for many years until discovered in the
Chief Justice’s papers in the Library of Congress (quoted in MAGRATH, supra note 52, at 22324).
150. Id.
151. For example, during oral argument, Justice Miller interrupted counsel stating that he
had “never heard it said in this Court or by any judge of it that these articles [i.e., the
fourteenth amendment] were supposed to be limited to the negro race . . . . The purport of the
general discussion in the Slaughter-House cases . . . was nothing more than the common
declaration that when you . . . construe any act of Congress, you must consider the evil which
was to be remedied in order to understand . . . what the purpose of the remedial act was.”
See KENDRICK, supra note 113, at 35. In contrast to all that has been made of the comments
attributed to the Chief Justice, no one has suggested that Justice Miller’s comments modified
his opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases.
152. See, e.g., MAGRATH, supra note 52, at 257-66, 303-05; Stephenson, Waite Court,
supra note 130, at 481-82 (quoting letter from Justice Miller complaining that Waite was
“sadly wanting” in “firmness and courage” and “anxious to be popular as an amiable kind
hearted man (which he is)”).
153. That the Reporter chose to include a discussion of his perception of the issues
addressed and a comment made from the bench, despite the Chief Justice’s caution, itself
raises questions. J. Bancroft Davis was a former president of the Newburgh and New York
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First, in the official, published version of the Court’s decision, the
Reporter presents the comments as if the exact words of the Chief Justice are
being quoted. Yet, comparison of the Waite-Davis correspondence with the
United States Reports makes clear that, however accurate the substance of
the quotation may be, the Reporter’s note to the Chief Justice did not
purport to quote what had been said in court. Instead, the Reporter’s letter
describes what he believed had been said four months earlier. In turn, the
Chief Justice’s response confirms, not the precise wording, but only the
general substance of the Reporter’s commentary with no hint of the
importance that the parties and, indeed, the Court previously had attached
to the issue. Given his explicit statement that the question had been
“avoided,” it is reasonable to assume that the Chief Justice responded
generally because he rightly believed that his response both made clear that
the issue had not been resolved and precluded any suggestion in the official
reports that it had.
Railway Company and, like Field, may have been sympathetic to the position of the railroads
before the Court. Although it is unlikely that a definitive answer can be reached, some
scholars suggest, without evidence, that perhaps Justice Field may have encouraged the
Reporter to include the remarks. See, e.g., Jess M. Krannich, A Corporate “Person”: A New
Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY L. REV. 61, 78
(2005); Graham, Waite Court, supra note 12, at 541.
Yet it is hard to imagine Reporter Davis included the comments at the behest of Justice Field
against the wishes of Chief Justice Waite. The two were long-time professional colleagues and
close personal friends. Waite and Davis had served together on the commission that
negotiated the settlement of the Alabama claims with Great Britain following the Civil War. As
lawyers and as diplomats, Waite and Davis both should have been sensitive to the need for
precise language in formal documents, such as a court opinion. Davis, at that time Assistant
Secretary of State, was one of Waite’s leading proponents when Waite was mentioned as a
candidate for the Court, urging President Grant to appoint him. Waite lived in Davis’ house
during the first year of his tenure on the Court. Moreover, Waite’s persistent efforts were
responsible for Mr. Davis’ appointment as Supreme Court Reporter. See MAGRATH, supra note
at 52, at 253-57, 297.
Justice Field’s relationship with Davis’ friend, Chief Justice Waite, was nowhere near sanguine.
In addition to his normally prickly personality, Field leveled a bitter personal attack on Waite
for supposedly slighting him in assigning responsibility for writing an opinion of the Court. See
id. at 99-100, 258-60. In fact, then-Professor Felix Frankfurter has characterized Waite’s term
on the Court as a “duel between him and Field.” See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WHITE 110 (1964). See also MAGRATH, supra note 52, at
209 (describing Field as “Waite’s great antagonist”). Moreover, although the dispute erupted
some years later, Field and Davis quarreled so bitterly that the Chief Justice was required to
intervene and, did so, on Davis’ behalf. See Alan Westin, Stephen Field and the Headnote to
O’Neill v. Vermont, 67 YALE L.J. 363, 363 (1943).
It seems more likely that Davis included the discussion on his own initiative. Davis’ service as
Reporter was characterized by, at best, questionable decisions about what should and should
not be included when the decision was published. See infra at note 157.
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Second, the text of the quotation appearing in the official volume of the
United States Reports differs from the language the Reporter presented to
the Chief Justice. The language submitted to the Chief Justice merely states
that the Court did not wish “to hear argument on the question whether the
Fourteenth Amendment” applies to corporations. The language included in
the United States Reports states that the Court declined argument on
“whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
which forbids a state to deny to any persons within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, applies to these Corporations.” Thus, it was the
Reporter, not the Chief Justice, however his words are viewed, who stated
expressly that the term “persons” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment
specifically guaranteed corporations due process and equal protection of
the laws.154 One might speculate that the Chief Justice may have agreed,
but it was for the Chief Justice — indeed, for the Court — to expressly so
state and declare the legal question resolved.
Third, just before purporting to quote the Chief Justice, the Reporter
includes in the United States Reports a description of the constitutional issue
and characterizes the arguments and briefing as focusing almost exclusively
on that issue. Notwithstanding the Reporter’s acknowledgment that the
Court had “passed by” the constitutional question,155 the juxtaposition of
this written description of issues and arguments just prior to the statement
attributed to the Chief Justice gives the inaccurate appearance that the
Chief Justice is announcing a decision rendered, after deliberate and full
consideration, in response to those arguments. Indeed, it is hard to imagine
that most readers would understand the statement attributed to the Chief
Justice as anything other than a determination of the constitutional question.
The Reporter’s approach bears a striking similarity to Conkling’s San Mateo
argument, in that, rather than stating its conclusion expressly, both rely on
“hints, intimations and distinctions made throughout”156 to mislead the
reader.

154. Whether the Amendment applied to corporations is a different question than whether
corporations are “persons” as that term is used in the Amendment. For example, counsel for
the County conceded that corporations were “persons” but emphatically denied that the
Amendment applied to protect corporations to the same extent as natural persons inasmuch
as corporations were created by the State and, therefore, could be given, or denied, such
rights as the State saw fit. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiff in Error, supra note 143, at 43-47. See
also id. at 21-36 (referring to argument of D.M. Delmas, Esq.). In addition, the Supreme
Court, at the time, repeatedly had decided whether state regulations denied corporations due
process or equal protection without reference to corporate personhood on the basis that the
Amendment had no application. See cases and discussion infra Part II.A.
155. Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 395.
156. Graham, Conspiracy Theory, Part One, supra note 12, at 377-78.
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Finally, any doubt that the Reporter intended to mislead readers to
believe that the Court had decided the corporate person issue is eliminated
by the Reporter’s inclusion of a headnote to the decision stating that the
issue had been decided. Headnotes — which are written by the Reporter
after an opinion is issued and do not bear the imprimatur of the Court —
have one purpose: to summarize the Reporter’s view of the holdings of the
Court for the convenience of readers.157 The first headnote in the official
United States Reports appears immediately following the Santa Clara case
caption and states explicitly that the Court held that corporations were
persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.158
Nothing that the Reporter said in his note to the Chief Justice provided
any warning that the Reporter intended to include a headnote asserting that
the issue had been decided. Whatever scope the Chief Justice’s letter may
have allowed the Reporter with respect to commentary on the Court’s
decision, the Chief Justice’s statement that “we avoided meeting the
constitutional question in the decision” clearly precluded the Reporter’s
assertion that the Court had decided that corporations were persons within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet, that headnote — and its
supporting commentary — has been cited repeatedly for the proposition

157. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906)
(commenting on another of Mr. Davis’ headnotes, stating that the “headnote is not the work of
the Court, nor does it state its decision” and that “[i]t is simply the work of the reporter, gives
his understanding of the decision . . . for the convenience of the profession”). The Court also
stated that the headnote upon which counsel had relied “is a misinterpretation of the . . .
decision.” Id. See also Smythe, supra note 10, at 662 (“because Davis was exercising his own
discretion as to what the Court’s opinion stated, his headnote had no precedential value, and
it did not reflect a change in constitutional doctrine”). Notably, and of no great surprise to
anyone who has read the Court’s opinion, as issued by the Court, i.e., without the reporter’s
commentary, it is patent that the corporate person question was not decided. Thus, for
example, the West Publishing version of the Santa Clara decision does not include any such
headnote, although it does include the reporter’s pre-opinion commentary and the statement
attributed to the Chief Justice. See Santa Clara, 188 U.S. 394. The Lawyers’ Edition version
includes a similar headnote, but it is last of four headnotes. See 30 L. Ed. 118, 119 (1886).
158. Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 394. This was not an isolated error. The Reporter, J. Bancroft
Davis, misstated the Court’s holding in other instances. See Frank D. Wagner, The Role of the
Supreme Court Reporter in History, 26 J. OF SUP. CT. HIST. 9, 18-19 (2001) (noting that
“inaccuracies in syllabuses have led to real problems,” referring to Mr. Davis’ headnote in
Hawley). After his death, the Reporter was severely criticized for both incomplete and
inaccurate headnotes. See 11 LAW NOTES 202 (1908) (J.C. Bancroft Davis as Reporter) (“As to
the quality of the headnotes . . . many of them entirely fail to show what the court
decided . . . .”). Cf. Westin, supra note 152, at 363 (chronicling acrimonious dispute between
Davis and Field regarding accuracy of headnote).
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that the Santa Clara court held that “corporations are persons within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.159
Even more to the point, despite the constitutional question having been
the basis for the decision in the Circuit, and despite that the Fourteenth
Amendment question — in the Reporter’s words — was “[t]he main-almost
the only-question[ ]” argued,160 Justice Harlan’s opinion for the unanimous
Court expressly reiterates what the Chief Justice told the Reporter: that the
Court had “no occasion to consider the grave questions of constitutional
law upon which the case was determined below.”161
Moreover, Justice Field, a vigorous proponent of the constitutional
corporate person issued a concurring opinion that condemns the Court for
failing to decide the question. Field’s opinion, which was issued
contemporaneously with Harlan’s and before publication of the headnote
and commentary in the United States Reports leaves no doubt that the issue
had not been decided.162 Field — the author of the Circuit decision being
reviewed and the Justice with the most personal investment in the question
— concurred in the judgment, stating his “regret that [the court] has . . .
deemed [avoiding the question] consistent with its duty to decide the
important constitutional questions involved, and particularly the one which
was fully considered in the circuit court, and elaborately argued here
. . . .”163
159. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n.15 (1978) (Powell,
J., opinion of the Court) (citing headnote); id. at 822 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing
commentary). See also Smythe, supra note 10, at 662.
160. Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396.
161. Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 411. But see Fire Ass’n of Phila. v. New York, 119 U.S. 110,
120-21 (1886) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “last term” Santa Clara court decided that
corporations were constitutional corporate persons based on comments attributed to Chief
Justice Waite by the reporter). It is hard to know what to make of this opinion in light of
Harlan’s Santa Clara opinion. On the one hand, “there is some evidence that [Harlan] was
reluctant to write opinions for the Court that did not entirely square with his personal views.”
YARBROUGH, supra note 130, at 125. At the same time, Harlan is reputed, when challenged
about apparent contradiction in his positions, to have replied, “Let it be said that I am right
rather than consistent.” Id. at 77.
162. San Bernardino, 118 U.S. at 422 (a companion case argued and decided at the
same time as Santa Clara).
163. Id. This is a remarkable opinion that has received little attention. First, Field had
nothing to say on the record in Santa Clara, the lead case. Reading the United States Reports,
for all that appears in the record, Field was just one member of the unanimous Court.
Because Field was the author of the opinion below which the Court was reviewing, his silence
might cause one to wonder if Justice Field had recused himself in Santa Clara. That, however,
was not the case. The Supreme Court Minutes from January 26 through January 29, 1886,
the days the Santa Clara case was argued, show that Field was on the bench for all of the
arguments. See Santa Clara Minutes, supra note 140, at January 26-29, 1886. To be sure,
standards regarding the circumstances in which judges ought to recuse themselves in the late
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Within less than two years of Santa Clara, a fourth justice, Waite’s ally
and principal collaborator on the Court,164 Justice Bradley, would confirm
that Santa Clara had not decided the constitutional corporate person
question in an opinion for the Court in The California Railroad Tax Cases. In
that case — which Justice Bradley characterized as “substantially similar” to
Santa Clara — Bradley wrote that the corporate person question remained
undecided.165 Astoundingly, the Reporter’s headnotes in The California
Railroad Tax Cases directly contradict the Santa Clara headnote, asserting
that the issue had not been decided in Santa Clara.166 In sum, four of the
Court’s justices — the Chief Justice to whom the holding was attributed,
Justice Harlan, the author of the Court’s opinion, Justice Field, the author of
two Circuit decisions deciding the question, including the Santa Clara
opinion reviewed by the Supreme Court and Justice Bradley — expressly
stated, contrary to the Reporter’s Santa Clara commentary and headnote,
that the corporate person issue was not decided by the Santa Clara Court.
Seen without the Reporter’s gloss, and in the context of the give and
take of courtroom dynamics, there would seem to be a strong possibility that
the Chief Justice was directing counsel to focus on the issues of interest to
nineteenth century were different from those currently in place. See Steven G. Calabresi &
David C. Presser, Reintroducing Circuit Riding: A Timely Proposal, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1386,
1397-98 (2006) (noting that, following the Justices’ usual practice, Chief Justice Marshall
recused himself from sitting on Supreme Court cases which he had decided as Circuit Justice,
but noting that practice was not uniform). Compare Ames v. Union Pac. Ry., 64 F. 165 (C.C.D.
Neb. 1894) with Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (Justice Brewer writes the circuit opinion
and sits on the case in the Supreme Court).
Field’s concurrence also is a window on the Justice’s thought processes. Without question, as
Harlan’s opinion states, the rule was that constitutional questions would be decided as a last
resort, and only when a case could be decided on no other basis. Field, however, set the rule
aside in the Circuit, 18 F. at 390, and would have had the Court do likewise, San Bernardino,
118 U.S. at 422-23, because of the self-perceived importance of the question. But every
constitutional question is important. The fact that Field believed that settled, clearly applicable
rules could be set aside when he denominated an issue as important says much about his selfimage. The fact that he thought the rest of the Court would go along with him, says even
more.
164. MAGRATH, supra note 52, at 298-99.
165. The Cal. R.R. Tax Cases, 127 U.S. 1, 28 (1888) (stating that if cases can be decided
on state law grounds it is unnecessary to decide application of Fourteenth Amendment
questions which “are so numerous and embarrassing, and require such careful scrutiny and
consideration, that great caution is required in meeting and disposing of them”). But see
Stockton v. Balt. & N.Y. R.R. Co., 32 F. 9 (C.C.D. N.J. 1887) (Bradley, Cir. J.) (asserting a few
months prior to The California Railroad Tax Cases that Santa Clara had held that corporations
were “persons” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
166. The Cal. R.R. Tax Cases, 127 U.S. at 2 (The cases “all involved the constitutionality of
tax laws of the State of California, in many respects the same constitutional questions being
presented as those which were argued (and not decided)” in Santa Clara).
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the Court. For example, the Court may have believed that it did not need
reargument of the corporate person question,167 because the Court was
thoroughly familiar with the constitutional issue having received extensive
written briefs twice in San Mateo and Santa Clara and having heard days of
argument in San Mateo.168 In addition, the constitutional corporate person
questions had been briefed and argued in several other cases heard by the
Court before Santa Clara.169
The “microscopic” state law questions, in contrast, had not been
addressed in San Mateo and, although raised in the Santa Clara Answer,
“on the trial, the point was not discussed by counsel . . . and thus the minor
point was left undetermined.”170 Directing counsel to focus on the nonconstitutional question was tantamount to asking that the record on the
other issues be developed to allow the Court to determine whether alternate
grounds existed to dispose of the case.
Moreover, then, as now, the Supreme Court does not issue unexplained
oral orders deciding notorious and strongly controverted constitutional
issues without explanation. Indeed, it is inconceivable that Chief Justice
Morrison Waite would countenance, let alone be the mouthpiece for
rendering such a bold and far reaching holding. Waite was self-restrained,
cautious, and careful and saw the judicial function as “properly a limited
one” to be exercised “modestly.”171 Waite once advised a district judge that
“the fault of Judges sometimes is to try and make too much law at once”
when they should “feel the way, and not be afraid to draw back if the

167. This, of course, was not the only time the Court advised counsel that it did not wish to
hear argument on an issue a second time. The Court issued such an instruction in a railroad
case similar to Santa Clara, for example. See FAIRMAN, PART TWO, supra note 133, at 727
(noting that Minutes in companion case to Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512
(1885) state: “The argument of these cases was commenced by Mr. A.B. Browne of counsel
for the plaintiff in error. The Court announced that it did not desire to hear further argument in
these cases.”). Humes, an opinion written by Field, held that the Fourteenth Amendment had
no application to the corporation’s claims.
168. FAIRMAN, PART TWO, supra note 133, at 727.
169. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 119 U.S. 129, 141-42 (1886) (argument of
Benjamin H. Bristow for plaintiff in error); R.R. Co. v. Richmond, 96 U.S. 521, 526-27 (1877)
(argument of Conway Robinson for plaintiff in error); Kentucky R.R. Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321,
328-30 (1885) (argument of C.B. Simrall for plaintiff in error); Chi. Life Ins. Co. v. Needles,
113 U.S. 574, 583 (1884).
170. San Bernardino, 118 U.S. at 423 (Field, J., concurring).
171. MAGRATH, supra note 52, at 209 (noting that Waite court was characterized by
caution and respect for precedent).
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ground will not hold you up.”172 Waite also jealously guarded his reputation
and that of the Court.173
At a time when the railroads were not well-regarded, when the record
and arguments (as well as Justice Field’s behavior in San Mateo) had raised
serious questions of the extent to which the railroads would go to achieve
their ends,174 and with the presence of a known apologist for the railroads
on the Supreme Court bench,175 it is extraordinarily unlikely that Chief

172. Id. at 209 (quoting letter from Waite to Robert W. Hughes, March 25, 1879).
173. MAGRATH, supra note 52, at 281-82 (noting duty to make his name as honorable as
his predecessors); id. at 97-98, 129-30, 152, 155, 159-60, 164 (discussing Waite’s
concerns with public perception of his work and that of the Court.); id. at 279 (quoting Waite:
“The effort of all should be to encourage the respect of everyone for the courts of the nation.
Anything that can by any possibility have a tendency in the opposite direction should be
avoided.”).
174. See, e.g., Paul Kens, The Credit Mobilier Scandal and the Supreme Court: Corporate
Power, Corporate Person, and Government Control in the Mid-nineteenth Century, 34-2 J. OF
SUP. CT. HISTORY 170 (2009).
175. Field had been recommended to President Lincoln for the Supreme Court by, among
others, his close friend, Leland Stanford. GOULD, supra note 87, at 153. The two had first
become friends in 1862 when Stanford was governor and Field was on the California
Supreme Court bench and Stanford became Field’s patron. Id. at 162. Field was a frequent
guest at Stanford’s house in San Francisco, was a Trustee of Stanford’s university, and,
following Stanford’s death, advised Stanford’s wife on legal and other matters. Id. at 165.
Field was also friendly with other prominent California railroad barons, including Stanford,
Huntington, Hopkins, and Crocker and so close was his relationship that questions regarding
Field’s integrity were raised even before his appointment to the Court. Id. at 154. Field’s
behavior undoubtedly contributed to those questions. Field recommended his good friend, J.
N. Pomeroy, to the railroads as counsel and he was retained, arguing both San Mateo and
Santa Clara in the Circuit. There were also repeated assertions and rumors that Field
discussed pending cases, including yet undisclosed outcomes, outside the Court with
interested parties. Despite Field’s denials, there is evidence that he did so. In private letters to
Pomeroy, Field advised that San Mateo was held over and that he had given Pomeroy
memoranda which Field had received from other Supreme Court justices. See Graham, supra
note 52, at 1106. There was also reason to believe that he may have been willing to discuss
other, undecided cases outside the Court. In Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866),
Field’s brother, David Dudley Field, represented the plaintiff, along with another well known
lawyer, Reverdy Johnson. KENS, supra note 51, at 111, 113-14. Field did not recuse himself
and, indeed, wrote the opinion for the Court. (Field sat on other Supreme Court cases argued
by his brother, Ex parte Milligan, 7 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) and Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333 (1867)). The case was argued in the spring of 1866, but not decided until
December of that year. In the summer of 1866, Reverdy Johnson told acquaintances in
Missouri that he had been given information that judgment for the plaintiff was forthcoming.
Field was believed to be the source. A.F. House, Mr. Justice Field and Attorney General
Garland, 3 ARK L. REV. 266, 269-70, 272 (1949); KENS, supra note 51, at 109. If true, such
conduct would not have been new for Field. While on the California Supreme Court, Field was
known to hold ex parte meetings with litigants. See KENS, supra note 51, at 104-05.
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Justice Waite would have delivered the gift of the constitutional corporate
person in such perfunctory fashion. Waite’s sensitivity to the impact and
reception of the Court’s decisions as well as his careful and detailed
analyses and explanations of the holdings in other, significant cases is
compelling evidence that Waite did not intend to resolve the corporate
person question in Santa Clara.176
Avoiding the constitutional question and deciding Santa Clara on the
basis of a state law question that Field had refused to address in the Circuit,
and which the Court could easily have side-stepped, not only was consistent
with Waite’s judicial approach, it may have been a veiled message that
Field — and his compatriots — could not, at least overtly, rule by personal
predilection. Chief Justice Waite, for example, had a history of using the
assignment of opinions to avoid the appearance that the Court was the
captive of any interest group so that, for example, writing responsibility for
significant pro-railroad opinions would be assigned to justices who were not
viewed as aligned with business interests.177 That John Marshall Harlan — a
known, vehement critic of C. Hollis Huntington, a founder of the defendant
Central Pacific Railroad, and of corporations generally,178 as well as no
friend of Conkling — was assigned the Santa Clara opinion could hardly

Without purporting to excuse Field’s behavior it is well to remember that standards of conduct
expected of judges were very different. In large measures these differences are due to
differences in the role of judges today that are attributable to the current ascendance of legal
realism versus the then-current notion of judges as “legal savants” whose “conception [was]
that ‘law’ was that of a body of fixed principles derived from authoritative . . . sources[,] such
as the Constitution.” See G. Edward White, Recovering the World of the Marshall Court, 33 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 781, 791, 798 (2000). Because of this perception, “it did not really matter
whether a judge helped cases come to the docket of his court.” Id. at 792. Thus, Marshall-era
justices, including both Marshall and Story instigated litigation in which they were interested. In
Marshall’s case, he wrote the writ of error petition in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304 (1816). Justice Washington granted the petition “knowing that Marshall, who
was a member of the land syndicate which was one of the litigants in the case, had drafted it.”
Id. at 784.
176. In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), for example, the Chief Justice went to great
lengths to explain and justify the holding that states might, consistently with due process,
regulate prices charged by businesses “affected with the public interest.” Waite conducted
searching research and consulted extensively with Justice Bradley while preparing the opinion
and relied on English Common Law authorities pre-dating the Constitution. See KENS, supra
note 49, at 126.
177. KENS, supra note 49, at 102 (discussing refusal to assign pro-railroad opinion to
Field); MAGRATH, supra note 52, at 258-60 (“Waite’s strategy . . . brings to mind Chief Justice
Hughes’ practice, whenever possible, of assigning liberal justices to write conservative
opinions and conservative justices to write liberal opinions in order to preserve the Court’s
image of impartiality.”).
178. LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 173
(1999).
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have been an accident, but, instead, seems a calculated statement about
the conduct of the San Mateo and Santa Clara cases and the railroad’s
attempt to invoke the Court’s aid.
Finally, the Court, as a whole, clearly had concerns about the
implications of a broad-based ruling favoring the railroads.179 During
Supreme Court argument in one of the companion cases to Santa Clara,
counsel for the County ominously made the reasons for concern explicit,
urging the Court:
to decline the exercise of an unnecessary jurisdiction . . . in the present
exasperated state of public feeling [and to refuse] to pronounce a merely
irritating decree, not needed for the protection of the substantial rights of
anyone . . . declaring that the Constitution of this sovereign State is void,

179. The Cal. R.R. Tax Cases, 127 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1888) (referring to the “numerous and
embarrassing” questions arising under the Amendment which “require such careful scrutiny
and consideration, that great caution is required in meeting and disposing of them. By
proceeding step-by-step, and only deciding what is necessary to decide, light will gradually
open upon the whole subject, and lead the way to a satisfactory solution of the problems that
belong to it. We prefer not to anticipate these problems when they are not necessarily
involved.”). See also Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 119 U.S. 129 (1886), on reargument, 134
U.S. 594 (1890) (constitutional person question argued five months after Santa Clara
argument in which Field’s circuit opinions are attacked as unprincipled; Court equally
divided).
Even Justice Field seemed to be concerned. See San Mateo II, 13 F. at 730 (Field noting that
issues were examined “with a painful anxiety to reach a right conclusion, aware as the Court is
of the opinion prevailing throughout the community that the railroad corporations of the state,
by means of their great wealth and the numbers in their employ, have become so powerful as
to be disturbing influences in the administration of the laws; an opinion which will be
materially strengthened by a decision temporarily relieving any one of them from its just
proportion of the public burdens.”); Santa Clara, 13 F. at 414 (noting “misapprehensions . . .
that have largely prevailed in the community since the trial of the San Mateo case” which also
involved a decision against the right of the state “to subject railroad property to its just
proportion of the public burdens” and making suggestions how to enforce such demands
without violating the Constitution).
Note that just two years earlier, the Supreme Court had refused to adopt Field’s San Mateo
corporate person theory and upheld an amendment to California’s incorporation statute
permitting the state to regulate prices changed by corporations formed under a version of the
statute that did not permit price regulation. See Spring Valley Water-Works v. Schottler, 110
U.S. 347 (1884). In dissent, Field quotes at length from his San Mateo circuit opinion arguing
that the regulation infringed the rights of those who had formed the corporate plaintiff. Id. at
364-73 (Field, J., dissenting). While attempting to avoid reading too much into the apparent
disagreement, it ought to be noted that Spring Valley was decided while San Mateo was being
held by the Court. It is possible that the different treatment of the two cases reflected the
Court’s discomfort with the potential breadth of a ruling in favor of corporate rights along the
lines proposed by Field.
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where your decision is an assumption of authority uncalled for by the merits
of the case . . . .180

This argument was an appeal to the Jacksonian federalism in which all of
the Justices were grounded181 and, perhaps more to the point, a reminder of
the public enmity toward railroads caused by the well-known fact that the
railroads were generating substantial profits for their owners despite the
mortgages carried because, in part, the railroads had not paid anything
other than interest on the mortgages.182 Indeed, if Field, who professed to
be immune to public criticism, was concerned enough to expressly attempt
to defuse public hostility over the issue in his Circuit opinions, almost
apologizing for the ruling and gratuitously providing advice regarding how
the state might adopt a legal tax, other Justices — especially the Chief
Justice — more attuned to criticism must have been seriously concerned.
By holding the California tax illegal on the narrow ground that it was
imposed on property that state law did not authorize to be taxed, i.e., the
fences, the Court gave all the parties something of a victory. The Court
invalidated the tax without holding that the provisions of California’s
constitution were unconstitutional and without establishing a general rule
that would have rendered similar taxes on railroads illegal. Because the
Court strictly limited its holding, it had little, if any, precedential value and
California could, if it wished, fix the problem and tax the railroads. That the
ruling denied Field and his railroad baron friends the far reaching precedent
they had hoped to obtain by manipulating the record and the judicial
process in two test cases may have seemed a bonus.
C. The Constitutional Person After San Mateo and Santa Clara: Field Ipse
Dixit Embeds the Corporate Person in the Constitution
The evidence clearly contradicts the notion that railroads and other
corporations through their politician-retainers slipped protection for
corporations into the Fourteenth Amendment sub silencio and without

180. See Argument on Behalf of Plaintiff in Error at 41, Cnty. of San Bernardino v. S. Pac.
R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 417 (1886) (No. 2757) (quoting Circuit argument).
181. See, e.g., KENS, supra note 49, at 7, 168, 172; PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 178, at
11-12, 150-51.
182. See Santa Clara Complaint, supra note 91, at 8. (Mortgage equals $46,000,000
“and no part thereof has ever been paid except the accruing interest.”). Remarkably, railroad
counsel had made the brazen and startling argument that “in so far as . . . [the railroad]
performs services for public interests and for public benefits, instead of its being an occasion
of burden of taxation, it ought to be a reason for limiting or reducing its taxation.” See Oral
Argument of Mr. Evarts for Defendants in Error at 16-17, The Cal. R.R. Tax Cases, 127 U.S. 1
(1888) (Nos. 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 1157).
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anyone noticing.183 However, in contrast to the conspiratorial, smoke-filled,
back-room Gilded Age imagery conjured by the early twentieth century
Fourteenth Amendment conspiracy theorists, when the issue is traced
through the Supreme Court’s nineteenth century post-Santa Clara decisions,
a pattern emerges which supports the conclusion that there was, indeed, a
systematic and determined effort to assure constitutional protection for
corporations. Rather than being perpetrated in secret, the maneuvering to
secure constitutional protections for corporations occurred, in the open, at
the Supreme Court, masterminded by Justice Stephen J. Field.184 Indeed, the
183. Typical of most modern authorities, J. Willard Hurst, characterizing the conspiracy
theory as ill-defined melodrama, states that no evidence supports, and the indirect evidence
contradicts, the theory. HURST, supra note 110, at 67.
184. The evidence — in Supreme Court cases, state cases and statutes, and federal
statutes — makes tolerably clear that any mid-or-late nineteenth century lawyer would have
understood “persons,” as used in the Amendment, to include corporations, notwithstanding
whatever its authors may have consciously intended and notwithstanding what Justice Field
may, or may not, have done. See id. Thus, without meaning to denigrate the role played by
Justice Field in midwifing the result, there may have been a certain inevitability about
interpreting “person” to extend constitutional protections to corporations. See, e.g., Morton J.
Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173,
177 (1985); SCHWARTZ, supra note 109, at 169 (stating that the role of corporations in the
economy made use of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect such persons natural, whatever
the framers’ intent); Mark, supra note 11, at 1447, 1463 (noting that, until the end of the
nineteenth century, corporate personhood was assumed, serving as a standard convention
and shorthand surrogate for addressing the corporators and the property they brought into the
corporation and arguing that historians unduly see Santa Clara as innovative); HURST, supra
note 110, at 62 (noting that the roots of corporate personhood “ran deep”); Aynes, supra
note 68, at 308 (stating that, at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted,
corporations were commonly understood to be persons); Gaffney, supra note 113, at 227
(arguing that Field could not have persuaded a Court to whom his views were antithetical);
RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW
55-56 (1996) (noting that corporate personality was well established and that large
businesses were treated as individual enterprises, e.g., Carnegie Steel, Rockefeller’s Standard
Oil, etc.). Thus, and not surprisingly, according corporations Fourteenth Amendment
protection did not generate significant contemporary controversy. See HURST, supra note 110,
at 68-69. Cf. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940)
(“It would be a narrow conception of jurisprudence to confine the notion of ‘laws’ to what is
found written in the statute books, and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon it.
Settled . . . practice . . . can establish what is . . . law. The Equal Protection clause did not
write an empty formalism into the Constitution. Deeply embedded traditional ways of carrying
out . . . policy . . . are often tougher and truer laws than the dead words of the written text.”).
That a corporation is a constitutional person answers only one-half of the question, however.
The penultimate question is whether corporate personhood means that a corporation has the
same (or similar) rights as a natural person. For example, one scholar has argued that even
“Justice Field would have denied to the corporations many of the rights enjoyed by natural
persons.” See Smythe, supra note 10, at 663. See also Argument for Plaintiffs in Error by J.M.
Wilson at 21, The Cal. R.R. Tax Cases, 127 U.S. 1 (1887) (Nos. 660, 661, 662, 663, 664,
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conspiracy theorists’ focus on Conkling’s role, on Robber Barons, and on
secret journals diverted attention from what was hidden in plain view.
Many authors and scholars accord Steven J. Field “great” or “near
great” status because it was he “who was largely responsible for the
expansion of substantive due process that became the major theme of
constitutional jurisprudence during the Gilded Age,” which “set the tone for
constitutional law for half a century.”185 However, relatively few recognize
that it was Field who assured constitutional protection for corporate persons
and that it was protection for the corporate person that gave significance to,
and triggered the development of, substantive due process.186 One without
the other had little value to corporate interests. On the other hand, the
1157) (even assuming constitutional corporate person was resolved by the Chief Justice in
Santa Clara, “the question still remains whether they are to be considered as standing on
precisely the same footing as natural persons.”).
185. See Albert P. Blaustein, The Twelve Great Justices of All Time, LIFE, Oct. 15, 1971, at
51, 59; Bernard Schwartz, Supreme Court Superstars: The Ten Greatest Justices, 31 TULSA L.J.
93, 108, 114 (1995).
186. Howard Jay Graham, for example, states: “[i]t has been overlooked that the later
Pembina [125 U.S. 181 (1888)] and Beckwith [129 U.S. 26 (1889)] dicta clinching the
doctrine . . . were written by Field.” Graham, Innocent Abroad, supra note 12, at 206. Some
have even denigrated the importance and significance of Field’s role, albeit wrongly, with
respect to constitutional corporate personhood. Paul Kens probably takes the most extreme
view:
The impact of Field’s opinions on constitutional doctrine, however, was limited . . . .
Ultimately, the full Court did confirm the result of Field’s circuit court ruling but it did
so on the basis of a peculiarly in the California law, ignoring the sweeping
constitutional theories upon which Field had based his circuit court opinions.
Field’s theory of corporate equal protection was a grand experiment that failed. The
Supreme Court ignored it, and Field himself soon abandoned it. Never again did he
attempt to employ the equal protection clause to invalidate a tax on corporations.
KENS, supra note 51, at 246. Professor Kens’ statement illustrates that literal truth, can
conceal broader reality. See infra at pp. 267-68.
The significance of Field’s opinions, of course, lies not in whether Field applied the theory to
invalidate a state tax on corporations, but more generally, in assuring that Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment protected artificial persons. Focusing on the substantive result of
Field’s future equal protection (and due process) cases obscures Field’s ingenuity in using
cases holding that constitutional protections were not denied to embed the corporate person
into the Constitution. See infra at pp. 270-71, 275. Moreover, Field can hardly be said to
have “failed” given the subsequent and continuing reliance by both courts and scholars on
Santa Clara and its progeny as definitively establishing that corporations are persons within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 780 (1978) (citing Santa Clara for proposition that “[i]t has been settled for almost a
century that corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
See also id. at 822 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Santa Clara for the proposition
that “a corporation is a ‘person’ entitled to protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment”).
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protections which both doctrines together provided corporations were
priceless, serving as a catalyst of the growth that was transforming the
American economy and culture.
Field’s effort to see that corporations were constitutional persons came
to fruition in the roughly ten and one-half years between the May 10, 1886
decision in Santa Clara and his December 1, 1897 retirement from the
Supreme Court. In that period, the Supreme Court decided eleven cases in
which the existence of the constitutional corporate person was addressed
expressly in the opinion for the Court. Steven Field wrote for the Court in the
first seven cases. Six of those opinions were announced in a period of
slightly more than ten months, between March 19, 1888 and January 7,
1889.187 In each case, resolution of the corporate person issue was
unnecessary, but Field explicitly and definitively asserted with, at best,
cursory discussion, that the Court already had decided conclusively that
corporations were persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In four of the opinions which he wrote for the Court, Field cites the
Supreme Court’s Santa Clara ruling as authority. However, Field’s citation
refers, not to the Court’s opinion, but to either the first page of the case (on
which the erroneous headnote appears) or to the Reporter’s description of
the pre-argument commentary of Chief Justice Waite. As each new opinion
issues, Field builds a cross-corroborating web of alleged Supreme Court
authority for the constitutional corporate person by citing, in addition to
Santa Clara, one or more of his prior decisions in which he had asserted, as
a fact, that the issue had been previously settled.
In contrast, the question of constitutional corporate personhood was
implicit, but not expressly addressed, in several other cases decided between
May 1886 and December 1897. Two things are striking about those cases.
First, Stephen Field wrote none of the Court’s opinions. Second, despite that
the constitutional corporate person issue arguably was critical to some of
those decisions, none of the opinions expressly addresses the point nor cites
Santa Clara or any other case addressing the issue.188
187. Inasmuch as Chief Justice Waite is viewed by many as having curbed Field’s ability to
write his expansive views into law, it ought not go unnoticed that Field’s seven opinions were
announced in a period that begins with Waite’s incapacitation and ultimate death on March
23, 1888. Moreover, from February 1887 until just prior to his death, Waite “worked . . .
incessantly” on preparation of the opinion in the Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1887), a case
which consumes more than 500 pages and an entire volume of the United States Reports.
KENS, supra note 51, at 167. See Stephenson, Waite Court, supra note 130, at 449.
188. The contrast between these cases and Field’s decisions asserting that the
constitutional corporate person issue had been resolved is striking. The analytic model in every
case — adjudication of the corporation’s substantive due process or equal protection claims is
identical with the analytic approach used in all of Field’s corporate persons decisions — with
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Just short of two years after the Supreme Court’s Santa Clara decision
was issued, Field, writing for the Court, asserted for the first time that the
constitutional corporate person question was settled. This, of course, was
exactly what, eighteen months earlier in his County of San Bernardino
concurrence, Field had complained that the Santa Clara Court did not
do.189
one exception: Field’s decisions, unlike those of every other justice, expressly assert that a
corporation is a constitutional person. See Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S.
165 (1893) (Brown J.) (treating a corporation as a person protected by the Fifth Amendment).
See also Mayer, supra note 109, at 582. Yet, despite holding that the corporate plaintiff was
deprived of its property without due process of law, the Court never mentions the constitutional
corporate person question. Noble, 147 U.S. at 176-77. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. R.R. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 136 U.S. 114, 118 (1890). (Lamer, J.) (assuming application of the Fourteenth
Amendment to corporations, but denying relief); New York v. Roberts, 171 U.S. 658, 662
(1898); Chi., Burlington, & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241, 257, (1897); Adams
Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 228 (1890); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska,
164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (taking of private property of a person or corporation without
consent for private use violates due process of law); Bell’s Gap R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134
U.S. 232 (1889) (finding no discrimination versus “any persons or corporation,” but assuming
Fourteenth Amendment protects corporation).
In the years immediately before the Supreme Court decided Santa Clara, the Court several
times had rejected claims that corporations had been denied due process and equal
protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Significantly, without expressly
addressing the corporate person issue, the Court, as it would after Santa Clara, generally
decides the case on the merits of the due process and equal protection questions. These cases
may reflect the view that, person or not, the Amendment had no application to the regulation
at issue or to corporations.
In Chi. Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U.S. 574 (1884), plaintiff claimed that its constitutional
rights were violated by regulations imposed by Illinois. After analyzing the application of the
regulations, the Court held “[t]here is no denial . . . of the equal protection of the laws; nor
any deprivation of property without due process of law . . . .” Needles, 113 U.S. at 584. In
The Ky. R.R. Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 328 (1885) counsel argued that “[c]orporations are
persons within the purview of § 1 [of the] Fourteenth Amendment.” After analyzing the
application of the Kentucky statutes, the Court held that equal protection had not been
denied. The Ky. R.R. Tax Cases, 115 U.S. at 336. In Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512
(1885) counsel argued that “[a] railway company is a citizen and a person” protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 516. The Court, speaking through Justice Field, found the due
process and equal protection claims “untenable” because there was no discrimination against
the railroad. Id. at 523. Finally, in Stone v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307, 332,
347 (1886), decided just days before arguments began in Santa Clara, the Court rejected a
challenge to Mississippi’s regulation of railroad rates. In doing so, without addressing the
corporate person question, Chief Justice Waite stated that the power to regulate could not
“amount . . . to a taking of private property without just compensation, or without due
process of law . . . within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment . . . nor take away from
the corporation the equal protection of the laws.”
189. Cnty. of San Bernardino v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 417, 422 (1886) (Field, J.,
concurring).
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In Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Company v.
Pennsylvania,190 a Colorado corporation argued that a licensing fee
imposed by Pennsylvania denied it equal protection of the laws because a
similar fee was not imposed on Pennsylvania corporations.191 Although the
Court found no impermissible discrimination and denied relief, Field, albeit
in dicta, peremptorily declared that a corporation was a person:
Under the designation of person there is no doubt that a private corporation
is included. Such corporations are merely associations of individuals united
for a special purpose, and permitted to do business under a particular
name, and have a succession of members without dissolution. As said by
Chief Justice Marshall, ‘the great object of a corporation is to bestow the
character and properties of individuality on a collective and changing body
of men.’ Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, 562.192

190. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 125
U.S. 181 (1888). The issue arose in other cases (albeit not directly addressed by the Court)
between the Santa Clara and Pembina decisions.
In 1887, the Court re-examined its holding in Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445
(1874). Morse had equated the rights of a corporation to remove a case to federal court with
the right of a “natural citizen.” Id. at 455. In Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186, 195 (1887),
Iowa argued that a foreign corporation was not a Fourteenth Amendment “person.” The Court
reaffirmed Morse equating a corporation’s removal right with those of “any individual citizen.”
Id. at 200. The Court never mentions the constitutional corporate person or Santa Clara,
which had been decided only ten months earlier.
In Fire Ass’n. of Phila. v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 111-13, 117 (1886), a Pennsylvania
insurance company claimed that it was denied equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment because New York taxed the company in a manner different than New York
corporations. Applying Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), the Court held that,
because corporations were creatures of state law, other states were not even required to
recognize the existence of foreign corporations. Fire Ass’n., 119 U.S. at 118-19. Thus,
because New York was not obliged to recognize the plaintiff corporation at all, it was not
required to treat it as a constitutional person. Id. at 117-18. In dissent, Justice Harlan,
ironically enough, the author of Santa Clara, began what was to become a mantra-like
incantation of his and of Justice Field: Santa Clara had decided that corporations were
constitutional persons entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection, in this case, whether
foreign or native. Id. at 120-21.
Fire Association may represent the Gilded Age Court at its schizophrenic best. It seems more
likely, however, that at least some of the Justices may not have appreciated the implications of
or uses to which Santa Clara was being put. Norfolk & W. R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U.S.
114, 118 (1890) (deciding that corporation was not denied equal protection without
mentioning corporate persons). Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S.
418, 440 (1890) (finding potential deprivation of property without due process and denial of
equal protection without mentioning corporate person questions).
191. Pembina, 125 U.S. at 182-83.
192. Id. at 189. This discussion is a précis of the rationale for the constitutional corporate
person that Field developed at length in his Circuit opinions in San Mateo and Santa Clara.
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As if to reinforce the claim that the issue was no longer open to discussion,
Field cites no other authority for his assertion and, despite the fact that
Field’s San Mateo and Santa Clara Circuit opinions cover a total of eightynine pages in the Federal Reporter, offers no further analysis.
No other analysis was needed because, person or not, the plaintiff
corporation was an out-of-state corporation and, therefore, according to the
Court’s long settled jurisprudence was in a different class than a
Pennsylvania corporation vis a vis state regulation. In other words, despite
his assertion that the plaintiff was a constitutional corporate person, in this
case it did not matter.
Field swept away the argument that the corporation had been denied
equal protection, holding that “[t]he application of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution to the statute imposing the license tax . . . is
not . . . apparent.”193 Applying long settled principles, Field held:
The plaintiff in error is not a corporation within the jurisdiction of
Pennsylvania . . . . The State is not prohibited from discriminating in the
privileges it may grant to foreign corporations as a condition of their doing
business or hiring offices within its limit . . . . The states may, therefore,
require for the admission within their limits of the corporations of other
States, or any number of them, such conditions as they may choose without
acting in conflict with the concluding provision of the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment.194

Perhaps, because the Santa Clara Court’s refusal to decide the
constitutional corporate person question — and his noisy objection thereto
— might have been still in the minds of his Supreme Court colleagues and
Court observers, or because Justice Bradley’s opinion in The California
Railroad Tax Cases which was issued at virtually the same time that Pembina
was issued, stated expressly that Santa Clara had not decided the
question,195 Field never mentions the Santa Clara decision in his Pembina
opinion.196 Curiously, however, Field cites an 1887 circuit opinion written by

See San Mateo II, 13 F. at 738-48 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) and 18 F. 385, 398-403 (C.C.D. Cal.
1883).
193. Pembina, 125 U.S. at 188.
194. Id. at 189. See also Fire Ass’n, 119 U.S. 110 (applying same rule of law over Justice
Harlan’s Santa Clara-based dissent).
195. Pembina, 125 U.S. at 181 (issued on March 19, 1888). The Cal. R.R. Tax Cases were
argued from January 11 to January 13, 1888, and the opinion was issued April 30, 1888.
See also Ky. R.R. Tax Cases, 115 U.S. at 321.
196. Written by Field, and decided twenty years earlier in the same year that the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 174-75 (1868), never mentions the
corporate person issue, but comes to the same conclusion as Pembina. Paul reinforces that
Field overreached to address the corporate person issue in Pembina. See also Fire Ass’n, 119
U.S. at 118-19 (applying Paul, upholding differential state regulation of foreign corporation).
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Justice Bradley which, although disagreeing with Pembina on the merits,
concluded that in Santa Clara “the doctrine that corporations are not
citizens or persons, within the protective language of the constitution, was
unanimously disapproved, and the court expressly held that [corporations]
are entitled, as well as individuals, to equal protection of the laws, under the
fourteenth amendment of the constitution.”197
About one month after Pembina, the Supreme Court decided Missouri
Pacific Railway Company v. Mackey.198 Once again, Field wrote the opinion
for the Court. In Missouri Pacific, Field’s overreaching is more blatant. The
case challenged a Kansas statute abrogating the fellow-servant rule, making
“[e]very railroad company organized or doing business in this state” liable
for damages suffered by one employee as the result of the negligence of
another employee.199 As in Pembina, Field first dismissed out of hand the
contention that the Fourteenth Amendment applied:
Such legislation does not infringe upon the clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requiring equal protection of the laws, because it is special in
its character; if in conflict at all with that clause, it must be on other
grounds. And when legislation applies to particular bodies or associations,
imposing upon them additional liabilities, it is not open to the objection that
it denies to them the equal protection of the laws, if all persons brought
under its influence are treated alike under the same conditions.200

After holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the type of
state legislation at issue, Field drops a single, unnecessary, and logically
disconnected sentence, stating: “It is conceded that corporations are
persons within the meaning of the amendment.”201
In Mackey, Field begins construction of a cross-corroborating web of
Supreme Court authority asserting that a corporation is a constitutional
person. In Mackey, Field cites both Santa Clara and Pembina as authority
for his “concession” that corporations are persons protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Field rests his “concession,” not on a reference to
the Santa Clara Court’s opinion, but on citation to the page of United States
Reports on which the inaccurate headnote appears.202 Thereafter, Field
picks up where he had left off, again asserting that the Fourteenth

197. Pembina, 125 U.S. at 186, 190 (citing Stockton v. Balt. & N.Y. R.R. Co., 13 F. 9
(C.C.D. N.J. 1887), where Justice Bradley “was not present at the argument” “and took no
part in [the Pembina] decision”).
198. 127 U.S. 205 (1888).
199. Id. at 206.
200. Id. at 209.
201. Id. at 209-10.
202. Field’s citation reads “Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 118
U.S. 394 . . . .” Id. at 210.
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Amendment did not apply because “the business of operating a railway
would seem to call for special legislation . . . having for its object the
protection of their employees as well as the safety of the public.”203 The
constitutional corporate person “concession,” thus, was classic obiter dicta.
The corporate person question next arose in a Contract Clause
challenge, rather than in a Fourteenth Amendment case. Once again, Field
inserted unnecessary dicta describing corporations as vested with the
attributes of a natural person.
In Georgia R.R. and Banking Co. v. Smith,204 the railroad argued that
the charter conferred on it by Georgia permitted it to charge certain rates.205
However, after the charter was issued, Georgia adopted a new Constitution
which authorized the legislature to set railroad tariffs.206 The company
claimed that such rate regulation was an illegal impairment of contract, i.e.,
its charter.
Despite that the constitutional prohibition on state impairment of
contracts does not hinge on whether the contract was held by an individual
or a corporation, Field went out of his way to inextricably intertwine the two:
The incorporation of the company, . . . [permits] numerous parties . . . to
act as a single body for the purposes of its creation, or as Chief Justice
Marshall expresses it, by which ‘the character and properties of individuality’
are bestowed ‘on a collective and changing body of men,’ Providence Bank
v. Bellings, 4 Pet. 514, 562 . . . .207

Field’s corporate person commentary was a gratuitous précis of the basis for
the corporate person theory that he had espoused in his San Mateo and
Santa Clara Circuit opinions.
As he had in Pembina and in Mackey, Field held that, person or not, the
railroad’s charter contained no language authorizing it to set rates on its
own, free of state regulation.208 Thus, Field’s assertion that the charter
conferred the “properties of individuality” was dicta and, as was the case in
Pembina and Missouri Pacific, would have attracted little notice because

203. Mackey, 127 U.S. at 210. A companion case was decided the same day on the
authority of Missouri Pacific. See Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U.S. 210
(1888). Although Herrick contains no additional analysis, merely referring back to Missouri
Pacific, Justice David Brewer, Field’s nephew, later cites Herrick as one of several authorities
settling the corporate person question. See Gulf, Colorado, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165
U.S. 150, 154 (1896). For this reason, Herrick is counted among Field’s corporate person
decisions.
204. 128 U.S. 174 (1888).
205. Id. at 177.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 179.
208. Id. at 181-82.
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Field inserted the dicta in a ruling denying a corporation’s plea for
constitutional protection.
Field’s next opportunity to address the constitutional corporate person
came two months later, in Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway Co. v.
Beckwith.209 In Beckwith, the plaintiff challenged, on both Fourteenth
Amendment due process and equal protection grounds, an Iowa law
providing double damages for injuries caused by a railroad in certain
circumstances.210
Field begins his analysis by once again asserting the unquestionable
existence of the constitutional corporate person: “It is contended by counsel
. . . as the basis of his argument, and we admit the soundness of his
position, that corporations are persons within the meaning of [section one of
the Fourteenth Amendment].”211 With several decisions asserting the
existence of a constitutional corporate person behind him, Field now
expressly asserts that the Santa Clara Court did precisely what he had
contemporaneously complained it did not do212 — decided that a
corporation was a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
According to Field:
it was so held in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118
U.S. 394, 396, and the doctrine was reasserted in Pembina Mining Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189. We admit also . . . that corporations can
invoke the benefits of provisions of the Constitution and laws which
guarantee to persons the enjoyment of property, or afford to them the
means for its protection, or prohibit legislation injuriously affecting it.213

Field now explicitly rests his claim that the issue had been decided, not on a
general reference to the first page of the Santa Clara case (where the
headnote appears) as he had in Mackey, but on a specific reference to the
page containing the Reporter’s notes and commentary.214 Moreover, Field’s
dicta for the first time expands the concept of the constitutional corporate
person beyond the protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment and

209. 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
210. Id. at 28, 34-35.
211. Id. at 28.
212. Cnty. of San Bernardino v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 417, 422-25 (1886) (Field, J.,
concurring).
213. 129 U.S. at 28.
214. Id. at 28. Field’s Santa Clara citation in Beckwith reads as follows: “118 U.S. 394,
396.” In the United States Reports, the Court’s opinion in Santa Clara begins one page after
the page cited by Field, i.e., on page 397. Page 394 contains the inaccurate headnote. Page
396 contains only the statement attributed by the Reporter to Chief Justice Waite and a
portion of the Reporter’s description of counsels’ arguments. Field could reference Santa Clara
without fear of contradiction because Chief Justice Waite had been dead for about ten months
at the time Beckwith was issued.
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asserts that corporations are entitled to the protection of any constitutional
or legal provision “guarantee[ing] . . . persons the enjoyment of
property.”215
In Beckwith, Field again upheld the validity of a state statute in a way
that marginalized the constitutional corporate person:
[T]he clause does not limit, nor was it designed to limit, the subjects upon
which the police power of the state may be exerted. The State can now, as
before, prescribe regulations for the health, good order and safety of
society, and adopt such measures as will advance its interest and prosperity.
[W]hen the calling or profession or business is attended with danger, or
requires a certain degree of scientific knowledge upon which others must
rely, then legislation properly steps in to impose conditions upon its exercise.
The concluding clause of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment
simply requires that such legislation shall treat alike all persons brought
under subjection to it. The equal protection of the law is afforded when this
is accomplished. Such has been the ruling of this Court in numerous
instances where that clause has been invoked against legislation supposed
to be in conflict with it.216

Thus, the legislation was valid, whether applied to a corporate person or to
a natural person, and Field’s commentary on the issue is, yet again,
dicta.217 For the fifth consecutive time, Field’s corporate person appears in a
ruling denying a corporation relief for alleged constitutional violations.
The Court next addressed the constitutional corporate person expressly
the following term. Once again, Justice Field spoke for the Court. In Home
Insurance Co. v. New York,218 the Court upheld a state statute imposing
taxes on corporations against a variety of constitutional challenges,
including an attack based on the Fourteenth Amendment.
Field first held that the legislature’s “action in this matter is not the
subject of judicial inquiry in a federal tribunal.”219 Thereafter, Field also held
that the Fourteenth Amendment “does not prevent the classification of
property for taxation . . . [n]or does the amendment prohibit special

215. Id. at 28.
216. Id. at 29.
217. Id. Any question that Field’s corporate person discussion is pure surplusage is
resolved by the following: In 1885 — one year prior to the Supreme Court’s Santa Clara
decision, but after the San Mateo case was argued and after Field’s Santa Clara decision in
the Circuit — Field decided a nearly identical Fourteenth Amendment challenge by a
corporation without ever mentioning the constitutional corporate person issue. See Missouri
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885). Comparison of Field’s opinions in Beckwith and
Humes — especially the ratio decidendi — confirms the extent of Field’s post-Santa Clara
overreaching.
218. 134 U.S. 594 (1889).
219. Id. at 600.
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legislation . . . [so long as] all . . . are treated alike under similar
circumstances and conditions . . . .”220 Because the New York statute
subjected all entities “of the same kind . . . to the same tax . . .[,] [t]here is
no discrimination in favor of one against another of the same class.”221
As he had done in a growing list of cases ruling against corporate
claims, Field confirmed the existence of the constitutional corporate person.
Immediately after characterizing the corporation’s constitutional claims as
untenable, Field nonetheless states “[i]t is conceded that corporations are
persons within the meaning of this Amendment. It has been so decided by
this court.”222 This time, Field eschews reliance on Santa Clara. Instead,
Field predicates his assertion that the issue “has been so decided” solely on
his Pembina decision.223

220. Id. at 606.
221. Id. at 607. Field also cites five of his previous decisions in support of the proposition
that the statute is not discriminatory. Three of the decisions are pre-Santa Clara decisions, only
one of which involves a corporation. That case, Humes, held that there was no discrimination
without addressing the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to corporations. The other
two cases were also decisions that Field had written. Both asserted that corporations are
persons protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The citations read: “Missouri Pacific Railway
v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205, 209; [and] Minneapolis Railway Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 32.”
The Mackey reference is to a portion of the opinion finding no discrimination that has nothing
to do with the corporate person. The Beckwith reference cites a page addressing both issues.
222. Home Ins. Co., 134 U.S. at 606.
223. Id. The reason for this is not clear. However, the history of Home Insurance raises
intriguing questions. Home Insurance was originally argued five months after Santa Clara was
decided. The constitutional corporate person issue was one of several pivotal issues
emphasized by the parties. In fact, the Attorney General of New York directly challenged the
correctness of Field’s San Mateo Circuit decision, arguing that “the broad scope given to the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, by this [San Mateo] decision is not sustainable on
principle or reason.” 119 U.S. at 146. That counsel attacked Field’s circuit decision — and
not the Supreme Court’s decision — months after Santa Clara was decided, is yet another
indication that the Santa Clara court was not viewed by the contemporary Bar as having
decided the issue.
The issue was never addressed in 1886, however. The Court split evenly, four to four, and,
thus, affirmed, without opinion, the state court decision. Id. at 148. The issues on which the
Court split, whether the nature of the tax, the even handedness of its application, or the
corporate person, were not revealed. The “decided, not decided” handling of the corporate
person issue in Santa Clara, see 18 F. at 402, its subsequent equivocal treatment by relatively
contemporaneous cases, see 18 F. at 398, the contemporaneous confusion about the
significance of the ruling in the lower courts at the time, see 18 F. at 398, and the clear
statement, two years later, in California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 28 (1888) (Bradley,
J. asserting “unnecessary for us to decide the question raised under the Fourteenth
Amendment), leave much room to wonder what, if any, role the corporate person played in
the split. In any event, the Court granted re-argument on February 7, 1887 and the case was
reheard by a full bench on March 18 and 19, 1890, and the opinion issued on April 7, 1890.
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In an 1892 case, Charlotte, Columbia and Augusta v. Gibbes,224 Field
again asserted that corporations had been conclusively determined to be
persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment when it was
unnecessary to do so. Gibbes, as had several of Field’s earlier constitutional
corporate person decisions, involved a tax levied upon a railroad which it
claimed violated the Fourteenth Amendment. As he had in the other
decisions, Field dismissed the substantive constitutional objection on the
merits:
That the state has the power to prescribe the regulations mentioned there
can be no question. Though railroad corporations are private corporations
as distinguished from those created for municipal and governmental
purposes, their uses are public. They are formed for the convenience of the
public in the transportation of persons and merchandise and are invested
for that purpose with special privileges . . . . Being the recipients of special
privileges from the State, to be exercised in the interest of the public, and
assuming the obligations thus mentioned, their business is deemed affected
with a public use, and to the extent of that use is subject to legislative
regulation . . . .225

Moreover, Field found that, whether the plaintiff was an artificial or a
natural person, “[t]he rule of equality” had not been violated because “[a]ll
railroad corporations in the state are treated alike . . . .”226
Despite the fact that defendant’s “public” character and the equality of
treatment rendered it unnecessary to decide whether corporations were
constitutional persons,227 Field again elected to explicitly confirm the
existence of the constitutional corporate person. Field stated: “Private
corporations are persons within the meaning of the [fourteenth] amendment
. . . .”228 According to Field: “[i]t has been so held in several cases by this
court. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394;
Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189; Minneapolis & St.
Louis Railroad Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26.”229 Thus, Field, in this, his
seventh consecutive opinion on the subject in less than four years, asserted
that the question whether a corporation was a person was settled not only in
Santa Clara (which he knew contained no such holding), but by misleading,
if not wholly inaccurate, dicta in two other decisions that he had written.

224. 142 U.S. 386 (1892).
225. Id. at 393.
226. Id. at 394.
227. Compare Charlotte, Columbia, & Augusta R.R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386 (1892),
with Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885).
228. Gibbes, 142 U.S. at 391.
229. Id.
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Field would serve on the Court just short of six more years. His legacy in
this respect was, however, secure. The question whether a corporation was
a constitutional person now appeared to have been at least affirmed, if not
decided, in seven opinions written by Field, and, in a revisionist gilding
added by Field, to Santa Clara.
One of the remarkable aspects in Field’s campaign to establish a
constitutional corporate person is that he did so in a line of forgettable
cases, all of which ruled against the corporate plaintiff. Doing so arguably
allowed Field to avoid the scrutiny that asserting the existence of the
constitutional corporate person in a case rendering judgment for a
corporation would have engendered due to his well-earned pro-railroad
reputation. Likewise, by affirming constitutional corporate personhood only
in cases where the question was irrelevant, Field avoided the attention given
rulings that were necessary predicates for a holding of the Court.
Field’s approach allowed him to accomplish in plain view what
Conkling, and the best lawyers the railroads could hire, had been unable to
deliver. By shifting the focus of the discussion from the text of the
Amendment and the intent of the authors and doing so in cursory,
innocuous, conclusory, and unnecessary assertions in run-of-the-mill
decisions, Field affirmed the conclusion — without providing any rationale
— of his Circuit opinions in San Mateo and Santa Clara. Thus, a
cornerstone of American constitutional law was laid on a foundation of
historical myth. Others would build on Field’s foundation.
D. With a Little Help from His Friends
After Gibbes, Field never again addressed the question of the
constitutional corporate person. There were, however, four decisions
between 1896 and 1898 (which were argued, if not decided before Field’s
retirement) in which the Supreme Court expressly addressed the question of
whether a corporation was a person for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
Three of the decisions, were written by Justice Harlan.230 The fourth decision
was written by Justice David Brewer.231 Justice Brewer, perhaps
coincidentally, perhaps not, was the nephew of Justice Field.232
All of the opinions assert that the question of the constitutional corporate
person was decided in Santa Clara. Although one of the decisions cites the
first page of the Santa Clara case, the other three refer to the page
containing the Reporter’s commentary. All of the cases cite Field’s decisions
as authority, asserting, as a given, that the question of the constitutional
230. Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896); Blake v.
McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
231. Gulf, Colorado, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
232. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 107 (2002).
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corporate person had been settled. In contrast to Field’s opinions, all of
which ruled against the railroad and business interests, the Court now
began to use the constitutional corporate person to render decisions in favor
of corporations.233
The issue was addressed by the Court in December 1896, one year
before Field retired.234 The Court’s opinion demonstrates that Field had
transformed the inaccurate headnote and the commentary attributed to
Chief Justice Waite into the law of the land. In Covington and Lexington
Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford,235 the Court held that “[i]t is now settled that
corporations are persons within the meaning of the constitutional provisions
forbidding the deprivation of property without due process of law as well as
a denial of the equal protection of the laws.”236 The Court rested its
conclusion on Santa Clara as well as Field’s Pembina,237 Beckwith,238 and
Gibbes239 decisions.
The Covington opinion was written by Justice Harlan. Harlan, of course,
was the author of Santa Clara, in which he had stated, and forcefully, that
the Court was not addressing the question whether a corporation was a

233. See, e.g., Smyth, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Gulf, Colorado, & Safta Fe Ry. Co., 165 U.S.
150 (1897); Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co., 164 U.S. 578 (1896).
234. By this time, Justice Field’s active participation in the life of the Court had declined
significantly on account of physical and mental impairments. See REHNQUIST, supra note 232,
at 98 (noting that “[d]uring the winter of 1896-97 [Field’s] condition worsened and his
questions in the courtroom indicated that he had no idea of the issues being presented by
counsel.”); SWISHER, supra note 42, at 442 (noting that during the winter of 1896-97, Field
became noticeably feeble, failed to follow arguments, and forgot having voted on cases). See
also Walter Wellman, Supreme Court Opens, CHI. TIMES-HERALD, Oct. 12, 1897, at 12;
Walter Wellman, Justice Field to Rest, CHI. TIMES-HERALD, Oct. 13, 1897, at 1; Walter
Wellman, Field Will Quit Dec. 1, CHI. TIMES-HERALD, Oct. 15, 1897, at 5; and Walter
Wellman, Story of Justice Field, CHI. TIMES-HERALD, Oct. 16, 1897, at 6 (collectively,
describing Field’s decline, inability to ambulate without assistance and failing memory). Field’s
decline is reflected by the fact that, between 1870 and 1892, it was common for Field to write
between twenty to thirty opinions a year (for the Court, concurring and dissenting), by contrast,
Field was the author of only eleven total opinions in 1896, of which only two were for the
Court and six were dissents. Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller’s biographer states that by early
1896, the Chief Justice would no longer assign Field majority opinions. JAMES W. ELY, THE
CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910, at 48 (1995). Field resigned effective
December 1, 1897. See REHNQUIST, supra note 232, at 98. See also OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 28-29 in 7 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT (Stanley N. Katz ed., 2006) (describing Field’s last years
as a member of the Court).
235. 164 U.S. 578 (1896).
236. Id. at 592.
237. Pembina Consol. Silver Mineral Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888).
238. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
239. Charlotte, Columbia, & Augusta R.R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386 (1892).
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person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.240 It is hard to
believe that Harlan was confused on the point because his Santa Clara
opinion had provoked a concurrence by Field condemning the Court, and
therefore, Harlan, for refusing to decide the question.241
The Court next addressed the corporate person question in Gulf,
Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Ellis,242 in which the Court states: “[i]t
is well settled that corporations are persons within the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”243 In
addition to Santa Clara, the Ellis court — speaking through Justice Field’s
nephew, David Brewer — rests its decision on five opinions, all written by
Justice Field.244 Notably, although without explicit reference to the circuit
opinions, the Gulf Colorado Court seems to invoke the corporation
aggregate reasoning first articulated by Field in the circuit decisions in San
Mateo and Santa Clara and touched upon in Pembina — that, in protecting
a corporation’s rights, a court is actually protecting the rights of the
individuals who are members of the corporation.245
240. 118 U.S. at 410, 411, 416. Cf. Santa Clara, 18 F. 385, 389-90 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883)
(Field, Cir. J.) (refusing to consider state law issues because of importance of constitutional
questions); id. at 444-45 (Sawyer, J.) (refusing to consider state law issues because of
importance of constitutional questions). This may explain Justice Harlan’s failure in Covington,
his first opinion for the Court on the issue, to cite a specific page of the Santa Clara opinion in
support of his position, and his referring, instead, only to the first page of the published
decision (which contained the erroneous headnote). Recall that, in his first opinion post-Santa
Clara, Field also failed to cite to a specific page. See Charlotte, Columbia, & Augusta R.R.
Co., 142 U.S. at 391. Notably, Justice Harlan did cite to specific Santa Clara pages in two of
the other three cases which he decided. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1989); Blake
v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 258-59 (1898); infra note 245.
241. Cnty. of San Bernardino v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 417, 422 (1886) (Field, J.
concurring). But see Fire Ass’n of Phila. v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 120 (1886) (Harlan, J.
dissenting) (asserting that issue was decided based on comments attributed to the Chief Justice
by the Reporter).
242. Gulf, Colorado, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). Cf. United States v.
Nw. Express, State & Transportation Co., 164 U.S. 686 (1897) (holding that statute conferring
jurisdiction on Court of Claims includes corporations within the term “citizens of the United
States” because to hold otherwise would deny relief to stockholders who are citizens of the
United States).
243. 165 U.S. at 154.
244. Id. (citing Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896)
(Harlan, J.).
245. Gulf, Colorado, & Safta Fe Ry. Co., 165 U.S. at 154 (“[T]he rights and securities
guaranteed to persons by [the Constitution] cannot be disregarded in respect to these artificial
entities called corporations any more than they can be in respect to the individuals who are
the equitable owners of the property belonging to such corporations. A State has no more
power to deny to corporations the equal protection of the law than it has to individual
citizens.”). This is the last of the decisions issued prior to Field’s retirement from the Court and
the only one to suggest a rationale. One might wonder whether Justice Field’s continued
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Two additional cases addressing the corporate person issue were
argued prior to Field’s retirement, but not decided until shortly afterward. In
Smyth v. Ames,246 and Blake v. McClung247 the Court, again speaking
through Mr. Justice Harlan, affirmed that settled law held that corporations
were persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Smyth, citing the Reporter’s commentary in Santa Clara and two of
Field’s decisions, Justice Harlan stated: “That corporations are persons
within the meaning of this [Fourteenth] Amendment is now settled.”248 In
Blake, the Court was equally conclusory, assuming that “a corporation is a
‘person’ within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”249 Justice
Harlan rested his Blake conclusion also on citation of the page containing
the Reporter’s commentary in the official report of the Santa Clara
decision.250
Justices Harlan and Brewer consolidated and confirmed Field’s work.
No one would challenge the existence of a constitutional corporate person
for another forty years.251 Moreover, although that challenge provoked
commentary and analysis of the historical record,252 it was given little
credence and even the challengers were inconsistent in questioning the
existence of the constitutional corporate person.253 Still, although a
corporation may be a legal person, the Court never has articulated what
such status means.
E.

At the End of the Day

Viewed from this perspective, it might be argued that Charles and Mary
Beard’s claim that the corporate person was surreptiously inserted into the
Fourteenth Amendment was both right and wrong. The Beards were wrong
presence, albeit in a limited capacity, or that the author was Field’s nephew and intellectual
disciple, played any role.
246. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). Smyth was argued April 5 and 6, 1897.
247. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898). Blake was argued November 8, 1897.
248. 169 U.S. at 552 (citing Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S.
394, 396; Charlotte, Columbia, & Augusta v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386, 391 (1892); Gulf,
Colorado, & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897)).
249. 172 U.S. at 259.
250. Id. (citing Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396) (including the page on which the statement
attributed to Chief Justice Waite appears). See also id. (citing Smyth, 169 U.S. at 522). Smyth,
of course, also rested on citation of the Reporter’s commentary.
251. See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83 (1983) (Black, J.,
dissenting). See also Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576 (1949) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
252. See, e.g., Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Court, the Corporation, and Conkling, 46 THE
AM. HIST. REV. 45, 53-55 (1940).
253. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 574-76 (Jackson, J., writing
separately).
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to focus so heavily, almost exclusively, on the Fourteenth Amendment’s
authors and on the role of railroad and corporate political-retainers, such as
Roscoe Conkling. The search for the framers’ intent and the focus on the
railroad’s efforts to obtain protection against the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment probably obscured the pre-existing federal and state case law,
the common usage of the term in federal and state statutes as well as the
post-Santa Clara decisions of Justices Field, Harlan and Brewer.254
The Beards were right in the sense that, whatever the framers of the
Amendment may have intended, there was indeed a concerted effort to
manipulate the Supreme Court’s processes and assure constitutional
protection for corporate interns. The Beards failed to recognize, however,
that it was not Roscoe Conkling, but Stephen J. Field, who, in a campaign
over the course of forty-six months, blatantly and knowingly misstated the
Santa Clara holding in an ultimately successful effort to eliminate all
question that the Fourteenth Amendment protected corporations. The
Reporter’s headnote and the commentary which he attributed to the Chief
Justice allowed Field to seize victory from the jaws of his Santa Clara defeat
and establish a critical legal principle. Even if it is an overstatement to
characterize Field, Harlan, and Brewer as participants in a conspiracy to
embed the corporate person in the Fourteenth Amendment, they clearly —
like Conkling — were participants in a determined, driven and overreaching
effort that knowingly transformed a Supreme Court Reporter’s preface and
an erroneous headnote born of a “ludicrous exchange” into one of the
critical propositions in American law.255

254. See Mark, supra note 11, at 1463.
255. Graham, Waite Court, supra note 12, at 532. Howard Jay Graham describes the
Santa Clara dictum as the “outstanding ‘holding’ of the Waite era.” Id. at 530. Yet, Graham
also argues that the words attributed to the Chief Justice by the reporter are “emphatically . . .
not the words . . . a Chief Justice of the United States [would] use if he has in mind what he
and his associates . . . intend[ ] to be a formally adjudicated, announced, unanimous rule
prospectively applicable to corporations generally.” Id. at 532. Graham sees Waite’s
recollection of what was said, as recorded in his correspondence with reporter Davis as
“conditional, . . . minor, informal, case-limited” in the nature of a “judge directing oral
argument” to issues of concern to the Court. Id. In fact, the Court had done exactly that in a
similar case during the prior term. See FAIRMAN, PART TWO, supra note 133, at 727. At the very
most, “[b]ecause court reporters, even Supreme Court reporters, are not sources of doctrine, it
is impossible to assume that the Court meant to do anything other than accept the argument
that corporate property was protected as property of the corporators, no matter what uses the
Court’s announcement was put to in later cases.” Mark, supra note 11, at 1464. See also
Smythe, supra note 10, at 662 (“Because Davis was exercising his own discretion as to what
the Court’s opinion stated, his headnote had no precedential value, and it did not reflect a
change in constitutional doctrine.”) (footnote omitted). It simply cannot be assumed that the
Chief Justice or anyone else on the Court believed that either the erroneous headnote or the
Reporter’s preface stated theretofore undecided constitutional doctrine. See Cnty. of San
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III. WHAT NOW?
As the eight confused and conflicting opinions in Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga Wood illustrate, the manner in which Field inserted the
constitutional corporate person into American law has practical implications
for the current debate regarding what, if any, rights the constitutional
corporate person possesses. Those implications require resolution of three
interrelated questions.
First, was Field speaking for the Court, or for himself, when he declared
that the constitutional corporate person question had been settled? Initially,
the question requires determination of whether the justices would have
agreed with Field, but agreement alone is insufficient. If the other justices
would have agreed with Field’s position, the subsidiary, but more important
question is whether Field was authorized to speak for the Court. If Field’s
declarations were authorized by the Court, the existence of the constitutional
corporate person is established and this part of the inquiry ends. Second, if
Field was not speaking for the Court — or if his authorization to do so was
ambiguous — the more difficult questions about the status of the doctrine
and the constitutional rights, if any, of corporations need to be
addressed.256 In either event, unless the constitutional corporate person is
wholly disowned, it remains to address what it means from a constitutional
perspective to be a corporate person and, specifically, what rights do
corporate persons possess and why.
A.

Were the Justices in Agreement with Field that “Persons” as Used in the
Fourteenth Amendment Included Corporations?

It is possible that the justices would have agreed that the term “persons”
in the Fourteenth Amendment included corporations and, therefore, saw no
reason to object to the inaccurate headnote to the Reporter’s commentary
appended to the Santa Clara decision or to Field’s later corporate person
claims. The English common law prior to the American Revolution,
numerous Supreme Court decisions, decisions of the state courts, and state
and federal statutes all defined “person” to include corporations.257 In fact,

Bernardino v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 417, 422-25 (1886) (Field, J., dissenting). See also
California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 28 (1887) (stating that Fourteenth Amendment
question raised difficult and “embarrassing” issues requiring “careful scrutiny and
consideration,” but need not be decided). In fact, Field saw an opening, enlarged it
exponentially, and then drove a train through it.
256. See White, supra note 133, at 1482-83 (discussing that, because most opinions were
not circulated prior to announcement, a majority of justices endorsed disposition of a case but
the “reasoning of the opinion of the Court . . . usually represented only the views of one
Justice” and, arguably, is, therefore, entitled to “diminished status . . . as precedent”).
257. See supra notes 73, 81, 176.
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it has been generally overlooked that, in Santa Clara, counsel for the
County expressly conceded the point:
The defendants have been at pains to show that corporations are persons,
and that, being such, they are entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. There was scarcely need of the array of learning and
elaborated disquisition which has been displayed on this point. Of course,
corporations are persons, and, of course, they are protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. No one, I presume, has ever questioned it.258

Counsel’s concession simply reflects that the rule, then as now, was that, in
the absence of special circumstances, words were to be given their usual
and customary meaning.
It is certainly true that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to extend
legal protection to the recently freed slaves and to loyal Southerners.259 The
question, however, remains: assuming the framers had neither a primary nor
a secondary intent to include corporations, had the framers been asked the
meaning of the term “persons,” would they have understood it to include
corporate as well as natural persons? Given that the term “persons”
included corporations in virtually all other contexts, the framers are likely to
have answered in the affirmative.260 Justice Field made the same point in the
Circuit and he would seem to have the right of it. The Justices arguably,
therefore, would have no need of argument on the matter — history and
experience, for them, would have settled the question.

258. Argument by D.M. Delmas, Esq., supra note 143, at 29. See id. at 30-35. See also
Brief for Plaintiff in Error, supra note 143, at 45 (“While conceding that in one sense
corporations are persons, we do not admit that they are persons for all the persons
contemplated by the fourteenth amendment.”).
259. See, e.g., Graham, Builded Better, supra note 12, at 545-46.
260. In Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83 (1938), Justice Black
appears to make a textual argument that the framers intended to exclude corporations, based
on the juxtaposition of the terms “citizens” and “persons.” Black also appears to be arguing
that the Amendment applied only to the newly freed slaves. Id.
Black’s textual argument depends in the first instance on the conclusion that “citizens” and
“persons” necessarily referred to the same legal entity. There is, however, no evidence to that
effect and it would deprive both “citizens” and “persons” of their well understood
connotations. Second, as Judge Sawyer said in San Mateo, “it would have struck the world
with some astonishment, when this amendment was proposed to the people of the United
States for adoption, if it had read: ‘Nor shall any state deprive any person of the negro race of
life, liberty and property without due process of law; nor deny to any person of the negro race
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’” San Mateo II, 13 F. at 761. See also
McLaughlin, supra note 252, at 45-63; Graham, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 12, at
881-88 (discussing “Ninth Circuit Law” applying the Equal Protection clause to protect
Chinese).
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The more difficult question was what a corporation’s status as a legal
person meant261 and there is no evidence that the justices were in
agreement with Field on that question. Indeed, while San Mateo remained
on the Supreme Court docket argued, but undecided, and two years before
Santa Clara was decided, the disagreement within the Court about the
meaning of corporate personhood became manifest. In Spring Valley Water
Works v. Schottler, Chief Justice Waite speaking for the Court over the lone
dissent of Field, upheld amendments to California’s incorporation statute
which allowed the state to regulate prices charged by a corporation that had
been created under an earlier version of the statute which contained no
such authorization.262 According to Waite, “[t]he corporation was created by
the State” and all of its powers and obligations . . . depend alone on the
statute under which it was organized, and such alterations and amendments
thereof as may . . . be made by proper authority.”263 Field, in contrast,
objected that the statute deprived “the corporators, natural persons” of their
property in violation of the Constitution because “they had associated
themselves together.”264 That disagreement may have a familiar ring: it is
essentially the same philosophic disagreement that divided the Hobby Lobby
and Conestoga Wood judges.
B.

Was Field Authorized to Speak for the Court When He Asserted that the
Existence of the Constitutional Corporate Person Had Been Settled

With the benefit of hindsight, an argument based on historical and
experiential understanding has much to commend it. Yet, it is speculation
about what the Court might have done. Moreover, such an argument
ignores what the Court, and the individual justices, actually did. In the end,
it is a less than satisfactory explanation, because it fails to address many
inconsistent facts and, most importantly, does not address what it means to
be a constitutional corporate person.
Viewed from the perspective of the late nineteenth century, there was
significant doubt about the significance of the term “person” as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment. As Howard Jay Graham has said, treating
corporations as legal persons for some concepts, and for some purposes,
261. Counsel argued that the Amendment did not protect corporations because
corporations were created by the state, which could grant or deny corporate rights as the state
pleased. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error, supra note 143, at 43-47; Argument of D.M. Delmas,
Esq., supra note 143, at 21-37. Cf. Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347,
351-52, 354-56 (1884) (Waite, C.J.) (holding that corporate rights depend on the statute
under which the corporation “was organized, and such alterations. . .thereof as may be made
by proper authority”).
262. 110 U.S. at 352.
263. Id. at 352, 256.
264. Id. at 352, 371-72.
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does not mean that the corporation was a constitutional person as that term
was used in the Fourteenth Amendment265 or that, even if it was a
constitutional person, that the corporation’s rights were comparable to those
of a natural person. At the very least, even if agreement on some aspects of
corporate personhood is assumed, there were critical aspects of the
corporate person that remained to be defined.
In fact, despite Field’s assertions that it was settled, the
contemporaneous evidence strongly suggests that, in the late nineteenth
century, the existence and, even more to the point, the meaning of the
constitutional corporate person was far from established. The SlaughterHouse Cases seemed to expressly reject the possibility of constitutional
protection for corporations. Moreover, even if the corporation was a
constitutional corporate person, that did not necessarily mean that the
Amendment guaranteed equality with natural persons. To the contrary, for
example, the county argued, and a long line of Supreme Court decisions
appeared to hold, that whether a corporation was denied equal protection
of the laws was determined by examining whether the plaintiff corporation
was subject to the same regulation and taxation to which other, similarly
situated corporations were subject, not by comparing the treatment of
natural persons.266
The railroads clearly viewed the questions as open. There is no other
explanation for the railroads’ willingness to sponsor first, San Mateo and,
when that failed to produce a resolution, Santa Clara267 and The California
Railroad Tax Cases268 as test cases in an effort to force the Court to decide

265. See, e.g., Graham, Builded Better, supra note 12, at 563-66.
266. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiff in Error, supra note 143, at 46-47 (arguing that
corporations were created by the State and endowed with rights and privileges not possessed
by natural persons, thereby precluding comparison to natural persons); Argument by D.M.
Delmas, Esq., supra note 143, at 27-37.
[B]y the very act of incorporation, these human beings [i.e., the incorporators] receive
rights, immunities, privileges, which form a part of the sovereign attributes of the State
[e.g., eminent domain], which are not enjoyed by any man in his individual capacity.
By the very act of incorporation the equality between the corporate body — the group
of corporate members, if you please — and isolated individuals is effectively destroyed,
[so that the State] without infringing the rule of equality [may confer rights and
privileges, as well as impose burdens, on a corporation not granted, or imposed on
natural persons].
Id. at 29.
267. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). Two years before Santa Clara, in the decision of Spring Valley
Water Works v. Schottler, Chief Justice Waite (for the Court) and Justice Field (in dissent)
disagreed with respect to the state’s ability to amend state law to permit regulation of
corporations not previously authorized. 110 U.S. 347.
268. 127 U.S. 1 (1888). In fact, San Mateo and Santa Clara were only two of two groups
of cases. Shortly, thereafter, the railroads made a third unsuccessful effort to force the Court to
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the issue. Indeed, if the question were free from doubt, the railroads would
have no need to hire the likes of two former senators, Roscoe Conkling and
George F. Edmunds, Senator William M. Evarts, an esteemed law professor,
J.N. Pomeroy, and a former Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court,
S.W. Sanderson, all of whom, at one time or another, in addition to the
Southern Pacific’s Solicitor General, Creed Haymond, represented the
railroads in San Mateo and Santa Clara. Moreover, the Court itself
characterized the constitutional corporate person question as “special and
peculiar” when it advanced San Mateo ahead of more than a thousand
pending cases,269 and the Santa Clara opinion itself describes the issue as
open.270 Finally, as an 1870 opinion (only two years after the Amendment
was adopted) by future Justice, then Judge, Woods, makes clear there were
credible textual arguments to limit the scope of the Amendment to natural
persons or, at least, to distinguish between natural and artificial persons’
rights under the Amendment.271
The timeline of the Court’s decisions expressly addressing the existence
of the constitutional corporate person also belie the notion that Field was
authorized to speak for the Court when he asserted that the question was
definitively settled. Seen in real-time context, there are multiple occurrences
and circumstances which, individually and collectively, refute the notion that
the Court was in agreement regarding (or had decided) the corporate
person question.

decide the issue in another group of test cases, The Cal. R.R. Tax Cases, a group of six cases
raising the same issues as San Mateo and Santa Clara, which the Court disposed of on like
grounds. Id. at 26. See also Cent. Pac. R.R. Co. v. People, 162 U.S. 167 (1896) (Fuller, C.J.)
(dismissing case based on Santa Clara over Justice Field’s dissent). In a colloquy between
Justice Miller and Mr. Haymond regarding issues presented Justice Miller notes, referring to
the constitutional question: “We have had them here three times, but could not get them
brought up, and we have not got them here this time.” To which Haymond replies: “All I desire
to say is that I do not wish to be held responsible for that. We have attempted twice to get
those cases here on the Federal issues alone, and each time the State has prevented.”
Argument of Creed Haymond, at 15-16, The Cal. R.R. Tax Cases, 127 U.S. 1 (1888) (Nos.
660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 1157) (Jan. 12 & 13, 1888).
269. Likewise, when San Mateo was dismissed just a few months before Santa Clara was
argued, Chief Justice Waite expressly recognized that it was a “test case, and many others are
depending on its adjudication.” San Mateo, 116 U.S. at 141. This is hardly the way one
describes a case raising easily resolved questions.
270. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 410 (1886) (stating the case
presents “no occasion to consider the grave questions of constitutional law upon which the
case was determined below. . .”). See also id. at 416.
271. Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67, 68 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (holding that because
the term “persons” is first used in the Fourteenth Amendment to refer to “persons born or
naturalized in the United States” the term necessarily must be read whenever used in the
Amendment to refer only to natural persons).
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First, the Santa Clara argument occurred January 26 through 29, 1886,
and the opinion was issued May 10, 1886. Harlan’s opinion, as issued from
the bench, expressly disclaimed ruling on the constitutional question.
Importantly, the United States Reports’ version of the official opinion
prepared by the Reporter — with the erroneous headnote and the
commentary attributed to the Chief Justice — was published no earlier than
late November 1886.272 Approximately five months after the Santa Clara
opinion was issued, on October 25 through 26, 1886, Home Insurance v.
New York273 was argued for the first time. During argument, the parties
disputed whether the reasoning of Field’s circuit decision in San Mateo
should control the outcome.274 The parties’ arguments regarding the value
of Field’s Circuit opinion is inexplicable if Santa Clara actually had resolved
the constitutional corporate person question.275
272. Volume 118 of the United States Reports, in which the Santa Clara opinion appears,
contains a memorial for President Chester Arthur. See 118 U.S. i, iv. President Arthur died
November 18, 1886. Appendix, 188 U.S. 697, 705. Thus, although the specific date on
which the volume was published is not given, volume 188 could not have been published
prior to mid-November, 1886.
273. 119 U.S. 129 (1886).
274. Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 119 U.S. 129, 141-47 (1886). Id. at 145 (arguing that
the Fourteenth Amendment “contention is based almost entirely upon a recent decision
rendered in the case County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 13 Fed. Rep. 222”).
This contrasts with the argument made when the case was re-heard in March. See Home Ins.
Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594, 606 (1890). In that argument, the company argued that it is
a “person[ ] within the meaning of [the Fourteenth] Amendment,” as well as Field’s Pembina
and Mackey decisions. Id. at 606-07.
Moreover, two years before, in 1884, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Spring Valley Water
Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347 (1884), a case argued eleven months after the San Mateo
argument by some of the same lawyers who had argued San Mateo, made clear that the
Court, as a whole, did not agree with Justice Field’s conception of the corporate person.
Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Waite held that corporations were created by the state
and the state retained power to amend the terms of incorporation. Id. at 354-56. Dissenting,
Justice Field quoted at length from his San Mateo circuit decision, arguing that “[b]ehind the
artificial body created by the legislature stand the corporators, natural persons,. . .who are as
much entitled, under the guarantees of the Constitution, to be secured in the possession and
use of their property thus held as before they had associate themselves together.” Id. at 37172. The 1884 Waite-Field disagreement has an eerie similarity to the disagreements in the
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood opinions.
275. The Plaintiff in error cited the Supreme Court’s Santa Clara decision in his initial brief
prior to the 1886 argument, so counsel clearly was aware of the opinion, (i.e., as it was
issued, without the erroneous headnote and commentary). 119 U.S. at 141. However, it is the
San Mateo circuit decision on which the Fourteenth Amendment argument rests in 1890. 134
U.S. 594, 606-07. There is no indication that the Court refused to hear the argument. Insofar
as can be determined, even after courts became aware of the headnote and the commentary
there was uncertainty about what Santa Clara had decided. For example, in two decisions the
Missouri Supreme Court and the United States District Court for the Northern District of
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Second, Field issued four opinions between March 19, 1888 and
October 29, 1888, asserting that the existence of the constitutional
corporate person had been established definitively by Santa Clara, among
other decisions.276 Yet, on April 30, 1888, the Court decided a case that
the Court’s opinion describes as “substantially similar”277 to Santa Clara.
The unanimous opinion of the Court — consistent with Harlan’s Santa Clara
opinion — states that “the judgments for the defendants in the former cases
[i.e., Santa Clara] were affirmed” because “the Board of Equalization
included in the assessments a valuation of rights, franchises and property
which they had no authority to assess . . . rendering the entire assessment in
each case void.”278 Thereafter, Justice Bradley’s opinion for the Court, says
that “it [is] unnecessary to decide the question raised under the fourteenth
amendment”279 and goes on, at length, to express relief at avoiding the
questions arising under that amendment [which] are so numerous and
embarrassing, and require such careful scrutiny and consideration, that
great caution is required in meeting and disposing of them. By proceeding
step by step, and only deciding what it is necessary to decide, light will
gradually open upon the whole subject, and lead the way to a satisfactory
solution of the problems that belong to it. We prefer not to anticipate these
problems when they are not necessarily involved.280

Incredibly, the statement of the case which precedes the Court’s opinion in
The California Railroad Tax Cases directly contradicts the Santa Clara
headnote stating that the cases presented “the same constitutional questions

Georgia expressed uncertainty about the significance of the comments attributed to the Chief
Justice and treated them as obiter dicta and resolved cases on the basis of Field’s Circuit
Court San Mateo and Santa Clara opinions. See Russell v. Croy, 63 S.W. 849 (1901); Singer
Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 33 F. 121 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1887). But see Stockton v. Balt. & N.Y. R.R. Co.,
32 F. 9, 13-14 (C.C.D. N.J. 1887) (Bradley, J., asserting, less than one year after the Santa
Clara decision, that Santa Clara “unanimously” and “expressly held that [corporations] are
entitled, as well as individuals, to the equal protection of the laws, under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution.”).
276. The decisions were: Pembina Consol. Silver Mineral & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania,
125 U.S. 181 (1888); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205 (1888); Minneapolis &
St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U.S. 210 (1888); Georgia. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Smith, 128
U.S. 174 (1888).
277. The Cal. R.R. Tax Cases, 127 U.S. 1, 26 (1888). Cf. S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. California,
162 U.S. 167, 167-68 (1896) (noting the record is “substantially a duplicate” of the records
in decisions using Santa Clara authority).
278. The Cal. R.R. Tax Cases, 127 U.S. at 27-28.
279. Id. at 45.
280. Id. at 28. See also Fire Ass’n of Phila. v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 112 (1886)
(rejecting the argument that foreign corporation is a person denied equal protection in
violation of Fourteenth Amendment by differential taxation as compared to domestic
corporation).
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. . . as those which were argued (and not decided) in Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 118 U.S. 394.”281
A clearer, more direct or more emphatic statement that the
constitutional corporate person issue had not been decided in Santa Clara
could not have been made. Roughly twenty-four months after Santa Clara,
at about the same time that Pembina, Mackey, and Herrick were issued, The
California Railroad Tax Cases Court, whatever the views of individual
justices282 and whatever Field had claimed, clearly did not view the
corporate person issue as having been decided, let alone settled. Indeed, if
the constitutional corporate person question had been resolved, Bradley’s
opinion and his relief at avoiding the question are nonsensical. Justice Field
neither dissented nor mentioned the Court’s decision in any of the opinions
that he wrote asserting that the question had been settled.283
The California Railroad Tax Cases are a virtually dispositive impediment
to the argument that Field was authorized to speak for the Court when
asserting that the constitutional corporate person was definitively
established. Moreover, it is hardly likely that the existence of the corporate
person had been established without some explanation of the reasons that a
corporation was able to exercise the rights of a natural person. Counsel for
the County of Santa Clara’s unanswered argument that corporate
personhood did not mean that a corporation was imbued with all of the
rights of a natural person, Field’s explanation in the Circuit of the reasons
that a corporation possesses the rights of a natural person takes almost
ninety pages in the Federal Reporter, and Bradley’s extreme reticence to
address the difficult and embarrassing questions and refusal to do so in The
California Railroad Tax Cases, at the very least, render Field’s authority to
speak for the Court ambiguous.
Third, when Supreme Court decisions are reviewed one hundred fifty
years after the fact, the published decision and its headnotes appear to have
been inextricably intertwined and contemporaneous. In fact, the decision
and the headnotes and commentary were published, at best, months apart
and are temporally independent of one another. For the constitutional
281. The Cal. R.R. Tax Cases, 127 U.S. at 2 (emphasis added).
282. But see Fire Ass’n of Phila., 119 U.S. at 120 (Harlan, J. dissenting) (quoting
commentary attributed to the Chief Justice and asserting that Santa Clara decided the issue);
Stockton v. Balt. & N.Y. R.R. Co., 32 F. 9 (C.C.D. N.J, 1887) (Bradley Cir. J.) (asserting that
Santa Clara decided the issue). Indeed, inasmuch as The Cal. R.R. Tax Cases were notorious
and controversial, the statement that the Court had not decided the corporate person question
perhaps ought to be given more weight in that individual justices who previously had
disagreed, seemed to have reversed course or, at least, silently acquiesced.
283. See, e.g., Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889); Home Ins.
Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594 (1890); Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta R.R. Co. v. Gibbes,
142 U.S. 386 (1892).
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corporate person, timing is everything, because the sequence in which the
opinions and headnote were prepared undermines the argument that the
Santa Clara Court decided the question.
The Santa Clara group of cases, which included San Bernardino, were
argued from January 26 through January 29, 1886. The majority opinion
was issued orally from the bench May 10, 1886. Stephen Field’s opinion
concurring in judgment, but condemning the Court for failing to decide the
constitutional question also was issued on May 10, 1886.
Whatever was or was not said by the Chief Justice when Santa Clara
was argued, Field had no reason to believe that the issue had been decided
for two reasons. First, in conference, the other members of the Court would
have approved the position — avoiding the constitutional question — taken
in Harlan’s majority opinion. The issuance of Field’s concurring opinion
denouncing the Court for failing to reach the constitutional question
contemporaneously with Harlan’s opinion for the Court demonstrates that
Field understood exactly what the Court had done. Second, the idea that the
published, official report of the case might assert that the Court had decided
the constitutional question first surfaced in the Reporter’s private
correspondences to the Chief Justice more than two weeks after the opinions
were delivered from the bench. Because the Chief Justice did not respond
until the end of the month, it is likely that the headnote and supporting
commentary were prepared at least a month after the Court and Field had
stated on the record that the constitutional corporate person issue had not
been decided. The volume of the United States Reports containing the
headnote and the commentary attributed to the Chief Justice could not have
been published — and the contents of the published decision would not
have been known to the Justices — earlier than mid-November 1886,
about six months after the Santa Clara opinions were announced.284
If the Court had decided the constitutional corporate person question —
or there was the least reason to believe that it had done so — Justice Field’s
separate opinion denouncing the failure to decide the issue makes no
sense. Had Field any basis to believe that the issue had been decided, or to
anticipate the headnote rather than complaining about the failure to decide
the case, Field surely would have embraced the headnote and the
comments attributed to the Chief Justice. Indeed, this is precisely what Field
later did in his opinions asserting that the constitutional corporate person
question had been settled. In short, if Field had any warrant to assert that
the issue had been resolved, that authority derived solely from the erroneous
headnote written by the Reporter and from the comments that the Reporter
284. See supra text accompanying note 272 (explaining that Volume 118 of the United
States Reports refers to the death of former President Chester A. Arthur on November 18,
1886).
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attributed to Chief Justice Waite, not from the Court. Yet, the headnote and
commentary were added to Santa Clara by the reporter after the fact.
Moreover, as the court later made explicit in response to another of
Reporter Davis’ headnotes which misstated the Court’s holding, “the
headnote is not the work of the court, nor does it state its decision.”285
Fourth, the most compelling argument that Justice Field spoke for the
Court when he asserted that the existence of the constitutional corporate
person had been settled is that no other justice dissented in any of the seven
cases in which Field made the assertion. The argument rests on two critical
assumptions. First, that the other justices knew that Field’s opinions would
make the claim. Second, that the failure to dissent in the face of such
knowledge signals agreement with Field’s assertion.
The assumptions are mistakenly grounded in twenty-first century
perceptions, rather than in the reality of decision-making by the nineteenth
century Supreme Court. The late nineteenth century Court’s decision-making
process286 — more specifically, the manner in which opinions in run-of-themill cases were prepared, vetted by the Court and published — and the
circumstances in which the decisions were rendered likely allowed Field the
opportunity to inaccurately, and unilaterally, assert that the existence of the
constitutional corporate person had been definitively established.
In the late nineteenth century, cases generally would not be argued for
two to three years after reaching the Court.287 Thereafter, however, the
deliberative process was cursory and moved at lightning speed.288 In the
normal course, a case was voted on at the Court’s conference on the
Saturday after the argument.289 The opinion would be assigned at that time,
with the expectation that a draft opinion would be completed within a few —
usually in two to three — weeks.290 This despite the fact that the justices did
not have the assistance of law clerks at the time.291 At that time, the draft

285. United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906).
286. See White, supra note 133; FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 133, at 69-71 (both
indicate that the Court’s decision-making methodology and its impact on the authority that
ought to be accorded the Court’s decisions has not been the subject of much investigation).
287. See White, supra note 133, at 1484 (describing nineteenth century decision making
process). See also FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 132, at 69.
288. FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 132, at 69 (characterizing the Court’s decisionmaking process as “cursory”). See also White, supra note 133, at 1485 (The 1869 expansion
of Supreme Court term “did not result in a more extensive deliberative process. Indeed, a
summary deliberative process was the only way in which the Court could have kept abreast of
its docket.”).
289. FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 132, at 69.
290. Id.
291. Chester A. Newland, Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks,
40 OREGON L. REV. 299, 301-06 (1961). In fact, at the time, “[t]he Justices had practically no
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opinion — or parts of it — would be read aloud to the Court by its
author.292 If approved, the opinion would be orally delivered in open Court
the following Monday.293
Of special significance here, except on rare occasions, written opinions
were not circulated among the Justices for scrutiny or comment.294 Indeed,
generally the Justices would see the written opinion for the first time only
after it had been delivered from the bench, given to the Clerk and set in
type, a period of days to weeks after it was delivered from the bench.295
As a result, if the Justices were generally satisfied when the opinion — or
portions of it — was read to the Court at the conference, the author was
largely free to decide the proposed language and content of the final
version of the opinion.296 Thus, “the other Justices would generally have no
opportunity to read the opinion and to reflect upon the drafting . . . . [T]he
Court as a body could not have scrutinized opinions to weigh the import of
expressions and omissions.”297 As a result, in this “process . . . [the]
other[concurring justices] . . . committed themselves to the results of that
opinion, hav[ing] no expectation of even seeing it, let alone signing onto its
language . . . .”298
In the nineteenth century, therefore, as a general rule, “[t]he content of
an opinion was a matter only for [the author] . . . and the Court

support staff.” DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE WAITE COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND
LEGACY 51 (2003).
292. FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 133, at 69.
293. See, e.g., Pembina Consol. Silver Mineral & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S.
181 (1888) (argued February 16, 1888, and decided March 19, 1888); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Mackey, 127 U.S. 205 (1888) (argued April 12, 1888, and decided April 23, 1888);
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889) (argued December 3, 1889,
and decided January 7, 1889); Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 119 U.S. 129 (1886) (reargument, 134 U.S. 594 (1890) was argued (the first time) October 25-26, 1886, and
decided November 15, 1886; the second time, it was argued March 18-19, 1890, and
decided April 7, 1890).
294. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Informing the Public About the Supreme Court’s
Work, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 283 (1998) (“There was a long time in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s history, indeed until Chief Justice Melville Fuller’s 1888-1910 tenure, during which
justices did not routinely circulate their draft opinions among their colleagues prior to
delivery.”). See also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 135 (1876) (exceptions were made in especially
important cases); FAIRMAN, PART TWO, supra note 133, at 365; MAGRATH, supra note 52, at
182. There were more mundane exceptions, too. See, e.g., Westin, supra note 153, at 38183.
295. FAIRMAN, PART TWO, supra note 133, at 105.
296. FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 133, at 70.
297. Id.
298. White, supra note 133, at 1482.
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Reporter.”299 At the time, given the prevailing legal philosophy of most
practitioners and judges, the judgment was most important, not the
rationale,300 so that a Justice had neither motive nor need to review a
written opinion prior to publication. In most cases, therefore, a Justice was
responsible only for his vote, not of the content for the Court’s opinion.301
The question of the weight to be given to a unanimous opinion of the
Court in the Waite era is further confounded because Waite, as had
Marshall, sought a “norm of consensus” by affirmatively “discourag[ing] the
public display of a divided bench. A Justice who indicated disagreement at
conference would later typically acquiesce in what the majority decided.”302
Acquiescence clearly was not endorsement of an opinion’s language.

299. Id. (commenting that, because opinions were not circulated, “none of the other
Justices had seen, let alone subscribed to, [the opinion’s] justifications”). See also G. Edward
White, Recovering the World of the Marshall Court, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 781, 789 (2000)
(noting that at time of the Marshall Court, only the author of the opinion and the Court’s
reporter saw the text of the opinion before publication in the Court’s official Reports and that
“the Justices ‘mooting’ of a case did not involve a discussion of how arguments supporting a
decision should be reflected in an opinion”); White, supra note 133, at 1484 (noting that the
Court’s internal processes, including noncirculation of opinions, the norm of silent
acquiescence, delays of two to three years from docketing to argument, and summary
deliberation and disposition, remained unchanged through the end of the nineteenth century);
id. at 1499, 1501 (noting that deliberative process “remained strikingly informal and that
[t]hrough Fuller’s tenure the Justices continued the practice of not circulating assigned
opinions before they were read in conference prior to being announced in Court”). But see
Westin, supra note 153 (reflecting that non-circulation was not always the case); MAGRATH,
supra note 52, at 182-90 (discussing collaboration of Bradley and Waite in writing of Munn
opinion).
300. See generally PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 178; G. Edward White, Recovering the
World of the Marshall Court, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 781, 791-92 (2000) (noting predominant
nineteenth century view that conceived “of ‘law’ . . . [as] a body of fixed principles derived
from authoritative written sources such as the Constitution, statutes, judicial decisions or from
authoritative unwritten sources such as custom” so that, in contrast to the legal realist’s
understanding, the background and even involvement of a judge in a case “did not really
matter”); White, supra note 133, at 1483 (noting that in the nineteenth century “judicial
decisions were not the equivalent of positivistic law, . . . but mere evidence of legal
principles”).
301. White, supra note 133, at 1481.
302. Stevenson, Waite Court, supra note 130, at 481. Thus, the appearance of unanimity
may be deceiving because Waite encouraged consensus and successfully discouraged dissent.
See Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI.
362, 366 (2001) (noting that number of dissenting votes in conference was much higher than
reflected in announced decisions). As a result, a justice dissenting in conference would often
acquiesce in the majority opinion. Id. at 367. Waite, himself, often switched his vote following
the conference when he had initially dissented. See D. Grier Stevenson, The Chief Justice as
Leader: The Case of Morrison Remick Waite 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 899, 918 (1973).
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Two observations that explain in large measure Field’s ability to
unilaterally assert that the constitutional corporate person’s existence was
settled can be drawn from this process. First, opinion-writing in the
nineteenth century “presented a greater opportunity” for one Justice to
shape the content of an opinion than the current, collaborative system in
which opinions are circulated in advance for comment and discussion in
order to develop consensus with respect to the rationale of the opinion, not
just the judgment.303 Because “[t]he consultation process was less formal[,]
the opinion author . . . had a free[ ] hand to compose and publish an
opinion untouched by all his colleagues’ minds,”304 with the author of the
opinion being given “considerable autonomy”305 so that in most cases, the
language of an opinion reflects the views of, and ought to be attributed only
to, the author.306 Thus, “opinion assignments,” particularly in cases of
interest to a justice, “may have been . . . coveted . . . .”307 Second, “the
focus of the Court was on the judgment. This meant that the reasoning of an
opinion of the Court, so long as the practice of non-circulation of draft
opinions remained in place, usually represented the views of one Justice.”308
In a colossal understatement, one authority has commented that, putting
all of this together “cause[s] the jurisprudential status of those opinions,
when considered from a modern perspective, often to be misleading.”309
This is so because “[w]hat counts most in legal writing is not authority, but
authorization. Whoever wrote the words, whoever speaks them, and
303. G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY AND THE CONSTITUTION: COLLECTED ESSAYS 434 (2007).
304. See Ginsburg, supra note 294, at 283.
305. White, supra note 133, at 1501; FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 133, at 70 (“So long
as the Justices were satisfied on the major points, the author was pretty free . . . to choose his
language.”).
306. FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 133, at 70. This was the case because judicial
opinions, at the time, had, compared to the present, “diminished status . . . as precedents.”
White, supra note 133, at 1483-84 (“The content of a judicial opinion was not seen as the
equivalent of law but only as evidence of the law’s application to a particular case, [thus] the
practice of stare decisis was qualified . . . . [T]he reasoning in a judicial opinion was
understood simply as evidence of the applicability of a legal principle or principles to a case. It
was a ‘gloss’ on the law, not the law itself . . . . [I]n this context, . . . the stakes in opinion
writing might have been perceived to have been lower, especially since the reasoning in an
opinion of the Court would have been perceived as simply an effort to apply principles to
cases rather than as a doctrinal road map for future cases.”).
307. WHITE, supra note 303, at 434; MAGRATH, supra note 52, at 258-262 (discussing
Field’s anger and vehement protests at Waite’s failure to assign him the opinion in United
States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 91 U.S. 72 (1875)).
308. White, supra note 133, at 1482.
309. Id. at 1481-82 (noting that nineteenth century attitudes “produced what can be
regarded, from a modern perspective, as a diminished status for judicial opinions as
precedents”). See also FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 133, at 70 (because of the process,
“one is less warranted in attributing to the Court the language used”).
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whoever believes what they say, the crucial question is whether the person
for whom the words are spoken has licensed their use in her behalf.”310 This
maxim is especially poignant in Field’s case because his assertions about
the constitutional corporate person are directly contradicted by the Santa
Clara majority opinion, by Field’s San Bernardino concurrence, by the
Court’s opinion in The California Railroad Tax Cases, and by Chief Justice
Waite’s assertion that the issue had been “avoided.”
The decision-making process, especially the combined impact of the
Court’s focus on the judgment rather than the opinion’s rationale and the
rule of silent acquiescence, assured that the Court, as a whole, was aware
of the outcome, i.e., the judgment of the cases, but at the very least, creates
doubt that Field’s statements about the existence of the corporate person
were of much concern to the Court.311 “It follows that, as compared with
what might be supposed, one is less warranted in attributing to the Court
the very language used, and better entitled to treat the composition (for
praise or blame) as showing the quality of the author.”312 It likewise follows
that, viewed from a nineteenth century perspective, the absence of
dissenting opinions is not really surprising and is not indicative of the other
Justices’ agreement with Field’s rationale or with statements made in the
opinions. Thus, it has been said that in the nineteenth century “there was not
a very high sense of corporate responsibility” for the Court’s opinions and it
is a misnomer to refer to the “opinion of the Court” in most nineteenth
century Supreme Court cases.313
Other events likely combined with the Court’s decision-making process
to enhance Field’s ability to act autonomously. For example, for many
months prior to Field’s campaign, Chief Justice Waite had been fully
occupied writing the opinion in The Telephone Cases,314 arguably the most
significant patent case of its time. The opinion, which occupies an entire
volume of the United States Reports, was finished on March 5, 1888, and
delivered orally in Court on March 19, 1888. Waite, however, was so ill

310. John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447, 485 (2001).
311. See FAIRMAN, PART TWO, supra note 133, at 105 (discussing Justice Miller’s complaint
to his brother regarding rationale of Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Fort, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 553
(1873), stating that Miller saw the opinion for the first time two weeks after the decision was
announced).
312. FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 133, at 70; White, supra note 133, at 1484. Indeed,
the reasoning, while not unimportant, had significantly less importance than it does today
because the rational was then perceived as a “‘gloss’ on the law, not the law itself” and not
seen “as a doctrinal roadmap for future cases.” Id.
313. FAIRMAN, PART ONE, supra note 133, at 70.
314. 126 U.S. at 1. The cases were argued January 24-28, 31 and February 1-4, 7-8,
1887, and the opinion issued March 19, 1888. Id.
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that Justice Blatchford had to read the opinion for him. Waite died four days
later on March 23, 1888.
Field’s first opinion, Pembina, asserting that the existence of the
constitutional corporate person was settled, also was issued orally from the
bench on March 19, 1888. Pembina, which of course would have been
written and vetted while Waite was alive, does not rely on Santa Clara as
authority for the proposition; in fact, it cites no authority.315
One month later, Field’s April 23, 1888 opinions in Mackey and Herrick
were issued. Mackey, as would several of Field’s later opinions, asserts that
the constitutional corporate person question was decided in Santa Clara. 316
At this point, Waite — the one person who could most authoritatively say
whether Santa Clara had held that corporations were constitutional persons
— was dead. Consequently, Field did not need to be concerned that the
Chief Justice would admonish that Santa Clara had “avoided” the issue.
Rather, writing opinions in non-controversial cases which were decided
based on long-standing precedents and always rendering judgment against
the corporations, Field must have been relatively certain that his corporate
person opinions would attract little or no attention, would not merit the time
to prepare a dissent, and would pass without contradiction. Moreover, if the
opinions were challenged, Field could always point to the headnote and
commentary attributed to the Chief Justice in Santa Clara as the basis for his
assertion without concern of authoritative contradiction.
That Field wrote the Court’s opinion in seven post-Santa Clara cases
expressly addressing the constitutional corporate person could not have
been an accident.317 Similarly, it was not happenstance that Field wove dicta
asserting that the constitutional corporate person was conclusively settled
into otherwise seemingly routine, and mostly forgettable, cases. It likewise
was not chance that Field’s constitutional corporate person dicta appeared
only in cases in which the judgment was against corporate interests. Finally,
five of the seven opinions of the Court written by Field expressly addressing
the corporate person question — including those principally cited for the
proposition that the issue was resolved — were argued and/or written in the
period roughly beginning with Waite’s incapacity and ending with Melville
W. Fuller’s installation as Chief Justice. To the contrary, these are all
315. See 125 U.S. at 189.
316. 127 U.S. at 209-10; 127 U.S. 210. Field’s Pembina opinion references Chief Justice
Marshall’s comment in Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 562 (1830) about the
general purpose of incorporation, but cites no authority with respect to the constitutional status
of corporations. 125 U.S. at 189.
317. Field was known to seek writing assignments, particularly in railroad cases. See, e.g.,
KENS, supra note 49, at 101-03 (discussing Field’s unsuccessful efforts to bully Waite into
assigning him to write the opinion in United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 91 U.S. 72 (1875));
Stephenson, Waite Court, supra note 130, at 477.
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evidence that Field was acutely aware that the Court’s judgment, not its
rationale for that judgment, would be the focus of any scrutiny and that he
used the Court’s processes — including the ability of an opinion’s author to
shape the rationale and language of the final product — to take advantage,
in the least objectionable and most effective way possible, of the opening
given him by the Reporter’s publication of the Chief Justice’s comments and
the erroneous headnote.318
Santa Clara left the constitutional corporate person question, at least
initially, in a kind of judicial limbo.319 Given the importance that he attached
to the issue, Field was not the type to allow the uncertainty to persist. Field’s
personality, temperament, and most importantly, his self-image as a judicial
prophet ordained to lead the resistance to what Field perceived as the
disassembling of American culture, society, and institutions, would not

318. It also should be emphasized that the view that the corporate person issue was settled
by the Chief Justice’s pre-argument comments and that all of the Justices were in agreement is
heavily dependent on the credibility and accuracy of the Supreme Court Reporter, J.C.
Bancroft Davis. Although a respected attorney and former judge of the Court of Claims, Davis
was notorious for inadequate and erroneous headnotes. Indeed, it was Davis’ misstatement of
the holding of Hawley v. Diller, 178 U.S. 476, 488 (1900), that led to the cautionary
language that now precedes every Supreme Court decision reported in the United States
Reports, warning the reader that the headnotes are not the holding of the Court. 200 U.S. at
322 (Field’s nephew, Justice David Brewer, stating that headnotes reflect only the Reporter’s
understanding of the decision and, in this instance, the headnote misinterpreted the decision).
So pervasive was Davis’ poor reporting that, noting his death in 1908, a widely-circulated
legal newspaper excoriated his work as Supreme Court Reporter, noting his “invariable
practice” to omit points decided and stating, among other things, that “many of [the
headnotes] entirely fail to show what the court decided.” LAW NOTES, supra note 158, at 202.
See also WILLARD L. KING, MELVILLE WESTON FULLER: CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 18881910, at 230 (1950) (noting that Davis’ papers are replete with letters from Justices correcting
headnotes and that Davis’ headnotes were vague and misleading). Davis, in fact, frequently
failed to make corrections to headnotes requested by the Justices and frequently reacted
angrily toward those requesting the correction. Id. at 230. In one case in which he dissented,
Justice Harlan told Chief Justice Fuller, the author of the opinion, that the headnotes “are
awful & are enough to make you & not me sick.” Id. at 175. Remarkably, the Chief Justice
had previously corrected the headnotes and sent the corrections to Reporter Davis, but the
corrections were never made. Id. at 174. Davis’ work was so problematic that Chief Justice
Fuller “[f]requently . . . wrote out head notes for his own opinions and sent them to Bancroft
Davis, thus doing the main part of the Reporter’s work for him.” Id. at 142.
319. See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 33 F. 121, 124-26 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1887)
(discussing confusion with respect to meaning of Supreme Court’s decision, Waite’s
commentary and status of Field’s Circuit decisions); Russell v. Croy, 164 Mo. 69, 63 S.W.
849, 853-857 (1901) (although the court was confused regarding the Supreme Court’s
holding, they ultimately decided the case based on Field’s Circuit opinions). But see N. Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Walker, 47 F. 681, 685-86 (C.C.D. N. Dak.) (1891) (holding that with respect to
taxation, there is no difference between property owned by a corporation and that owned by a
natural person without mentioning Santa Clara).
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permit him to accept such an ambiguous outcome,320 particularly where
those who he perceived had built the society and supported the institutions
that he protected were at risk.321
It is hardly surprising that Field began to pursue a course to make
certain that the corporate person was embedded in the Fourteenth
Amendment. To the contrary, doing so was entirely consistent with Field’s
approach to judging.322 By temperament and world view, Field believed

320. See, e.g., MAGRATH, supra note 52, at 100, 190 (noting that Field was “given to fits
of self-righteous moralizing” and for “whom every case involving property rights was an
Armageddon where the forces of order and decency contended with those of anarchy”). See
Letter from Stephen J. Field to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States (Oct. 12, 1997), reprinted in 168 U.S. 713, 717 (1897) [hereafter
Field Letter]; Cachán, supra note 97, at 564 (discussing Field’s commitment to conservatism
of the era and willingness to convert his personal beliefs into precedent); KENS, supra note 51,
at 10; Stephenson, Waite Court, supra note 130, at 472 (commenting that Field could not
keep his opinions to himself); 5 CARL B. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64, at 830 (The
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, Paul A.
Freund, ed., 1974) (discussing Field’s capacity for molding the law to reflect his own
convictions and to do so without compunction).
321. See, e.g., KENS, supra note 51, at 285 (stating that Field acted and wrote as if he
believed he was the one person charged with leading the country into the future); GOULD,
supra note 87, at 154 (discussing Field’s tendency to side with those that he believed were the
empire builders, such as Stanford, Huntington, and Hopkins). Field’s perspective plainly was
shaped by his experience as a pistol-packing judge on the California frontier. See Archibald
Hopkins, The Late Mr. Justice Field, 11 GREEN BAG 245, 246 (1899); KENS, supra note 51, at
1. It was also shaped by his personal observation of the 1848 revolutions that swept over
Europe, replacing existing structures and institutions with, in his view, unstable, populist ones,
as well as the American Civil War and ever more frequent labor strife. See Hopkins, supra
note 321, at 246; Graham, Justice Field, supra note 12, at 857-59. Moreover, in California,
Field lived among men who invested all they owned and more in collective efforts to build
wealth and society. KENS, supra note 51, at 18. Indeed, Field’s railroad magnate friends once
had been such men, for, initially, few were willing to invest in the Central Pacific. Huntington,
Stanford, and Crocker invested their own capital, but found that, even after virtual completion,
the railroad remained chronically short of money. Id. at 140. In Field’s eyes, those who took
such risks to provide public services were entitled to public protection.
322. In THE SUPREME COURT, former Chief Justice Rehnquist states that Field “conceived the
role of a judge to be little different from that of any other public official — do your best to see
that the matter is settled in the way you believe is correct.” REHNQUIST, supra note 232, at
100. Field’s handling, described by the former Chief Justice, of the San Francisco Land Cases
is illustrative. Ownership of land outside San Francisco was dependent on a pre-statehood
Mexican land grant. When the district judge refused to hear the city’s case challenging the
United States Board of Land Commissioners’ refusal to confirm the city’s title, Field drafted a
bill providing that the case would be transferred to the circuit court — Field’s court. Field
arranged for the bill to be sponsored by a California senator and it was passed by Congress.
Field held that the city owned the land. The disappointed suitors sought Supreme Court review.
Before the cases were heard, Field drafted a bill confirming the city’s title which, with the
support of the California delegation was passed by Congress. As a result, the Supreme Court

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2014]

THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP

293

himself to be a “judicial barricade against popular government,”323 so that,
for Field, personal philosophy was at least as important as precedent.324
Field may have been a Supreme Court justice, but Field saw himself as a
lawyer, an advocate before the bar of history, and not as a judge.325 No
good lawyer in his position would have failed to take advantage of the
opportunities available to Field.326
C. What are the Current Implications of Santa Clara and its Progeny?
As counsel for the County of Santa Clara argued, even assuming the
existence of the corporate person, “[t]he question is: Does that amendment
place corporations upon a footing of equality with individuals.”327 Yet,
because Field inserted the constitutional corporate person into American law
virtually by fiat, simply asserting that the question was settled, the Court has
never articulated what it means to be a corporate person nor has it
identified the source or rationale of corporate rights.
never heard the case and, as a practical matter, Field’s decision awarding title to the city
stood. Id. at 73.
323. Nelles, supra note 97, at 1007; Field Letter, supra note 320, at 777 (describing the
judiciary’s “negative power, this power of resistance” as “the only safety of a popular
government”).
324. KENS, supra note 51, at 10; SWISHER, supra note 42, at 262-63 (discussing Field’s
diametrically opposed positions in Cent. Pac. R.R. Co. v. California, 162 U.S. 91 (1896); S.
Pac. R.R. Co. v. California, 162 U.S. 167 (1896); and the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700
(1878) and noting that the statutes were the same, but Field quoted “certain phrases which he
had seen fit to ignore in the earlier cases” suggesting that Field did so because “the interests
[i.e., the railroads] to which he sought to give protection were the same”).
325. Professor Magrath describes Field’s world view as well as anyone:
Fearing the collectivism of communism — whose challenge he perceived in such
diverse events as the Paris Commune, the Granger movement, and miners’ strikes in
his native California — and having enjoyed a spectacularly successful career as an
individualist, Field came to see the people as a mob of rabble highly susceptible to the
suasions of demagogues. He sought therefore to enlarge the judicial function,
believing that only the judiciary could save the people from themselves. As he told his
fellow judges on the occasion of his retirement in 1897, the Supreme Court
“possess[es] the power of declaring the law, and in that is found the safeguard which
keeps the whole mighty fabric of government from rushing to destruction. This negative
power is the only safety of a popular government.”
See MAGRATH, supra note 52, at 209. See generally Field Letter, supra note 320.
326. Paul Kens describes Field as the prototype of the modern judicial activist. See KENS,
supra note 174, at 10. See also MCCLOSKEY, supra note 145, at 69 (noting that Chase,
Bradley, and Field felt authorized to help Americans decide what kind of nation they should
be).
327. See Argument of D.M. Delmas, Esq., Counsel for Plaintiff, supra note 141, at 29. The
same point was made in The Cal. R.R. Tax Cases by counsel for the State of California. See
127 U.S. at 21-22 (assuming corporations are persons, “the question still remains whether
they are to be considered as standing precisely on the same footing as natural persons”).
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Indeed, the largely forgotten opinions of Field in the Circuit Court are
still virtually the only comprehensive explications of the reasons that the
rights of corporate persons should be protected.328 However, those opinions
provide no comprehensive theory of corporate personhood. The Circuit
opinions of Field and Sawyer state only that corporate property was entitled
to constitutional protection because their corporators possessed
constitutional property rights in their individual capacities, that their property
rights were not lost when the corporators associated in the corporate form,
and that failure to protect the corporation’s rights would be tantamount to a
denial of the corporators’ rights.329 Those opinions, however, do not
address whether corporations possess civil rights, as that term is used today,
equivalent to a natural person.330
In addition, Field’s “corporation aggregate” approach is only one
approach to corporate theory and to determining a rationale to extend, or
to deny, constitutional rights to corporations. Indeed, for some, Field’s
approach arguably proves too much. Taken to its logical conclusion, for
example, it answers the question posed by Justice Ginsburg in Citizens
United, concluding that it may be irrelevant whether corporations were
endowed by their creator with inalienable rights — their corporators were so
endowed and those rights must be protected because those corporators,
notwithstanding their association in the corporate form, are natural persons
entitled by the Constitution to equal protection and due process.331
In contrast, others have noted that Chief Justice Marshall, although at
times vacillating between theories of corporate personhood, sometimes
described corporations as artificial creatures whose existence was
dependent entirely on the state and which, therefore, were able to exercise
only those powers, and had only those rights, that the state deigned to give
them.332 If that is the operative theory, the government could, with few
restrictions, recognize or deny corporate “rights” largely at will. Still others
have argued for other approaches.333

328. Graham, Innocent Abroad, supra note 12, at 160. But see Spring Valley Water Works
v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 369-71 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting) (summarizing the theory Field
had detailed in the San Mateo circuit opinion).
329. 18 F. at 402. This view may be too narrow because, in the nineteenth century
property rights were considered the quintessential civil rights.
330. Cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
331. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876,
928-29 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); 110 U.S. at 371.
332. See, e.g., Krannich, supra note 153, at 67-69; Mark, supra note 11, at 1441.
333. See, e.g., Sandford A. Schane, The Corporation is a Person: The Language of a Legal
Fiction, 61 TUL. L.R. 563, 565-69 (1987) (discussing theories); Krannich, supra note 153, at
62 (discussing three most common metaphors: (1) the artificial entity; (2) the aggregate entity;
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The failure to develop a consistent corporate personhood theory,
particularly in relation to the constitutional corporate person, has led to a
patchwork of decisions that often are inconsistent, sometimes internally, and
sometimes externally.334 This state of affairs creates the impression that the
applicability of constitutional rights and guarantees is result-oriented and
that justice depends, not on the law, but on personal predilection.335
The perception that the Court’s constitutional person jurisprudence is
reactive and ungrounded in principle would be problematic under any
circumstances. It, however, has special poignancy currently. The eight
opinions in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood are the latest paradigms of
the problems caused by the Supreme Court’s refusal to define the corporate
person. Indeed, the divisions between the eleven judges on the Conestoga
Wood and Hobby Lobby courts could hardly be more pervasive or
fundamental.
D. The Conestoga Wood and Hobby Lobby ACA Challenges
The ACA requires employer-sponsored health insurance plans “to
provide coverage without cost-sharing for preventative care and screening
for women in accordance with guidelines created by the Health Resources
and Services Administration, a sub-agency of [the Department of Health and
Human Services].”336 HRSA, however, delegated responsibility for
development of the guidelines to the Institute of Medicine (IOM), a private,
non-governmental entity that “works outside of government to provide
and (3) the real entity); Mayer, supra note 110, at 620-21 (discussing Court’s abandonment
of corporate theorizing).
334. Compare First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (rejecting view
that corporations have only rights given by state) with CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S.
69, 89 (1987) (criticizing lower court for failing to appreciate that corporations’ “very
existence and attributes are product of state law,” citing Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
In Citizens United, for example, the majority and concurring opinions appear to follow a
corporate aggregate approach, which rests on the proposition that individuals who associate
in the corporate form do not thereby lose constitutionally protected rights. Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 907-08. See id. at 917 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 928-29 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). The dissenters, in contrast, appear to predicate their disagreement on the theory,
that, as an artificial state-created entity, corporations have only those rights conferred on them
by the state. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 950-52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
335. See, e.g., Michael D. Rivard, Toward A General Theory of Constitutional Personhood:
A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1425, 1445 (1992). Cf. Editorial, “The Rights of Corporations”, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009,
at A26 (editorial castigates Supreme Court’s conservative block for unprincipled decisionmaking).
336. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 381, citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4).
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unbiased and authoritative advice to decision makers and the public.”337
HHS, the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Labor
ultimately
promulgated
regulations
incorporating
the
IOM’s
recommendation that health plans cover “[a]ll Food and Drug
Administration approved contraceptive methods . . . for women with
reproductive capacity.”338 In total, the regulations required coverage of
twenty different contraceptive medications and devices.
Citing deeply held religious beliefs, the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Wood plaintiffs objected to providing coverage for two “emergency
contraception” drugs, commonly known as the “morning-after” pills.
According to the plaintiffs, such drugs are abortifacients that take human life
in contravention of their religious beliefs by preventing implantation in the
uterus “of an already conceived but not yet attached human embryo.”339 For
the same reason, the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs objected to covering two types
of intrauterine devices. None of the plaintiffs objected to providing coverage
for any of the sixteen remaining contraceptives.

337. Id. at 391-92 n.2 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 381.
339. Id. at 381-82 (quoting Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint at 9, Conestoga Wood, 724
F.3d 377 (No. 13-1144)). Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1122, 1123. The individual Conestoga
Wood plaintiffs, the Hahns, practice the Mennonite religion. They alleged that their church
teaches that the “taking of life which includes anything that terminates a fertilized embryo is
intrinsic evil and a sin against God to which they are held accountable.” 724 F.3d at 381-82
(quoting Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Board of
Directors of the corporate Conestoga Wood plaintiff adopted “The Hahn Family Statement on
the Sanctity of Human Life” asserting that “human life begins at conception . . . , is a sacred
gift from God and only God has the right to terminate human life.” 724 F.3d at 382 n.5.
The Hobby Lobby Complaint alleged that both corporate plaintiffs were “operate[d] according
to a set of Christian principles.” 723 F.3d at 1120. Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose
recites that its owners “are committed to honoring the Lord in all that we do by operating the
company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.” Id. at 1122. Hobby Lobby operates
a chain of craft stores. The second corporate plaintiff, Mardel, sells only Christian books and
materials and describes itself as “a faith-based company.” Id. The complaint alleged that the
owners’ “faith . . . guide[s] the business decisions of both companies. For example . . . the
stores [of both companies] are not open on Sundays; Hobby Lobby buys hundreds of full-page
newspaper ads inviting people to know Jesus as Lord and Savior, and Hobby Lobby refuses to
engage in business activities that facilitate or promote alcohol use.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). The companies are operated through a management trust which
“exists to honor God . . . and to use the [owners’] family assets to create, support and
leverage the efforts of Christian ministries.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). The trustees must execute a “Trust Commitment” affirming commitment to those
values. Id. “[O]ne aspect of the [owners’] religious commitment is a belief that human life
begins when sperm fertilizes an egg. In addition, the [owners] believe it is immoral for them to
facilitate any act that causes the death of a human embryo.” Id.
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1. The Third Circuit’s Conestoga Wood Decision
In the Third Circuit, the corporate plaintiff argued that it could assert
Free Exercise Rights in its own name.340 Alternatively, the corporate plaintiff
argued that it could assert the Free Exercise rights of individual owners on a
“passed through” theory.341 The individual owner-plaintiffs also asserted
claims that their personal Free Exercise rights were impermissibly burdened
by the Contraceptive Mandate.
Characterizing the issue as a “threshold” question, the Third Circuit
rejected the corporate plaintiff’s claim that “a for-profit, secular corporation,
can exercise religion.”342 Despite recognizing that the Supreme Court
repeatedly has held that the application of other First Amendment rights
“may not [be] suppress[ed] on the basis of . . . corporate identity,”343 the
Third Circuit nonetheless stated that: “[c]orporate identity has been
determinative in denying corporations certain constitutional rights . . . .”344
Emphasizing the distinction between for-profit corporations and nonprofit corporations, the Third Circuit concluded that “we simply cannot
understand how a for-profit, secular corporation” that was created to make
money can exercise religion apart from its owners.345 Because it had
concluded that “Conestoga cannot exercise religion,” the Third Circuit
declined to “decide whether such a corporation is a ‘person’ RFRA.”346
The Third Circuit also rejected the corporate plaintiff’s argument that the
corporation could assert the rights of its individual owners on a “passed
through” theory because it rested “on erroneous assumptions regarding the
very nature of the corporate form.”347 The Third Circuit held that allowing a
corporation to assert the rights of its owners “fails to acknowledge that, by
incorporating their business, the [owners] themselves created a distinct legal
entity that has legally distinct rights and responsibilities from . . . the owners
of the corporation.”348
The Conestoga Wood dissent rejects the majority’s premise “that
Conestoga lacks any right to the free exercise of religion . . . because the
340. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 383.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 382-83.
343. Id. at 383 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010)) (holding that First Amendment
protection for political speech depends on whether the activity is protected not on the identity
of speaker); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986); Bellotti,
435 U.S. at 784 (1978).
344. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 383.
345. Id. at 385.
346. Id. at 388.
347. Id. at 383.
348. Id. at 387-88.
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Constitution nowhere makes the ‘for-profit versus non-profit’ distinction
invented by the government and the language and logic of Supreme Court
jurisprudence justify recognizing for-profit corporations like Conestoga are
entitled to religious liberty.”349 Further, the dissent also argues that, while
religious convictions may be a matter of individual belief and experience,
religious observance is exercised collectively, noting that “there is nothing
about the ‘nature, history, and purpose’ of religious exercise that limits it to
individuals. Quite the opposite; believers have from time immemorial
sought strength in numbers.”350
The dissent adopts the plaintiff’s “passed through” approach, arguing
that a corporation has the right to Free Exercise for the same reason that a
corporation has Free Speech rights: “because the people who form and
operate [corporations] do, and we are concerned in this case with people
even when they operate through the particular form of association called a
corporation.”351 Thus, in the dissent’s view, failure to afford the corporate
entity Free Exercise protection is, for all practical purposes, a denial of the
Free Exercise rights of the corporation’s owners because it is they who must
direct the corporation to comply with the Contraceptive Mandate.352
2. The Tenth Circuit’s Hobby Lobby Decision
In contrast to the Third Circuit, the Tenth Circuit held that the Hobby
Lobby corporate plaintiffs could assert Free Exercise challenges to the ACA
under the RFRA. Because “RFRA provides . . . that Government shall not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion,”353 the Tenth Circuit first
addressed the question “whether [the corporate plaintiffs] are ‘persons’
exercising religion for purposes of RFRA.”354 The Tenth Circuit held that the
“first resource in determining what Congress meant by ‘person’ in RFRA is
the Dictionary Act,”355 According to the Dictionary Act, “[i]n determining the
meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . .
the word [ ]’person’ . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals.”356 The Tenth Circuit then held that “we could end the matter
349. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 398. (Jordan, J., dissenting.)
350. Id. at 400.
351. Id. at 398 n.14.
352. Id. at 410, 406 n.21.
353. 723 F.3d at 1128 (quoting RFRA, supra note 5).
354. Id. at 1128. Although four of the eight sitting judges also believed that the Greens
individually could bring RFRA claims, the majority saw no need to reach the question
“[b]ecause we conclude RFRA protects Hobby Lobby.” Id. at 1126 n.4.
355. Id. at 1129. The Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, provides definitions for a variety of
terms commonly used in statutes.
356. Id. at 1129 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1).
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here since the plain language of the [RFRA’s] text encompasses
‘corporations’ including ones like Hobby Lobby . . . .”357
The Tenth Circuit continued, stating “courts have recognized a right to
associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the
First Amendment — speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances,
and the exercise of religion . . . as an indispensable means of preserving
other individual liberties.”358 Noting that the Supreme Court in Citizens
United359 had recognized that the First Amendment protected the right of
for-profit corporations to express themselves for political purposes, the Tenth
Circuit could “see no reason [why] the Supreme Court would recognize
protection for corporation’s political expression, but not its religious
expression.”360
The principal dissent rejected the majority’s conclusion that corporate
plaintiffs could allege RFRA and Free Exercise claims, asserting that it rested
on the novel characterization of the plaintiff for-profit corporations as “faithbased companies and businesses with a religious mission.”361 According to
the dissent, “neither the United States Supreme Court nor any federal circuit
court, until now, has ever used the phrase ‘faith-based company’, let alone
recognized such a distinct legal category of for-profit corporations.”362 The
dissent argued that it was “simply unreasonable to allow the individual
plaintiffs in this case to benefit, in terms of tax and personal liability, from
the corporate/individual distinction, but to ignore that distinction when it
comes to asserting claims under RFRA.”363
E.

The Problem of the Corporate Person and What the Supreme Court
Should Do

The divisions between the eleven judges on the Conestoga Wood and
Hobby Lobby courts could hardly be more pervasive or fundamental. The
eight separate opinions reflect disagreement over the meaning and
application of basic legal concepts governing what it means to be a
corporate person. To summarize:
Some judges believed that a for-profit, secular corporation was unable
to engage in religious exercise.364 In contrast, other judges argued that there
357. Id.
358. Id. at 1133 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
359. 558 U.S. at 342-55.
360. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1135.
361. Id. at 1166.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1173.
364. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 381; Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1172 (Brisco, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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was no statutory or constitutional basis for distinguishing between non-profit
and for-profit corporations.365
Some judges argued that the corporate nature of the plaintiff precluded
recognition of a Free Exercise right, noting that the Supreme Court had
denied corporations protection for other rights possessed by natural persons
including right against self-incrimination as well as the right to privacy.366
Other judges rejoined that the Supreme Court’s case law mandates that the
right to all First Amendment protection turns, not on the identity of the
claimant, but on whether the conduct is protected by the Amendment.367
Some judges argued that there is no history of the Supreme Court
providing Free Exercise Clause protection to for-profit corporations.368
Other judges contended, however, that religious expression, like political
speech, is protected whether exercised individually or collectively.369
Some judges believed that a corporation could not claim Free Exercise
protection because the “human” and “personal” nature of the right
demonstrated that only natural persons were protected.370 Other judges, in
contrast, asserted that whether a corporation can allege a Free Exercise
claim under RFRA or the First Amendment depends upon whether the
corporation is deemed to be a legal “person” exercising religion.371
Some judges argued that allowing the corporation to assert the rights of
its owners to exercise religion would eviscerate foundational principles
providing that a corporation is a legally distinct entity from its owners and
would be a radical revision of First Amendment law.372 Other judges hold
that, whether a corporation can claim a right to Free Expression has nothing
to do with the purposes or incidents of incorporation — aggregation of
capital and limitation of liability — so that an individual operating for-profit
whose Free Exercise rights are protected does not, by incorporating, lose
those rights.373
Some judges refused to allow corporations or their owners to assert the
owners’ individual rights because, in their view, responsibility for compliance

365. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 389-90 (Jordan, J., dissenting); Hobby Lobby, 723
F.3d at 1129, 1133.
366. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 383.
367. Id. at 385 (Jordan, J., dissenting); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1134.
368. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 384-85; Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1168 (Brisco, C.J.,
dissenting).
369. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1133-34; Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 398-400
(Jordan, J., dissenting).
370. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 385, 388.
371. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1129.
372. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 389; Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1172 (Brisco, C.J.,
dissenting).
373. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1133-34.
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with the ACA’s Contraceptive Mandate falls exclusively on the corporation
which is legally distinct from its owners.374 Yet, other judges believed that
both the corporation and the individual owners could assert Free Exercise
claims because people who operate in association with one another do not
forfeit their rights of conscience; further, as a practical matter, the
Contraceptive Mandate requires the corporate owners to direct the
corporation to take action that their religion says is morally wrong.375
Three interrelated points bear emphasis. First, notwithstanding the
conflicts between the courts and the judges, all opinions rely on essentially
the same case law precedents and authorities to reach diametrically
opposed conclusions. Second, the divide between the courts and judges is
so deep that the various opinions do not even agree on an analytic
approach to the question; the Third Circuit concludes, for example, that the
corporate person question is irrelevant, but the Tenth Circuit views the
corporate person question as fundamental. Third, neither Circuit explains
why a for-profit corporation, as opposed to a non-profit, can, or cannot,
exercise religion; instead both opinions are largely conclusory applications
of the “we can’t understand how it could be otherwise” principle. As a
result, especially when juxtaposed, the Third Circuit and Tenth Circuit
decisions condone disparate treatment of similarly situated entities and the
only obvious explanation for the conflicting results seems to be the personal
predilections of the judges.376
Most common law legal concepts are products of gradual evolutionary
development over time that reflects both logic and experience as courts seek
to define decision-making principles that balance individual rights and
duties and accord similarly situated individuals and entities similar
treatment. The existence of the constitutional corporate person, however,
was established essentially by Justice Field’s unilateral decree. Moreover,
Justice Field pronounced the existence of the corporate person in cases in
which the attributes of a corporate person were irrelevant because the Court

374. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 385, 387-89.
375. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 389, 398 n.14 (Jordan, J., dissenting); Hobby Lobby,
723 F.3d at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
376. Compare First Nat’l. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (rejecting the
view that corporations have only rights given by the state) with CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (criticizing the lower court for failing to appreciate that corporations’
very existence and attributes are products of state law, Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)). Compare Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70,
74 (1906) (using two different theories of corporate personhood to hold that corporations are
not protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but are protected by
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches), with United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (holding that Fifth Amendment Double
Jeopardy Clause protects corporations).
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held that the corporate plaintiffs — whether persons or not — had no
enforceable rights. As a result, Justice Field had no need to explain why a
corporation should be permitted to exercise the rights of a natural person.
As the ACA challenges illustrate, there is no definition of what it means
to be a corporate person and no specification of the attributes of the
corporation which have legal significance to the determination of what, if
any, rights a corporation may assert. Not surprisingly then, advocates and
judges have used the corporate person concept in the same fashion that
Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty used words — to “mean . . . just what [they]
choose [them] to mean — neither more nor less.”377 Consequently, and
especially when the issues implicate vigorously contested political issues
touching on important personal and societal values like Free Speech, Free
Exercise, Freedom of Association, and access to affordable healthcare, the
absence of a settled, principled understanding of the meaning of corporate
personhood results in confusion and inconsistent results. Until the Supreme
Court provides a principled basis, explaining why and when corporations
are to be protected as legal persons, that courts can apply to determine
what, if any, rights corporations may assert and in what circumstances, the
confusion, inconsistencies, and divisiveness characterizing Conestoga Wood
and Hobby Lobby will continue to be the rule.378
In order to define the meaning of corporate personhood, the Court must
recognize that there are several possible theories of corporate personhood,
that all theories ultimately are metaphors that analogize corporations to
natural persons based on historical and policy considerations, and that case
377. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
222 (1968).
378. It bears emphasis that Conestoga Wood and Hobby Lobby focus only on the narrow
question of a for-profit corporation’s constitutional rights, but that is only one aspect of the
problem and those cases are not isolated examples. For example, Hobby Lobby’s October
2013 response to the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari states: “The existing conflict
[between the courts] is likely to deepen rapidly, with the same issues pending in some thirty-five
other [ACA] cases around the country. Brief for the Respondents at 17-18, Hobby Lobby 723
F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-354). Moreover, that the ACA has brought the corporate
person issue to the fore should not obscure that, as Citizens United illustrates, the issue has
been and will continue to be dispositive in numerous other constitutional and statutory
contexts.
The meaning of corporate personhood has arisen in a wide variety of contexts prior to the
current dispute. For example, the question whether the corporate person could assert
protected rights appears to have first arisen with respect to the anti-divestiture provisions of the
treaties between the United States and Great Britain ending the Revolutionary War. See The
Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. The Town of New Haven, 21 U.S.
464, 482 (1823). Another early case held that corporations were “persons” as the term was
used in civil and criminal statutes. United States v. Amedy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 392, 412-13
(1826) (Story, J.).
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law utilizes all three metaphors from time-to-time and sometimes has used
more than one metaphor in the same case.379 The need for the Court to, in
effect, start over with first principles is evident in that the Third Circuit and
the Tenth Circuit freely mix corporate person metaphors and do not appear
to understand that there are competing theories of corporate personhood,
that each theory has outcome implications, or that the theories are, at times,
in conflict and largely independent of one another.
For example, in Conestoga Wood, the Third Circuit starts its analysis
with the assertion that states “are [not] free to define the rights of their
creatures [i.e. corporations] without constitutional limit” because
“[o]therwise corporations could be denied the protection of all constitutional
guarantees, including due process and the equal protection of the laws.”380
The Third Circuit’s caveat is based on the assumption that corporate
existence is imbued with some inherent, inalienable rights not granted by the
state when it created the corporation. The difficulty is that the basis for that
assertion is not immediately obvious and the Third Circuit fails to articulate
any explanation of the source or basis for such corporate rights. The source
of the corporate person’s rights is critical because, in theory, rights
conferred by the state may be taken away, or limited, by the state whereas
corporate rights derived from, or exercised on behalf of, natural persons
may be inalienable.381
The Third Circuit’s statement — although something of a throw-away
line — seems to reflect the “real entity” theory of corporate personhood. As
one commentator has explained, “[t]he real entity theory generally views the
corporate entity as a natural creature, to be recognized apart from its
owners, existing autonomously from the state.”382 Thus, real entity theory
posits that “corporate legal status does not arise solely from the state;
instead it arises primarily from the individual incorporators” and the
corporation “enjoy[s] a degree of autonomy from the state.” Similarly, the
separation of management and control renders the corporation “an entity
apart from its shareholders.” As a result, “the corporation is a real entity
rather than an artificial entity,” in effect, an analog to a natural person
imbued with certain, unspecified rights as a legal convention simply because
the corporation exists.383

379. Krannich, supra note 153, at 84 n.150; Mark, supra note 11, at 1442.
380. Conestoga Wood, 724 at 383. See also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14.
381. Cf. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636 (Marshall, C.J.) (stating that a
corporation “possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it”).
382. Krannich, supra note 153, at 80.
383. Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood
for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1459-60 (1992).
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The Conestoga Wood majority opinion, however, also relies on a
second corporate person metaphor — the artificial entity theory —
seemingly without recognizing the potential doctrinal differences or the
conflict with the real entity approach.384 The “artificial entity” approach
argues that, because corporations are created by the state, the state can
decide what, if any, rights a corporation possesses and may exercise.385
Thus a corporation may be a ‘person’ but the scope of the rights of the
corporate person are determined and fixed by the state.
Without explanation or analysis, Conestoga Wood appears to predicate
its holding directly on the artificial entity theory or, perhaps, on a conflation
of the artificial entity and real entity theories: “We do not see how a forprofit artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation
of law . . . that was created to make money could exercise such an
inherently ‘human’ right.”386 One difficulty — not recognized or addressed
by the Third Circuit — is that the artificial entity theory posits that
corporations have the rights given them by government and, in this case, the
Dictionary Act — as the Tenth Circuit pointed out — which expressly
includes corporations in the definition of “persons” protected by RFRA’s Free
Exercise guarantee. Moreover, all corporations, whether for-profit or nonprofit, must make money if they are to survive, but the Third Circuit never
explains why the corporate plaintiff’s for-profit status precludes it — but not
a non-profit — from claiming Free Exercise rights.
The Tenth Circuit — also without argument or much analysis — appears
to rest primarily on a third theory of corporate personhood: corporation
aggregate. The corporation aggregate approach posits that a corporation is

384. A court’s reliance on more than one corporate person theory is not unique to
Conestoga Wood. The Supreme Court has done the same. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 70, 74, (1906) (using two different corporate person theories to hold that
corporations have Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches but not Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination). See also Rivard, supra note 383, at 145051 (discussing the Supreme Court’s use of two different corporate person theories to deny Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination while granting Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy protection, stating that various corporate person theories are “merely post hoc
nationalization for result oriented decisions”).
385. See, e.g., Schane, supra note 333; Krannich, supra note 153, at 62 (discussing three
most common metaphors: (1) the artificial entity; (2) aggregate entity; and (3) the real entity).
Compare, Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636 (Marshall, C.J.) (a corporation
“possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it . . .”) with
Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren, 36 U.S. 420 (1837) (allowing the government to alter
corporate rights charter, because the state always retains the power to regulate in the public
interest).
386. Conestoga Wood, 724 F. 3d at 385 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
See also id. (“[W]e simply cannot understand how a for-profit secular corporation – parte from
its owners – can exercise religion.”).
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merely an amalgam, an association of individuals, including natural persons
who have come together to pursue, collectively, some joint purpose. This
“corporation aggregate” theory asserts that individuals, by associating in a
collective, do not thereby surrender their constitutional rights. Indeed,
because the Constitution explicitly protects freedom of association,
government action denying such individuals the ability to protect their
personal and property rights would effectively penalize joint actors for
exercising their constitutional right to associate in otherwise legal ventures
and entities.387
In sum, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood diverge on three
foundational points that the Court should address. First, when a corporation
seeks to assert constitutional or statutory rights, what basis, if any, supports
the conclusion that the corporation itself, as distinct from its owners, has
been vested with the right the corporation seeks to vindicate? Second, when
a corporation claims constitutional protection, is the corporation treated as
a legal person because it is asserting rights possessed by its owners on a
derivative or “passed through” basis?388 Third, whether a corporation can
assert constitutional rights on its own or derivatively on behalf of its owners
or not, may the individual owners assert that the burdens and obligations
imposed directly on the corporation effectively deny their personal
constitutional rights?
Citizens United, Hobby Lobby, and Conestoga Wood illustrate that,
because the Court has failed to articulate a consistent, principled
explanation of what it means to be a constitutional corporate person, the
Supreme Court’s decisions on the subject, in a variety of contexts, have an
ad hoc, result-driven appearance.389 Moreover, the lack of a principled

387. Cf. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876, 928-29 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
388. Note that, although it does not appear to have figured significantly into the analysis of
any members of the court, Hobby Lobby is a closely held family business organized as an SCorp., but it is not owned directly by the family members. Instead, the family members
operated Hobby Lobby through a management trust of which each member of the family was
a trustee. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1122.
389. This debate is long-standing as are the problems caused by the Court’s failure to
resolve it. Compare, e.g., The Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61,
87-90 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.) (holding that when determining right to sue, courts may look
through corporate form because “the corporate name represents persons who are members of
the corporation”) with Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636 (Marshall, C.J.) (a
corporation “possess only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it”).
Compare also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70, 74 (1906) (using two different theories of
corporate personhood to hold that corporations are not protected by the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but are protected by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
against unreasonable searches) with United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,
569 (1977) (holding that Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause protects corporations).
See also Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 9 U.S. 57 (1809) (holding that diversity jurisdiction
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distinction between those cases in which corporations may, and may not,
claim constitutional or statutory rights makes the Supreme Court appear to
be a political body whose members, like any other public official, pursue
whatever means is necessary to achieve their personal view of an
appropriate outcome, whatever the law.390 That appearance not only causes
disrespect for the Court, it undermines the Court’s authority as “fair broker”
trusted to evenhandedly, objectively, and dispositively resolve difficult
disputes.391 Indeed, legal realists can make the case that, from long before
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, Supreme Court decisions
regarding corporate citizenship and personhood have reflected, not
controlling legal principles, but society’s shifting and ambivalent view of the
role and value of corporations.392
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1886, when the Supreme Court refused to decide the constitutional
corporate person question in Santa Clara, Justice Field warned about the
consequences of avoiding the question: “The question is of transcendent
importance, and it will come here [to the Supreme Court], and continue to
come, until it is authoritatively decided . . . .“393 Conestoga Wood’s and
Hobby Lobby’s challenges to the ACA’s Contraceptive Mandate almost 130
years after Field’s warning demonstrate that the Justice was not overstating
his case.
One of the principal purposes of the law is to provide structure and
predictability so that individuals and businesses may assess the potential
burdens and benefits of proposed conduct and order their affairs
depended on citizenship of members of corporation); Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R.
Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844) (holding that jurisdiction depends on imputed
citizenship of the corporation without regard to actual citizenship of corporate members).
390. REHNQUIST, supra note 232, at 99-100 (discussing Justice Field’s perceived approach
to deciding cases).
391. See Pres. Obama, State of Union address (Jan. 27, 2010) (following Citizens United),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-ad
dress.
392. Compare, e.g., The Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636 (Marshall, C.J.) (a
corporation is an artificial person created by state which can give or deny rights), with
Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 86 (Marshall, C.J.) (a corporation is an aggregate association of
individuals who are the real parties in interest for purposes of diversity jurisdiction), with Bank
of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839) (overturning Deveaux, treating corporation
as an artificial person distinct from its corporators), with Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston
R.R. Co., 43 U.S. at 497. See also Mayer, supra note 110, at 641; Constitutional Rights of the
Corporate Person, supra note 120, at 1657. Both cases trace changing theories against
political and social climate.
393. Cnty. of San Bernardino v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 417, 423 (1886) (Field, J.,
concurring).
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accordingly. Predictability is especially important with respect to complex
statutes, like the ACA, that attempt to pervasively restructure a major
component of the economy and appear to threaten fundamental individual
rights and access to basic services and entitlements. Additionally, by
predicating conflict resolution on known and articulated principles, law
provides elements of objectivity, evenhandedness, and integrity that promote
acceptance of adverse results even by bitterly disappointed litigants.
Conestoga Wood and Hobby Lobby well-illustrate the confusion and
inconsistency caused by the Supreme Court’s failure to define when and why
a corporation may, and may not, claim the rights of a “person.” For
example, Conestoga Wood and Hobby Lobby both seem to agree —
without explaining why — that at least some non-profit corporations possess
and may assert a constitutionally protected right to Free Exercise. Yet,
neither court explains why a corporation’s for-profit status is relevant to —
or not relevant to — its ability to claim First Amendment Free Exercise
Rights. The underlying problem is that neither court can point to any
Supreme Court decision providing a rationale for — or undermining — the
for-profit versus non-profit distinction. In short, because much of health
reform depends on corporate involvement, the Supreme Court’s failure to
define the corporate person leaves the application of the ACA in doubt and,
on a broader scale, the resultant confusion and uncertainty denies the
predictability necessary to develop and effectively implement complex
programs utilizing private corporations to address major societal problems.
As important as the systemic problems caused by the Supreme Court’s
failure to provide guidance are, one should not lose sight of the fact that the
consequences of the failure to define the meaning of the corporate person
are potentially devastating on a personal level. If the owners of Conestoga
Wood and Hobby Lobby had elected to do business in their individual
capacities, rather than in the corporate form, they may have foregone
certain benefits of incorporation, such as limitations on liability, but it seems
likely that the owners would have been able to assert RFRA claims in
opposition to the ACA’s Contraceptive Mandate and, at the very least,
attempt to vindicate their personal Free Exercise rights. Instead, because the
owners of Conestoga Wood and Hobby Lobby elected to incorporate, their
ability to assert Free Exercise rights as a defense to the Contraceptive
Mandate is in doubt and they are currently compelled to engage in what
they believe to be immoral behavior or suffer ruinous fines.
Hobby Lobby and its owners are faced with the choice of adhering to
their religious beliefs or potentially incurring a “fine that would total at least
$1.3 million per day, or almost $475 million per year” or, alternatively,
“dropping employee health insurance altogether [and] fac[ing] penalties of
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$26 million per year.”394 Similarly, Conestoga Wood would be subject to
fines of about $95,000 per day, or in excess of $34 million per year, with
the result that Conestoga Wood’s business would be destroyed and 950
jobs would be lost.395
In Citizens United, Justice Sotomayor suggested that the Court consider
re-examining the question of corporate personhood and the entitlement of
corporations to the constitutional protections afforded “persons.” Normally,
such a suggestion would implicate considerations of stare decisis. But what
decision should the Court let stand?396 And what weight should be given to
opinions that, as a result of nineteenth century Supreme Court protocols and
jurisprudence, may be the views of a single justice who manipulated the
process to secure his ends, are surely mere dicta and, in any event, were
probably not authorized by the Court and, moreover, lack a principled
rationale?
Alternatively, should the Court, as it has done on at least one prior
analogous occasion, refuse to reexamine constitutional corporate
personhood because of the extreme disruption that undoing the theory is
likely to have?397 In Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,398 for
example, the Court’s holdings in Letson399 and Deveaux400 regarding
corporate citizenship for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction were
challenged as “extrajudicial, and therefore not authoritative.”401 The Court,
however, refused to consider the challenge, saying
If we should now declare these judgments [i.e., Letson and Deveaux] to
have been entered without jurisdiction or authority, we should inflict a great
and irreparable evil on the community… For this reason alone, even if the
court were now of the opinion that the principles affirmed in … [Letson], and
that of … [Deveaux] were not founded on right reason, we should not be
justified in overruling them. The practice founded on these decisions…

394. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1125, 1140.
395. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 392 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
396. Howard Jay Graham, perhaps the foremost authority on the history behind the
constitutional person, has said that Chief Justice Waite’s dictum is wrong and should be
overruled. See Graham, Waite Court, supra note 12, at 530-32. Assuming that dictum can be
overruled, then what? Mr. Graham, despite his suggestion, rejects the idea that corporations
should be denied constitutional protections, accepting the idea of an evolving Constitution.
See Goldman, supra note 111, at 869.
397. See Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 51 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 325-26 (1853).
398. Marshall, 51 U.S. at 314.
399. Letson, 43 U.S. at 497.
400. Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 61.
401. Marshall, 51 U.S. at 325.
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injures or wrongs no man; while their reversal could not fail to work wrong
and injury to many.402

A similar argument can be made with respect to the existence of the
constitutional corporate person. The theory of the constitutional corporate
person, however, is another matter altogether, never having never been
defined.
There is great irony in the Court’s inconsistent analysis of a
corporation’s entitlement to constitutional rights because it often occurs in
the context of a case in which the Court ostensibly is applying the guarantee
of equal protection of the laws. It is fundamental, however, that equality of
legal protection cannot be assessed unless the nature and position of the
entity alleging discrimination relative to its peers is known. Without such a
touchstone, it is impossible to identify similarly situated entities against which
to assess the quality of the plaintiff’s treatment.
Indeed, this was the debate at the heart of Santa Clara and the debate
has never been resolved. The railroads argued that corporations were
imbued with the rights of their corporators — who were natural persons —
so that the equality of the corporate person’s treatment was assessed by
comparison to the treatment accorded a natural person. The county, in
contrast, argued that as creatures created by the State and given rights,
privileges and immunities unknown to natural persons, corporations were an
entirely different class of legal person than a natural person and that the
rule of equality requires only that equality shall be observed among
[persons] of the same class.”403
The Court’s questioning during argument in Citizens United reflected an
unstated, but obvious disconnect among the justices and between the
justices and counsel that can be explained by the absence of settled first
principles.404 In many respects, this is the lasting and most serious problem
wrought by Field’s campaign because, even if the existence of the corporate
person is admitted, the absence of a principled basis for such conclusion
means that the attributes of a corporate person are unknown and
unknowable. As the Citizens United colloquy, the Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga Wood opinions and subsequent reactions illustrate, such

402. Id. at 325-26.
403. See Argument of D.M. Delmas, Esq., supra note 143, at 35; Santa Clara Complaint,
supra note 91, at 47, 57.
404. Citizens United Transcript, supra note 15, at 4, 53, 54, 55 (Scalia, J.) (questioning the
denial of speech rights of shareholder in corporation sole); (Roberts, C.J.) (stating that
corporations have diverse interests similar to individuals); (Ginsburg, J.) (suggesting that
corporations are not endowed with inalienable rights, ability to amass huge sums); (Kagan,
Sol. Gen.) (arguing corporations engage in discourse differently from individuals, based on
profit motive differentiating them from individuals).
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uncertainty enhances the perception that the Court is primarily advancing a
political agenda, impairs public confidence in government, and, in this
instance, calls into question a critical aspect of the economy.
Finally, those involved in the formulation or implementation of health
policy must recognize that the question whether a corporation is a legal
person entitled to constitutional protections has potential implications well
beyond the ACA. Notwithstanding that court cases always arise in the
context of specific facts and specific plaintiffs and defendants, resolution of
legal claims depends upon the application of broad, unifying principles and
there is no obvious basis to limit impact of a definition of the attributes of a
legal person to either the ACA or to corporations.
To illustrate, Roe v. Wade’s holding establishing a constitutional right to
abortion rested, in part, on the Supreme Court’s largely unexplained
assertion “that the word ‘person’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment,
does not include the unborn.”405 A Supreme Court decision identifying the
attributes that allow an entity, artificial or natural, to claim the status of a
legal person may confirm, or provide a basis to reexamine, Roe’s assertion
about the meaning of the term “person” as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment. If that seems to push the argument too far, it ought to be
remembered that the corporate personhood debate in San Mateo and Santa
Clara asked the same question, albeit from a different perspective: did the
protection afforded “persons” by the Fourteenth Amendment include
corporations. As the RFRA claims alleged in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Wood illustrate, the Fourteenth Amendment is merely one among many
constitutional and statutory provisions affording protection to legal persons.
Consequently, resolution of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood may have
impact far beyond the ACA claims at issue in those cases.
Rather than creating uncertainty and risk, the law should promote
citizens’ ability to choose the benefits and burdens of proposed conduct —
in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, to weigh their right of Free Exercise
and the effect on their religious beliefs of lawfully engaging in business in
one form or another. It is long past time for the Supreme Court to establish
a corporate person theory and concomitant decisional principles that should
produce, if not consistent, at least understandable and rational outcomes
when questions regarding the corporation’s entitlement to constitutional
protection are raised. Failure to do so will assure, as Justice Field
prophesized, that the corporate person issue will remain divisive and that “it
will come [before the Supreme Court], and continue to come, until it is
authoritatively decided . . . .”406

405. 410 U.S. at 158.
406. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. at 423 (Field, J. concurring).

